In the Matter of: THE BISHOP FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 10 11 12 IN THE MATTER OF: 13 14 THE BISHOP FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST. 15 16 Case No. 16PR178573 17 18 ORDER RE APPLICATION 19 FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH 20 ORDER AND FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF 21 ATTACHMENT 22 23 24 The above-entitled action came on for hearing before the Honorable Lori E. Pegg on May 22, 25 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 7. The matter having been submitted, the court finds and 26 orders as follows: 27 28

1 INTRODUCTION 2 Petitioners Juliana L. Bishop and Laurie B. Holderman (“Petitioners”), co-trustees of the Bishop 3 Family Revocable Trust, filed a petition for redress of (1) financial elder abuse, (2) relief under 4 Probate Code section 850, (3) breach of contract, (4) unjust enrichment, and (5) conversion. On 5 August 18, 2025, they filed an amended petition alleging only (1) financial elder abuse, (2) relief 6 under Probate Code section 850, (3) breach of contract (“Amended Petition”). Petitioners allege 7 that Respondents Vander Landscape and Reetpaul Singh Vander (“Vander”, collectively 8 “Respondents”) contracted with octogenarian David Bishop (“Bishop”) to perform landscaping 9 on several acre property in Gilroy at a price of $150,000.

But Respondents kept increasing the 10 price and scope of work until the project costs exceeded $1.5 million. Petitioners also assert that 11 Respondents were unlicensed at the time they entered into the contracts with Bishop and that 12 Respondents caused damage to the property. 13 Currently before the court is Petitioners’ application for writ of attachment. Respondents have 14 opposed the application. 15 DISCUSSION 16 I. Legal Background 17 “A financial elder abuse claimant may obtain an attachment for potential compensatory damages 18 and an award of attorney fees and costs associated with those damages, but only if the request for 19 it complies with all applicable provisions of the statutory scheme governing pretrial attachments 20 (the Attachment Law) (Code Civ.

Proc., § 481.010 et. seq.).” (Royals v. Lu (2022) 81 21 Cal.App.5th 328, 336.) “The Elder Abuse Act, a remedial scheme designed to protect a 22 vulnerable class of citizens, is generally construed broadly in favor of plaintiffs seeking relief on 23 behalf of elders [citation], while the Attachment Law, which authorizes ‘a harsh remedy [that] ... 24 causes the defendant to lose control of his property before the plaintiff’s claim is adjudicated’ 25 [citation], is generally construed strictly according to the letter of its statutory terms. [Citation.]” 26 (Id. at pp. 344-345.) 27 “Attachment is an ancillary or provisional remedy to aid in the collection of a money demand by 28 seizure of property in advance of trial and judgment. [Citation.]

Under the statutory scheme

1 governing attachments in California (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 481.010–493.060), denominated by the 2 Legislature as The Attachment Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 482.010), plaintiffs must meet a set of 3 detailed procedural and substantive requirements.” (Royals v. Lu, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 4 345, internal quotation marks omitted.) “Procedurally, the plaintiff must meet the burden of 5 showing her claim has probable validity, meaning it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will 6 obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 481.190.) 7 Substantively, the plaintiff must, among other things, present an affidavit or a verified complaint 8 stating that the attachment is sought to secure the recovery on a claim upon which an attachment 9 may be issued together with a statement of the amount to be secured by the attachment. (Id., § 10 484.020, subds. (a)–(b).) [T]he amount to be secured by an attachment is [t]he amount of the 11 defendant’s indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff (id., § 483.015, subd. (a)) plus allowable costs 12 and attorney fees (id., §§ 483.015, subd. (a), 482.110).” (Royals v.

Lu, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 13 p. 345, internal quotation marks omitted.) 14 “As a general matter, the statutory remedy of attachment is limited to an action on a claim or 15 claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 483.010, subd. 16 (a)), and if the defendant is a natural person, only if the contract claim for which attachment is 17 sought arises out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession (id., subd. 18 (c)). But there are exceptions.

Outside the realm of claims for money based on breach of 19 contract, the remedy of pretrial attachment is available as an aid to civil enforcement of certain 20 statutes, one of which is the Elder Abuse Act.” (Royals v. Lu, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 346, 21 internal quotation marks and fn. omitted.) 22 “In 2007, the Legislature, acting on reports that the intent to encourage private claims by 23 providing for enhanced remedies ... has largely been unrealized ..., made available the remedy 24 of prejudgment attachment as a way to facilitate quick recovery of losses in financial abuse 25 cases. ([Welf. & Inst.

