Flor de Maria “Pamela” Huamanialdaz v. Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC et al

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).) Similarly, “The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method . . . if it determines either of the following: (1) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. (2) The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2019.030, subd. (a).) Finally, “[t]he court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (b).)

We begin by noting that “[a] complaint . . . shall contain . . . [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a). Italics added.) In pleading, surplusage and argument are to be avoided. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2026) at § 6:14.1; see also 640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom (2022) 78 CA5th 840, 852, 294 CR3d 123, 130, fn. 7 [“[w]e disregard everything in the Complaint other than well-pleaded factual allegations and matters properly subject to judicial notice”].)

The general rule is that a complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate, as opposed to evidentiary, facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “It has been consistently held that a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. . . . There is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be required in a pleading.” (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Association., Inc. v.

Truck Insurance Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098-1099 (Doheny Park). Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Plaintiff initiated the instant employment discrimination action by filing a 54-page Complaint with 206 paragraphs of allegations asserting 24 “causes of action” against Defendant. Plaintiff, here, seeks an order excusing her from having to respond to requests for production that, pursuant to Plaintiff’s moving papers, seek support for each of the matters asserted in the Complaint. Of note, through the motion, Plaintiff complains that certain requests for production relate to “rhetorical language,” “legal conclusions,” and/or “statutory standards.” (See Support Memorandum at 3:11-4:9.)

The Court is initially struck that Plaintiff, having pled the action with significant specificity and having included, in the Complaint, legal argument and statutory standards, now appears to seek protection against Defendant’s efforts at conducting civil discovery for the precise purpose it is meant to serve –developing an understanding of which of Plaintiff’s allegations and assertions are supported by evidence and which are not.

Plaintiff contends that Request Nos. 25 through 447 are improper because documents responsive to each would also be responsive to one of Request Nos. 1 through 24, and as a result, Request Nos. 25 through 447 are duplicative. (See, e.g., Support Memorandum at 2:12-19.) Again, however, Plaintiff concedes that each of these requests is addressed to a specific

allegation or assertion set forth in the Complaint. (See, e.g., Support Memorandum at 2:7-9 [“Defense Counsel extracted individual sentences from virtually every paragraph of the 206- paragraph complaint and converted each sentence into a separate document request”].) Plaintiff cites to no authority providing that it is improper for a defendant to propound contention-specific document requests and general “catch-all” requests. In the Court’s experience, this is a common practice in civil discovery.

Plaintiff argues that “[s]everal of these requests are duplicative of one another (RPD Nos. 449 and 461; RPD Nos. 455 and 462).” (Support Memorandum at 3:3-5.) Plaintiff also contends that “RPD Nos. 459 and 464 both seek all communications between Plaintiff and Defendant.” (Id. at 7:12-13.) The Court agrees. Based on the foregoing, the Motion is GRANTED as to Request Nos. 461, 462, and 464.

Plaintiff asserts that several of the requests “invade Plaintiff’s privacy (RPD No. 456), seek privileged information (RPD No. 476), or sweep far beyond the temporal and topical scope of this case (RPD No. 453).” (Support Memorandum at 3:5-7.) As to Request Nos. 456 and 476, Plaintiff is free to object if she has a valid and good faith belief that specific documents in her possession, custody, or control are shielded from discovery based on her right to privacy or a recognized privilege.

The Court agrees that Request No. 453 is overbroad. Defendant appears to concede the point by failing to address this argument through the Opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is GRANTED as to Request No. 453.

Plaintiff asserts that Request Nos. 41-44, 47-49, and 195-196 seek documents that “[a] former hotel server does not possess . . ..” (Support Memorandum at 3:21-23.) Perhaps. However, Defendant is entitled to a verified response to that effect, if, in fact, Plaintiff does not possess, have custody over, or control of, any such documents.

Plaintiff asserts that “[Request] Nos. 50 through 67 systematically target every sentence of the complaint’s standard alter ego, agency, respondeat superior, and joint employer allegations.” (Support Memorandum at 3:23-26.) The Court does not find that any of Request Nos. 50-52 relate to these allegations. The Court finds that Request No. 54 is nonsensical as it seeks documents relating to the definition of terms as used in the Complaint. However, the Court finds that the remaining Requests within this group each relate to a specific factual allegations set forth in the Complaint, and each is, therefore appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is GRANTED as to Request No.

54.

Plaintiff asserts that Request Nos. 56, 102, 291, 352, 359, 364-367, 372-375, and 376-378 “quote sentences from the complaint that are pure legal conclusions or citations to statutory standards, then demand ‘all documents’ supporting them.” (Support Memorandum at 4:1-4.)

The Court agrees as to Request Nos. 102, 352, 359, and 375. The Motion is, therefore, GRANTED as to these Requests.

The Court finds that Request Nos. 56, 291, 364-367, 372-374, and 376-378, however, contain factual allegations and are not therefore, “pure legal conclusions or citations to statutory standards.”

Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[Request] Nos. 478 through 481 each demand documents supporting Plaintiff’s allegation that she was employed by one of the four defendant entities, a transparent attempt to challenge the joint employer allegations through invasive discovery from Plaintiff rather than through proper dispositive motions.” (Support Memorandum at 7:23-27.) The argument is vague and ambiguous. However, the Court notes that each of the identified Requests seeks documents “that support, refer, and/or relate to YOUR allegation that you were employed directly or jointly by” one of the four Defendants. (See Declaration of Eli Banayan, Exh. A, and p.

91. Italics added.) Based on this language, the Court finds nothing improper with these Requests.

2. Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.020, subd. (b), 2019.030, subd. (c), 2031.060, subd. (h).)

As discussed in detail above, the Court finds that the breadth and extent of Defendant’s Requests for Production of Document was driven largely by the length and detail of Plaintiff’s Complaint in the action. As a result, the Court finds that Defendant acted with substantial justification in propounding the Discovery.

Plaintiff’s Request for an award of monetary sanctions is, therefore, DENIED.

**at 9:30 a.m.** Ryan Newberry v. Napasport, LLC 22CV000521

RENEWED MOTION TO DISBURSE THE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS

TENTATIVE RULING: Good cause appearing, no objections being filed, and the moving party having sufficiently addressed the Court’s previous concerns raised through its September 12, 2025 Minute Order, the motion is GRANTED.

The moving party failed to include in the notice of this motion proper notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 2.9. Moving party is directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the missing notice to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of

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