Douglas v. Regents of the University of California

under this section may include, but are not limited to, costs that may be claimed under Section 685.070.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080, subd. (a).) Thus, a noticed motion under section 685.080 may encompass the same postjudgment enforcement costs recoverable through a memorandum of costs under section 685.070, including attorney’s fees authorized under section 685.040. (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 416, 424-425 [a memorandum of costs and a noticed motion filed together].)

Although attorney’s fees may be recoverable as enforcement costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040, Judgment Creditor has separately filed a noticed motion seeking attorney’s fees, which remains pending. Because the amount, reasonableness, and recoverability of the requested fees are disputed, and because the issue is already before the Court through the separately noticed fee motion, the issue is more appropriately resolved through that motion.

Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney’s fees through the present Memorandum of Costs After Judgment and instead defers the issue to the pending fee motion.

G. Cost Incurred More than Two Years

The costs incurred for recording and indexing abstracts of judgment on 08/02/2023, 08/04/2023, and 08/07/2023 were not included in the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment until more than two years after they were incurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (b).) Because the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment was not filed until 12/17/2025, those specific costs are untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.070, subdivision (b), and are therefore taxed.

H. Other Costs

Judgment Debtors do not specifically challenge the remaining claimed enforcement costs, including the debtor examination fees and stipulation-related costs.

Judgment Debtors to give notice.

5 Douglas v. Plaintiff Christopher Ryan Douglas moves to compel Defendant Navigate Regents of the BioPharma Services, Inc. to provide verified responses without University of objections to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories (set one) and request for California production of documents (set one). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

Responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents are due 30 days after service (plus appropriate time for method of service). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260; 2031.260.) If the party to whom a discovery request is directed fails to respond timely, that party waives all objections, including claims of privilege and work product protection. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290(a); 2031.300(a).)

Defendant first contends that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff’s discovery is premature in light of the fact that Defendant has a pending demurrer to the operative Second Amended Complaint.

The right to discovery does not depend on whether a case is at issue. For example, a plaintiff may serve a deposition notice 20 days after service of summons (§ 2025.210, subd. (b)) notwithstanding that the defendant has 30 days to respond to the complaint (§§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3) & (6), 430.40, subd. (a)). Moreover, discovery continues despite a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436, fn. 3 [pleading deficiencies do not affect party's right to conduct discovery]; Budget Finance Plan v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 794, 797 [plaintiff may continue to conduct discovery after demurrer to complaint sustained].)

Defendant has not sufficiently shown that the pending demurrer should prohibit Plaintiff from conducting discovery.

Defendant also contends that the discovery was served prematurely in violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.020(b). Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.020, “[a] plaintiff may propound interrogatories to a party without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.020, subd. (b).) Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.020 provides, “[a] plaintiff may make a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, the party to whom the demand is directed, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.020, subd. (b).)

Defendant was served by substitute service on December 10, 2025 with the Summons and Complaint. (ROA 43.) Plaintiff then served the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents, along with the First Amended Complaint, on Defendant on December 29, 2025, well over 10 days after December 10, 2025. (ROA 55.) Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the discovery was not served prematurely.

As a result of Defendant’s failure to respond to the discovery requests, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses without objections except for those based on the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) However, if Defendant asserts such objections, Defendant shall provide a privilege log within 30 days pursuant to Code Civ. Proc § 2031.240(c) that identifies each document for which privilege or work product protection is claimed, its author, recipients, date of preparation, and the specific privilege or work product protection claimed.

Defendant is ORDERED to serve responses and the privilege log (if applicable) within 30 days.

Sanctions are available on motions to compel responses to interrogatories and inspection demands. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(c), § 2031.300(c). (“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response ... unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”).)

Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $124.05, consisting of the motion filing fee of $60, printing/exhibits/binders costs of $19.90, and travel (mileage) costs of $44.15 from Calabasas. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for $79.90 in monetary sanctions. Defendant is ORDERED to pay $79.90 in monetary sanctions to Plaintiff by June 25, 2026.

Plaintiff shall file and serve notice of this ruling.

Case Management Conference

The Case Management Conference is continued to November 05, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in this department.

Plaintiff to give notice.

6 Temple Beth El of The court OVERRULES the demurrer by Defendant and Discovery South Orange Preparatory School Inc. (“DPSI”) as to second, fourth, fifth, seventh, and County v. The ninth causes of action of the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Discovery Temple Beth El of South Orange County. Preparatory School A. Standard for Demurrer

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-1405.) Questions of fact cannot be decided on demurrer. (Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1556.) A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the complaint; a court will not consider facts that have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably inferred from the matters alleged or are proper subjects of judicial notice. (Hall v. Great W. Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 718 n.7.)

Although courts should take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints (see Code Civ. Prod., § 452), it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.) Bare conclusions of law devoid of any facts are insufficient to withstand demurrer. (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 481; see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).)

B. Sham Pleading

DPSI first argues that the SAC constitutes a sham pleading and should be sustained in its entirety. The court disagrees.

Under the sham pleading doctrine, harmful admissions or allegations in a complaint cannot be omitted/altered in an amended pleading without explanation, and in the case of such amendments, the court may take judicial notice of the prior pleading and disregard any inconsistent allegations. (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.)

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