Code,] § 15657.01; Stats. 2007, ch. 45, § 1, p. 191.) [Citation.] The 26 purpose of making pretrial attachment available to financial elder abuse actions claimants was to 27 help claimants preserve the elder or dependent adult’s assets wrongfully held by defendant until 28 judgment is rendered. [Citation.]” (Royals v. Lu, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 347, internal

1 quotation marks omitted.) “Section 483.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure . . . is the limiting 2 statute restricting the scope of the Attachment Law to contract claims for damages, absent a 3 statutory exception. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.01 is such an exception.” (Id. at 4 p. 348.) 5 Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.01 provides, “Notwithstanding Section 483.010 of 6 the Code of Civil Procedure, an attachment may be issued in any action for damages pursuant to 7 Section 15657.5 for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Section 8 15610.30.

The other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure not inconsistent with this article 9 shall govern the issuance of an attachment pursuant to this section. In an application for a writ of 10 attachment, the claimant shall refer to this section. An attachment may be issued pursuant to this 11 section whether or not other forms of relief are demanded.” 12 “At the hearing, the court shall consider the showing made by the parties appearing and shall 13 issue a right to attach order, which shall state the amount to be secured by the attachment 14 determined by the court in accordance with Section 483.015 or 483.020, if it finds all of the 15 following: (1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment 16 may be issued. (2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the 17 attachment is based. (3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on 18 the claim upon which the attachment is based. (4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is 19 greater than zero.” (§ 484.090, subd. (a).) 20 II.

Merits of the Application 21 Petitioners seek a right to attach order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.01 and 22 section 484.010, et seq. based on their financial elder abuse claim. They seek to attach 23 unspecified property of Respondents in the amount of $1,290,210.00, which includes estimated 24 costs in the amount of $50,000 and estimated attorney fees in the amount of $200,000. 25 Respondents oppose the application arguing, inter alia, that the application is procedurally 26 deficient and that Petitioners cannot prevail on their requisite showing of probable validity. 27 Respondents maintain that the application is procedurally deficient in that it fails to describe the 28 property Petitioners seek to attach.

Section 484.020, subdivision (e) provides, “The application

1 shall be executed under oath and shall include all of the following: . . . A description of the 2 property to be attached under the writ of attachment and a statement that the plaintiff is informed 3 and believes that such property is subject to attachment. Where the defendant is a corporation, a 4 reference to ‘all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of 5 Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010’ satisfies the requirements of this subdivision. Where 6 the defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to ‘all property of 7 the partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to 8 subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010’ satisfies the requirements of this 9 subdivision.

Where the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property shall be 10 reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be 11 attached.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.020, subd. (e).) 12 Here, the application indicates that Petitioners are seeking to attach “[p]roperty of a defendant 13 who is a natural person that is subject to attachment under Code of Civil Procedure section 14 487.010[.]” The application then indicates, “SEE ATTACHMENT 9(c) TO APPLICATION 15 FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDER AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OR WRIT OF 16 ATTACHMENT [AT-105].”

But nothing is attached to the application and no description of the 17 property is provided in any of the supporting materials. 18 “ ‘ . . .[W]here the defendant is an individual, subdivision (e) of Section 484.020 requires the 19 plaintiff to include in his application a description of the property sought to be attached which is 20 reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify such property. [para.] The writ issued 21 pursuant to Section 484.090 is limited to the property described in the plaintiff's application. 22 Thus, the defendant can determine whether he desires to make a claim of exemption as to that 23 property. . . .’ ” (Bank of America v.

Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 268, 24 quoting Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc., § 484.020 (1988 pocket 25 supp.) p. 57.) Section 484.070 provides a procedure by which the respondent can claim that 26 certain property is exempt from the writ of attachment. But by failing to describe the property 27 Petitioners have deprived Vander of the opportunity to do so. 28

1 Even if the court could overlook the failure to describe the property, the court finds that 2 Petitioners have not established the requisite probable validity of the financial elder abuse claim. 3 “Probable validity means that ‘more likely than not’ the plaintiff will obtain a judgment on that 4 claim. (§ 481.190.)” (Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World National Assurance Co. 5 (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881, 885.) “In determining the probable validity of a claim where the 6 defendant makes an appearance, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the 7 respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome of the litigation. (Law 8 Revision Com. com. to § 481.190.)” (Loeb & Loeb v.

