JOHN DOE VS. LIOR ZOREA, ESQ, ET AL.

The motion is timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).)

In his Opposition papers, plaintiff asserts several arguments as to why he believes Defendants’ motion should be denied, or alternatively, reduced. The court finds that plaintiff’s arguments, for the most part, lack merit.

May 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 8 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

The court disagrees with plaintiff’s contention that the motion fails to properly apportion fees incurred on the anti-SLAPP motion from fees incurred on other motions. The supporting Ibarra declaration states that all of the claimed fees (29 hours) were incurred on the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants’ moving papers include a table with defined fee categories, all of which pertain to the anti-SLAPP motion. The Ibarra Declaration also states that he reviewed the firm’s billing to insure that all of the claimed fees were specific to the anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibarra Decl., pp. 2-3, fn. 1.)

The court disagrees with plaintiff’s contention that the motion fails to properly apportion fees incurred for each of the three moving defendants. The motion sufficiently explains that the anti- SLAPP motion focused on the interrelated actions of defendants Nixon Peabody and Deschenes related to the legal representation of Defendant Zorea. The anti-SLAPP motion targeted the allegations of a single paragraph, namely, ¶ 11 of plaintiff’s initial complaint. Thus, Defendants have sufficiently shown that all of the work performed applied equally to each moving defendant.

Plaintiff’s arguments relating to the Court’s alleged use of artificial intelligence (AI) and the Finato case are misplaced and incorrect. In both his opposition brief and in his “Supplemental Statement Regarding AI-Assisted Adjudication and California’s Governing Framework,” filed May 12, 2026, plaintiff argues that the court based its Order on a published decision in Finato v. Keith A. Fink & Associates (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 136 (Finato). Plaintiff contends that the court’s use of AI, and its reliance on a case (Finato) that the parties had not cited in their briefing, resulted in plaintiff being denied a fair chance to respond.

This argument is incorrect. First, it is misplaced. Plaintiff is confusing Defendant’s first SLAPP motion with their second SLAPP motion filed later in the case. The present fee motion pertains to Defendants’ first SLAPP motion, filed January 21, 2025, heard on April 1, 2025. (Ibarra Decl. ¶ 3.) The court did not cite to or rely on the Finato case in its Order granting the first anti-SLAPP motion. Second, while the court conducts its own research, it does not cite a case found in its research until it has read the case.

The court in its tentative ruling stated that “The parties are to APPEAR because the court is basing its ruling on legal authorities that were not cited in the papers and the court will allow oral argument about its ruling. (Min. Mar. 17, 2026). The court then discussed the Finato case in its tentative ruling and allowed the parties to argue. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s speculation regarding attorney’s fees incurred during the litigation stay lacks merit. Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that attorney’s fees incurred during a litigation stay are not recoverable. And even if that were true, it appears that none of the claimed fees here were incurred during the stay. Defendants filed their fee motion on May 7, 2025, and this court issued a litigation stay on May 9, 2025. (Ibarra Decl. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff argues that his indigent and self-represented status weigh in favor of reducing any fee award. While the court is not unsympathetic to this argument, the court cannot rule on sympathy. Plaintiff’s argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in a similar case of plaintiffs suing a law firm who argued that the fees were excessive in light of their annual income, plaintiff’s self-represented status which made them ineligible for fees, and the wealth and size of the law firm. (Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 744.)

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument: “The mandate of subdivision (c)(1) is clear: prevailing defendants are entitled to attorney fees. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735 [‘under ... (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees’].) ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘Rules of equity cannot be intruded in matters that are plain and fully covered by positive statute

May 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 9 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ [citation]. Neither a fiction nor a maxim may nullify a statute.’ ’ ’ ’ (Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368, fn. 5, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 4.)” (Ibid.) Accordingly, this court must also reject this argument.

Plaintiff cites no authority supporting his argument that Defendants Zorea and Deschenes cannot recover fees on grounds that the Nixon Peabody firm (two other attorneys in the same law firm) represented them, or because the motion offers no proof that the fees were actually paid. Defendants Zorea and Deschenes did not represent themselves; they were represented by other Nixon Peabody attorneys, and thus, their fees are recoverable. (Witte v. Kaufman (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [“a prevailing defendant [on a § 425.16 motion] is entitled to recover attorney fees if represented by counsel.”])

While the case law appears somewhat mixed on this issue, plaintiff may have a valid argument that Nixon Peabody, as a law firm that was represented by its own attorneys, may not be entitled to recover its fees. (See, e.g., Witte v. Kaufman, supra, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1211 [“KLA incurred no attorney fees in bringing its motion to strike, because all the work was done by members of the firm on their own behalf. Thus, KLA is not entitled to attorney fees.”].) However, even if the court were to conclude that Nixon Peabody cannot recover its fees, such a conclusion, as noted above, would not impact Zorea’s and Deschenes’ entitlement to recover their attorney’s fees. (Id. at p. 1211.)

And since all of the incurred attorney’s fees here appear to be unapportionable, meaning they were incurred jointly by all three moving Defendants, arguably, Zorea and Deschenes would still be entitled to recover the full amount of the claimed attorney’s fees. Plaintiff does not point to any specific fees that he claims the court should strike, which would have assisted the court. Nevertheless, it is this court’s duty to review the fee request and only award a reasonable fee.

