| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
|---|
Motion to Enforce Settlement
the grounds it is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible as phrased. Without waiving said objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: Pending further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff does not have any medical records documenting any diagnosed mental capacity issues. However, decedent was very ill and bed ridden requiring 24/7 care and was dependent and susceptible to undue influence. From the records received from Fidelity there were two purported beneficiary changes on or about January 7, 2022. Thereafter the account was restricted and further purported beneficiary changes were submitted on October 14, 2023.” (Beg Decl., ¶ 4, Exs. 3a-3c.)
Defendants contend the response is evasive and non-responsive. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff provided responses identifying facts, persons with knowledge, and supporting documents for each request at issue. Although the responses are repetitive and rely on generalized assertions, Interrogatory 17.1 requires disclosure of the factual basis for a denial, not that the response be detailed, supported by extensive evidence or even persuasive. The responses, though minimal, do not warrant further responses. Plaintiff contends she provided all information available at the time the responses were served on 11/4/25. Defendants provide no evidence to the contrary.
The parties’ discussion about additional Fidelity documents that Defendants received pursuant to their subpoena that Plaintiff did not also receive is immaterial. There is no evidence that Plaintiff received those documents before her responses were due. In fact, the parties appear to agree that Plaintiff ultimately received those documents in April 2026, which is long after Plaintiff served her responses. (See Shaver Decl., ¶¶ 7-10, Exs. D-F; Beg Decl. iso Reply, ¶ 6.)
The motion is denied. 3 22-01263671 Motion to Enforce Settlement
Chavez vs. Prime Plaintiff Cesar Chavez’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is Construction Group DENIED. Inc. Plaintiff moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the parties’ Settlement Agreement and enter judgment against defendants Prime Construction Group, Inc., Joe Manoukian, Joe Manoukian dba JM Floors Décor, and JM Flooring Concepts (collectively, Defendants) in the amount of $17,000 plus 10% interest from the date of breach.
On 3/19/26, the Court continued the hearing on this motion to allow Plaintiff more time to file a Supplemental Brief by April 9, 2026 close of business. (ROA 153.) Defendants were allowed to file an opposition by April 23, 2026 close of business. (ROA 153.) The parties timely did so.
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subdivision (a), provides as follows: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
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In ruling on a motion to enforce settlement, “the trial court acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. Trial judges may consider oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone. When the same judge hears the settlement and the motion to enter judgment on the settlement, he or she may consult his [or her] memory.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360 [cleaned up].) However, “nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon. (Ibid. [emphasis in original].)
Existence of Agreement
On 4/22/25, the parties reached a settlement agreement wherein Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff $17,000.00 within 45 days of that agreement with the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement pursuant to Civil Code Section 664.6. (See Shabini Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) The agreement is signed by all parties and their counsel. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s counsel attests that the attached agreement “is a true and correct copy of the settlement agreement reached in this matter.” (Ibid.)
The Court finds Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement during the pendency of this litigation. (See Shabini Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)
Defendants dispute the existence of a settlement agreement on two grounds. First, Defendants argue an attorney’s signature on the agreement alone is insufficient and Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that all parties personally signed the agreement. Defendants’ argument lacks merit. Effective 1/1/25, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by the party or the party’s attorney. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6 subd. (b)(1), (2); see also Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (a) [“A ... signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.”].) Here, the settlement agreement is electronically signed by defendant Joe Manoukian on behalf of each defendant on 4/9/25 and defense counsel on 4/8/25. (See Shabini Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) This is sufficient. Notably, neither Joe Manourkian nor Defense counsel dispute signing the agreement.
Second, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to establish a “meeting of the minds” as to material terms because disputes remain as to timing, performance conditions, and other essential terms. However, Defendants
fail to state specifically how the terms of the attached agreement are incomplete or insufficiently definite.
Breach of Settlement Agreement
Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to establish that “payment was due and owing under enforceable conditions” and that “any alleged delay or nonpayment may be excused or subject to conditions precedent.” Defendants’ conclusory contentions lack analysis and citation to supporting evidence.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees. While Plaintiff has established Defendants did not pay the settlement amount within 45 days of the agreement (see Shabini Decl. [Supplemental], ¶ 4), the agreement contains the following condition precedent:
“20. Condition Precedent – Dismissal. Plaintiff acknowledges and agrees that a condition precedent to the receipt of the Settlement Amount is the full execution of this Agreement and the filing of a Request for Dismissal with prejudice of the entire action identified as Case No. 30 2022-01263671-CU-PO-CJC. Defendants shall have no obligation to make any payment under this Agreement until such dismissal has been filed and confirmed.” (See Shabini Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1, ¶ 20 [emphasis added].)
To date, Plaintiff has not filed a Request for Dismissal as agreed. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy a condition precedent.
Interest
Lastly, Defendants argue Plaintiff seeks interest and expanded relief not clearly set forth in the agreement. This argument is well taken. Plaintiff seeks interest of 10% per annum from the date of the breach, which is a request for prejudgment interest. However, the settlement agreement does not contain a provision for prejudgment interest. Therefore, there is no basis for awarding prejudgment interest. (See Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, 502 [reversing award of prejudgment interest not provided for in § 664.6 agreement: “The $20,000 settlement sum in the stipulation (of entry of judgment) is unallocated, and may or may not have included . . . prejudgment interest. We find no basis for awarding . . . prejudgment interest in addition to the stipulated settlement sum.”].)
The motion is DENIED. 6 24-01394637 Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel of Record
Dubai Holdings, LLC vs. The motion of attorney Ira Frzer to withdraw as attorney of record for Taifour Defendant Mahammad Taifour is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc. § 284, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) Attorney will be relieved as counsel of