Beverly Glen Music (1985) 166 9 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1120; accord Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 10 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1478.) 11 Financial elder abuse is defined by Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, subdivision 12 (a) as follows: [¶] “ ‘Financial abuse’ of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or 13 entity does any of the following: [¶] (1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or 14 personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or 15 both. [¶] (2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal 16 property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. [¶] 17 (3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, 18 obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue 19 influence, as defined in Section 15610.70.” 20 To state a claim for financial elder abuse, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following: (1) the 21 plaintiff was “elderly” within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act (Welfare & Institutions Code 22 § 15600, et seq.), i.e., 65 years of age or older; (2) the defendant took or retained the plaintiff’s 23 property with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, for a wrongful use, or by undue influence; (3) the 24 plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing in the 25 plaintiff’s harm. (See CACI No. 3100; Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 15610.30.) Bad faith or intent to 26 defraud is no longer required in elder abuse cases, but wrongful use of the property nevertheless 27 must be established. (See Bonfigli v. Strachan (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1315-1316.) “A 28 person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained

1 property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, 2 appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person or entity knew or should have known 3 that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 4 §15610.30, subd. (b).) 5 Petitioners contend that Respondents convinced Bishop to enter into a series of contracts, 6 incrementally increasing the scope and price of the landscaping contract Bishop had entered into. 7 They further allege that, at the time the contracts were entered into, Vander’s contractor’s license 8 was suspended.

They also assert that Respondents contracted to provide services, including 9 installation of solar panels, that fell outside the scope of Vander’s license. Finally, they maintain 10 that Respondents damaged portions of Bishop’s property. Petitioners support their showing with 11 documents from the California Contractors State License Board primarily showing that Vander’s 12 license was suspended from January 6, 2025 to May 20, 2025 when Bishop and Respondents 13 entered into the contracts between January 8, 2025 and March 4, 2025. (See Petitioners’ Exhibits 14 C & J-M.)

Petitioners also provide the declaration of Petitioner Juliana Bishop who explains the 15 contracts Bishop and Respondents entered into, including the dates of signing and the amount of 16 the contracts. (Declaration of Juliana Bishop in Support of Application for Right to Attach Order 17 and for Issuance of Writ of Attachment (“Bishop Decl.”), ¶¶ 8-13.) The declaration also indicates 18 that Bishop paid Respondents a total of $1,040,210 of trust funds but little to no work had been 19 completed at the property. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16.)

It also alleges that Vander attempted to cultivate 20 favor with Bishop by taking him on outings, including taking him for meals and long drives, and 21 even sought to take him on a multiple-day road trip to Washington. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The declaration 22 further insists that Respondents damaged the property by “driving over septic system lines, 23 destroying existing swales, and leaving work unfinished” and that Respondents took materials, 24 such as lighting and brass plumbing that had been purchased with trust funds. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 17.) 25 Finally, the declaration indicates that Bishop is 84 years old. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 26 Although Petitioners argue that Respondents took materials and damaged trust property, the 27 amount of the attachment they seek is limited to the $1,040,210 Respondents were paid under the 28 various contracts, in addition to anticipated attorney fees and costs.

Petitioners contend that the

1 taking of the $1,040,210 amounted to elder abuse because Respondents convinced Bishop to 2 enter into the various contracts when they had no intent of completing the work and were not 3 licensed to complete same. They also argue that Respondents used excessive persuasion to 4 convince Bishop to expand the scope of the project by taking him on outings. 5 Under Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b), “Except as provided in 6 subdivision (e), a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an 7 action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the 8 unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”

Business and Professions Code 9 section 7031, subdivision (e) provides, in pertinent part, that “the court may determine that there 10 has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown at 11 an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a 12 contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the 13 act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted 14 promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon 15 learning of the failure.” 16 Respondents concede that Vander’s license was suspended when the contracts were entered into. 17 But Vander argues that he was unaware of the suspension until January 16, 2025, after the first 18 contract was signed and the work was scheduled to begin. (See Declaration of Reetpaul Singh 19 Vander in Support of Opposition to Petitioners’ Application [], ¶ 14.)