The court finds the fees reasonable. Attorney fees are ordinarily determined by the court pursuant to the “lodestar” method. Under the lodestar, a “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by an attorney of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group); Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132; Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157.) This court may adjust the lodestar amount based on various factors specific to the case to fix the attorney fees at fair market value for the services provided. (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1095- 1096.)

The factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 C4th at p. 1132; Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) Defendants do not request a lodestar adjustment. In considering the lodestar factors, a trial court must “focus on providing an award of attorney fees reasonably designed to fully compensate [the prevailing party] attorneys for the services provided.” (Horsford v.

Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) This court may use its own experience to determine the value of attorneys’ fees. (Spencer v. Collins (1909) 156 Cal. 298, 306 [“The value of attorney's services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar. When the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.”];

May 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 10 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Reynolds v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1113-14 [“The trial court acted well within its discretion in using ‘the prevailing market value in the community for similar legal services’ relying on its personal knowledge and familiarity with the area legal services, as the ‘touchstone’ for determination” of the reasonable hourly rates.’” (citations omitted)].). This court had extensive experience in class action and other common fund cases while an attorney and has made decisions about attorneys’ fees and costs frequently during her time as a judicial officer. This court is the single assigned judge.

The court finds Aldo E. Ibarra’s and Connor C. McNamara’s rates reasonable. Ibarra requests $450.00 per hour and has been an attorney since 2010; McNamara requests $450.00 per hour and has been an attorney since 2017. Defendants refer on the Laffey Matrix. The court is familiar with the use of the Laffey index which may be used by the trial court (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702.) Under the Laffey Matrix, Ibarra’s hourly rate is as high as $1,036.00 per hour and McNamara’s rate is as high as $917.00 per hour. They are only claiming hourly rates of $450 per hour for this work. Based upon this court’s experience and the Laffey Matrix, the court finds the hourly rate of $450 for both attorneys reasonable.

The court finds the work performed reasonable. Defendants request compensation for twentynine (29) hours of work. (Ibarra Decl., ¶9.) They state that they may request further fees for reviewing the opposition, drafting a reply, and appearing at the hearing. (Id., ¶ 11.) The billing records have been reviewed to make sure that Defendants are only requesting time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion and not on any of the other motions being brought during the same time period. (Id., ¶ 4, fn. 1.) The court in reviewing the tasks set forth in paragraph 3 of Ibarra’s declaration finds the time spent on each task reasonable and the collective amount of twenty nine (29) hours reasonable for an anti-SLAPP motion, which includes appearing at the hearing. Therefore, the court finds that an attorneys’ fee award of $13,050.00 reasonable under the circumstances.

The court finds the costs reasonable and statutorily required to be awarded.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendants shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.

May 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 11 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 3 24-CIV-06068 JOHN DOE VS. LIOR ZOREA, ESQ, ET AL.

JOHN DOE PRO SE LIOR ZOREA ALDO E. IBARRA

DEFENDANTS LIOR ZOREA’S, GREGORY DESCHENES’, AND NIXON PEABODY LLP’S MOTION FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons stated below, defendants Lior Zorea’s, Gregory Deschenes’, and Nixon Peabody, LLP’s (NP) (collectively, Defendants) unopposed Motion for Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal, filed February 13, 2026, is GRANTED. Even though plaintiff has not filed an opposition to this motion, the court has considered the arguments he raised in opposition to the other motion for attorneys’ fees, which is being heard concurrently with this motion.

Background. On January 24, 2025, Defendants filed a Special Motion to Strike portions of plaintiff John Doe’s original complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP” motion). On April 11, 2025, this court granted Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. (April 11, 2025 Order.) On April 28, 2025, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order granting Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. On October 17, 2025, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Order granting Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and awarded Defendants their costs on appeal. (See Feb. 13, 2026 Ibarra Decl., Ex. B [Court of Appeal Opinion], which can also be found at Doe v. Zorea (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2025, No. A173383) 2025 WL 2945631, reh'g denied (Oct. 30, 2025), review denied (Jan. 14, 2026).) On January 23, 2026, this court received the remittitur. On February 13, 2026, Defendants filed their motion.

By this Motion, Defendants seek to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees of $9,675.00 and costs incurred on the appeal of $412.20.

Application. The unopposed Motion is GRANTED.

The motion is timely. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1702(c)(1).)

As the prevailing parties on the appeal, Defendants are entitled to recover their costs incurred on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a); Feb. 13, 2026 Ibarra Decl., Ex. B [Oct. 17, 2025 Court of Appeal Opinion, stating, in part: “Defendants may recover their costs on appeal.”]) Thus, the court must award costs and Defendants have demonstrated that the fees of $412.20 are recoverable.

Defendants are also entitled to attorneys’ fees. California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(f) provides that “Unless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney's fees on appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule 3.1702.” Rule 3.1702 provides the procedure for attorneys’ fees on appeal. A defendant who brings a successful SLAPP motion is entitled to