Metropolitan Wines LLC et al v. Allied World Assurance Company Inc. et al

Defendant Allied World Assurance Company (US), Inc. (Allied) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a), 576, and Rule of Court 3.1324, for leave to file a SACC to add a second cause of action for reimbursement based on the same factual allegations currently supporting their sole cause of action for rescission. Allied further seeks leave to file an Amended Answer to Metropolitan's Third Amended Complaint to revise the Sixth Affirmative Defense for Rescission to elaborate on the bases for its rescission defense and to also add a Seventh Affirmative Defense.

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a).) Similarly, “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.)

Typically, a court will exercise its discretion liberally in favor of allowing amendment of the pleadings in order that litigation may be tried on its merits. (See Kauffman v. Bobo & Wood (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 322, 323.) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)

The Court finds that the motion is timely made. The parties appear to be in accord that the proposed amendments would not allege any additional facts. Rather, by the SACC, Allied seeks to make clear that, in addition to the remedy of rescission, it seeks, in the alternative, a remedy of reimbursement of amounts paid out under the policy. Similarly, by the Second Amended Answer, Allied seeks to clarify and assure its right to assert the same legal theory as a defense to Plaintiff’s claims.

Allied asserts that the importance of the amendments became clear only when Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 22, 2026. (Capell Decl. at ¶ 7.) That Allied brings the motion in time for Metropolitan to revise and reassert its pending Motion for Summary Judgment supports a finding that the motion is timely made.

Through its Opposition, Metropolitan contends that this assertion demonstrates that the motion is brought for an improper, tactical purpose. The Court is unpersuaded. The Court finds, from the nature of the allegations of the currently operative cross-complaint and answer to the TAC that, while the amendment does not appear strictly necessary to enable Allied to seek reimbursement and/or seek to defend against Metropolitans claims based on the current allegations of omission and misrepresentation in the absence of rescission of the policy,

permitting the amendment would clarify Allied’s intentions to assert these legal theories through the proceedings.

Importantly, Metropolitan fails to identify any specific prejudice that it would suffer from the proposed amendments.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is GRANTED.

Flor de Maria “Pamela” Huamanialdaz v. Remington 25CV001897 Lodging & Hospitality, LLC et al

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is excused from any obligation to respond to Request Nos. 54, 102, 352, 359, 375, 453, 461, 462, and/or 464 in the Subject Discovery (defined below). The request for a protective order is DENIED as to all other Requests. Plaintiff is granted 30 calendar days leave from entry of the instant order to respond to the Subject Discovery, excepting the Requests identified above. The request for an award of monetary sanctions is DENIED.

The moving party failed to include in the notice of this motion proper notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 2.9. Moving party is directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the missing notice to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

A. NATURE OF MOTION

Plaintiff Flor De Maria “Pamela” Huamanialdaz moves, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017.020, 2019.030, 2030.090, and 2031.060, for entry of a protective order “with respect to the excessive, oppressive, and otherwise improper Requests for Production of Documents (‘the RPDs’) that Defendant Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC (‘Defendant’) has propounded on Plaintiff.”2 (Notice of Motion at 1:28-2:5.) Plaintiff also requests an award of monetary sanctions against Defendant and/or its counsel of record.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Request for Protective Order

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will 2 The Court, herein, refers to this Set of Requests for Production as the “Subject Discovery” and to each of the requests set forth therein as Request No. X.

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