Vander also declares that 20 the reason for the suspension was an unpaid liability based on his alleged failure to pay workers 21 who had obtained a judgment against him of which he was unaware.(Id. at ¶ 13.) When he 22 learned of the judgment, he contacted the Department of Industrial Relations to sort things out. 23 (Id. at ¶ 13.) Petitioner’s own materials reflect that Vander’s license was reinstated on May 20, 24 2025 and that Vander had previously been licensed since 2010 with one suspension from 25 September 28, 2021 to November 2, 2021. (See Petitioners’ Exhibit C.)

From this, one could 26 conclude that Respondents meet the requirements of substantial compliance despite the license 27 suspension. (C.W. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carpenter (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 165, 169 [contractor 28 that pleaded it was a duly licensed contractor prior to and during part of the performance of the

1 contract, that it did not know or have reason to know of the defect in licensure, and that upon 2 learning of same, it applied for correct designation and was granted same shortly after sufficient 3 for evidentiary hearing under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (e)]; Twenty-Nine Palms 4 Enterprises Corp. v. Bardos (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1454 [contractor did not act promptly 5 to reinstate license where license was not active in 2007 when work was performed and did not 6 become active again until 2010].) 7 Petitioners also assert that Respondents contracted to perform work outside the scope of a 8 landscaper’s license, such as installation of solar panels, electrical work, and barn siding.

But, 9 they provide no evidence or authority establishing that such work may not be performed by a 10 landscaper and, in any event, Respondent have provided an expert declaration indicating that the 11 C-27 license held by Vander would allow him to contract with subcontractors to perform work 12 that he was not licensed to perform himself. (See Declaration of David J. Tognela in Support of 13 Opposition to Petitioners’ Application [], ¶¶ 12-13.) 14 As to Petitioners’ argument that Respondents overcame Bishop’s will to coerce him into making 15 additions to the scope of the project, they assert only that Respondents took Bishop on outings 16 and otherwise conclusorily state that Respondents overcame Bishop’s will. (See Bishop Decl., ¶ 17 15 [Respondents took Bishop on outings, including meals and long drives and tried to convince 18 Bishop and Juliana Bishop to accompany him to Washington].)

This is insufficient. 19 Section 482.040 requires that “[t]he facts stated in each affidavit filed pursuant to this title shall 20 be set forth with particularity.” Petitioners also rely on their verified Amended Petition to 21 support their request. But a cause of action for elder abuse is statutory and, therefore, must be 22 pleaded with particularity. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) 23 “Accordingly, [the] ‘[u]se of such terminology [as fraudulently and recklessly] cannot cure [the] 24 failure to point out exactly how or in what manner the [respondent] transgressed.’ [Citation.]” 25 (Carter v.

Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 410.) Petitioners’ 26 allegations are similarly conclusory. (See Amended Petition, ¶¶ 42 [“Respondent Vander 27 specifically induced David to make these payments by means of coercion and undue influence, 28 as defined by Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70, employing excessive persuasion

1 that overcame David’s free will, resulting in inequity.”], 45 [“Vander repeatedly pressured and 2 coerced David to exponentially expand the landscaping project into a construction project. 3 Petitioners are informed and believe, and thereon allege, Vander pressured David to enter into 4 and execute the Contracts with escalating costs, convincing him to agree to change orders and 5 additional work that dramatically increased the project and exponentially increased pricing over 6 a short period of time.”], 48 [“Petitioners are informed and believe, and 7 thereon allege Vander engaged in excessive persuasion that caused David to enter into and 8 execute the Contracts and to pay Respondents over $1 million of Trust assets.

Petitioners are 9 informed and believe and thereon allege Respondents’ conduct caused David ‘to act or refrain 10 from acting by overcoming his free will and results in inequity.’ ”].) These statements are too 11 conclusory to support a judgment for financial elder abuse. Accordingly, Petitioners have not 12 shown the probable validity of the elder abuse claim. 13 The application for right to attach order is DENIED. 14 CONCLUSION 15 16 The application for right to attach order is DENIED. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated: ___________, 2026 ________________________________ 20 HON.

LORI E. PEGG 21 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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