PIMOR, ET AL. v. VANHEE WOODWORKS

of this jurisdiction, if the course or proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this

Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (Ibid.)

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 22, 2026

Code of Civil Procedure section 187 is often used as authority for amending a

judgment to add a new judgment debtor who is the alter ego of the original judgment

debtor, as in this case. (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772, 778 (NEC

Electronics).) This procedure is appropriate when the alter ego had control of the

litigation and reason to conduct the litigation with a degree of diligence corresponding

to the personal risk. (Id., at pp. 778–779.) The theory behind this procedure is that the

court is not actually adding a new defendant, but merely inserting the correct name of

the real defendant. (Id., at p. 778.) “The greatest liberality is to be encouraged in the allowance of such amendments in order to see that justice is done. [Citation.]” (Carr v.

Barnabey’s Hotel Corp. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 14, 20.)

Nonetheless, this procedure is not applicable to cases where the case was never

contested on its merits. In Motores De Mexicali v. Superior Court (1958) 51 Cal.2d 172,

the Supreme Court refused to allow the amendment of a default judgment to add

parties because the new judgment debtors “in no way participated in the defense” and

it would violate due process to summarily add new judgment debtors “without allowing

them to litigate any questions beyond their relation to the allegedly alter ego

corporation.” (Id., at pp. 175–176.)

The court notes that the instant case did not proceed directly to default judgment.

At least some written discovery was conducted before the court granted plaintiffs’

motion for terminating sanctions and entered default against defendant. The court finds this situation to be similar to NEC Electronics, where, after answering

the complaint, the defendant “let the matter proceed uncontested.” (NEC Electronics,

supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 780.) In effect, the matter proceeded as if it were a default.

NEC Electronics Inc. (NEC) filed suit against Ph Components (Ph) to recover monies due

on a sale of goods from NEC to Ph. Ph did not appear for trial. (Id., at p. 775.) NEC

obtained a $139,366.37 judgment against Ph. Ph thereafter filed bankruptcy proceedings. (Id., at p. 776.) NEC then filed a motion to amend the judgment to name

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 22, 2026

Porter Hurt, the sole shareholder and chief executive officer of Ph, as an additional

judgment debtor, on an alter ego theory. (Id., at pp. 775-776.) The trial court granted

the motion, but the appellate court reversed. (Id., at pp. 776, 782.)

The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's alter

ego finding. (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 778.) Hurt had

received more than $2.8 million in undocumented loans from Ph, on which he paid no

interest. Hurt also received from Ph berthing fees, insurance, and fuel and maintenance

expenses with respect to his privately owned boat. In addition, Ph provided a leased vehicle to Hurt's wife and made more than 30 mortgage payments on his personal

residence. At the same time, Hurt paid numerous corporate obligations with his

personal funds. (Id., at p. 776.) Alter ego notwithstanding, the appellate court held that

it was improper to amend the judgment to add Hurt as an additional judgment debtor.

(Id., at p. 778.)

The NEC court stated: “Judgments are often amended to add additional judgment

debtors on the grounds that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment

debtor. [Citations.] This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is

not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct

name of the real defendant. [Citations.] ‘Such a procedure is an appropriate and

complete method by which to bind new individual defendants where it can be

demonstrated that in their capacity as alter ego of the corporation they in fact had control of the previous litigation, and thus were virtually represented in the lawsuit.’

[Citation.] In other words, ‘[i]f the claim of individual liability is made at some later stage

in the action, the judgment can be made individually binding on a person associated

with the corporation only if the individual to be charged, personally or through a

representative, had control of the litigation and occasion to conduct it with a diligence

corresponding to the risk of personal liability that was involved.’ [Citation.]” (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 778-779.)

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 22, 2026

The court remarked that surely Hurt, as chief executive officer, was aware of the

lawsuit. However, awareness alone was not enough. (NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt, supra,

208 Cal.App.3d at p. 781.) Hurt had neither been named as a party to the litigation nor

served in his individual capacity. (Id., at p. 775, 780.) He was not at risk of personal

liability and had no obligation to intervene. (Id., at p. 780.) Furthermore, inasmuch as Ph

neither appeared at trial nor made any attempt to defend the lawsuit, Hurt's individual

interests could not have been represented in the litigation. (Id., at pp. 780-781.) The

court concluded: “ ‘Control of the litigation sufficient to overcome due process objections may consist of a combination of factors, usually including the financing of the

litigation, the hiring of attorneys, and control over the course of the litigation.’

[Citation.] Clearly some active defense of the underlying claim is contemplated.

[Citation.] In this case, Hurt delegated responsibility for the claim to [Ph's chief financial

officer]. [The two men] did attempt to satisfy the creditors of Ph but were never actively

involved in defending the NEC lawsuit. As a result, we do not believe that there is

substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Hurt controlled the

action between NEC and Ph.” (Id., at p. 781.)

In this case, there is evidence that Mr. Vanhee verified defendant’s written discovery

responses. However, defendant was represented by counsel until May 30, 2025, when

Mr. Vanhee signed a substitution of attorney on behalf of defendant indicating that

defendant would proceed in pro per. This substitution attorney was the last filing defendant submitted in this case. On August 29, 2025, the court granted plaintiffs’

motion for terminating sanctions based on defendant’s repeated discovery violations

and willful violations of this court’s orders.

Similar to NEC Electronics, the instant case effectively proceeded as if it were a

default. And, similar the sole shareholder of Ph in NEC Electronics, the court finds

insufficient evidence in support of the instant motion to conclude that Jeffrey Vanhee controlled the litigation. The court denies the motion to amend without prejudice.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 22, 2026

TENTATIVE RULING # 4: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

ISSUED MARCH 12, 2026, IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. NO HEARING ON THIS

MATTER WILL BE HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247),

UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS

TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE

TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS

ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY

TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.