Douglas v. Regents of the University of California

The right to discovery does not depend on whether a case is at issue. For example, a plaintiff may serve a deposition notice 20 days after service of summons (§ 2025.210, subd. (b)) notwithstanding that the defendant has 30 days to respond to the complaint (§§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3) & (6), 430.40, subd. (a)). Moreover, discovery continues despite a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436, fn. 3 [pleading deficiencies do not affect party's right to conduct discovery]; Budget Finance Plan v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 794, 797 [plaintiff may continue to conduct discovery after demurrer to complaint sustained].)

Defendant has not sufficiently shown that the pending demurrer should prohibit Plaintiff from conducting discovery.

Defendant also contends that the discovery was served prematurely in violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.020(b). Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.020, “[a] plaintiff may propound interrogatories to a party without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.020, subd. (b).) Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.020 provides, “[a] plaintiff may make a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, the party to whom the demand is directed, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.020, subd. (b).)

Defendant was served by substitute service on December 10, 2025 with the Summons and Complaint. (ROA 43.) Plaintiff then served the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents, along with the First Amended Complaint, on Defendant on December 29, 2025, well over 10 days after December 10, 2025. (ROA 55.) Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the discovery was not served prematurely.

As a result of Defendant’s failure to respond to the discovery requests, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses without objections except for those based on the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) However, if Defendant asserts such objections, Defendant shall provide a privilege log within 30 days pursuant to Code Civ. Proc § 2031.240(c) that identifies each document for which privilege or work product protection is claimed, its author, recipients, date of preparation, and the specific privilege or work product protection claimed.

Defendant is ORDERED to serve responses and the privilege log (if applicable) within 30 days.

Sanctions are available on motions to compel responses to interrogatories and inspection demands. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(c), § 2031.300(c). (“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response ... unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”).)

Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $124.05, consisting of the motion filing fee of $60, printing/exhibits/binders costs of $19.90, and travel (mileage) costs of $44.15 from Calabasas. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for $79.90 in monetary sanctions. Defendant is ORDERED to pay $79.90 in monetary sanctions to Plaintiff by June 25, 2026.

Plaintiff shall file and serve notice of this ruling.

Case Management Conference

The Case Management Conference is continued to November 05, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in this department.

Plaintiff to give notice.

6 Temple Beth El of The court OVERRULES the demurrer by Defendant and Discovery South Orange Preparatory School Inc. (“DPSI”) as to second, fourth, fifth, seventh, and County v. The ninth causes of action of the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Discovery Temple Beth El of South Orange County. Preparatory School A. Standard for Demurrer

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-1405.) Questions of fact cannot be decided on demurrer. (Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1556.) A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the complaint; a court will not consider facts that have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably inferred from the matters alleged or are proper subjects of judicial notice. (Hall v. Great W. Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 718 n.7.)

Although courts should take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints (see Code Civ. Prod., § 452), it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.) Bare conclusions of law devoid of any facts are insufficient to withstand demurrer. (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 481; see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).)

B. Sham Pleading

DPSI first argues that the SAC constitutes a sham pleading and should be sustained in its entirety. The court disagrees.

Under the sham pleading doctrine, harmful admissions or allegations in a complaint cannot be omitted/altered in an amended pleading without explanation, and in the case of such amendments, the court may take judicial notice of the prior pleading and disregard any inconsistent allegations. (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.)

“The court may examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended complaint is merely a sham. [Citation.] ... Moreover, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. [Citation.]” (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4th 336, 343–44).

Here, DPSI argues that in the prior first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges: “Plaintiff does not have privity of contract with Discovery Inc. and has no means of collecting past due rent from Discovery Inc.” (FAC ¶ 77.) However, in the SAC, Plaintiff now alleges that the License Agreement was made between Plaintiff and DPSI.

DPSI, however, is ignoring the full context of the SAC. Plaintiff acknowledges that the signatory to the License Agreement was Discovery, LLC. However, Plaintiff makes multiple allegations that, although Discovery, LLC, signed the agreements at issue, DPSI should be vicariously liable on these agreements as a mere conduit, a single business enterprise, and/or a successor to Discovery, LLC. Plaintiff expressly alleges in the SAC that the agreement was signed by Discovery, LLC. The court finds that the SAC provides sufficient explanation as to why, even without privity of contract, Plaintiff contends that an implied contract existed between Plaintiff and DPSI. As such, the sham pleading doctrine does not apply here.

C. Vicarious Liability Allegations against DPSI

Here, Defendant DPSI’s main argument is that the licensing agreements at issue were between Plaintiff and Defendant The Discovery Preparatory School, Ltd. Liability Co. (“Discovery, LLC”). Yet despite the agreement being between Plaintiff and the Discovery, LLC, and no contract exists between Plaintiff and DPSI, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged alter ego and/or any other vicarious liability theory against DPSI.

Courts have expanded the alter ego theory to apply to other corporations under a mere conduit/single business enterprise theory. (Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1107–1108). “A court may also disregard the corporate form in order to hold one corporation liable for the debts of another affiliated corporation when the latter ‘is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit, or adjunct of another corporation.’” (Id.) “Under the ‘single business enterprise’ doctrine, separate corporations may operate with integrated resources in pursuit of a single business purpose.” (Id.) “The ‘singlebusiness-enterprise’ theory is an equitable doctrine applied to reflect partnership-type liability principles when corporations integrate their resources and operations to achieve a common business purpose.” (Id.)

Alter ego and/or the mere conduit/single business enterprise theory, therefore, seek to how the “equitable owner” responsible when the corporate form is sued to perpetuate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538).

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