Montecito Water District v. Miradero LLC

In addition, the 1924 Indentures granted to the District a "right of way" over portions of the Carpenter Tract, now Miradero's Property, for laying and maintenance of pipelines (Pipeline Easement). (Compl., P.P. 9, 11, Ex. 1 at pp. 4-6 & Ex. 2.) The Pipeline Easement indicated it was "for all the uses and purposes of laying, operating and maintaining pipe lines" over the described Pipeline Easement. (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 4 & Ex. 2; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 7-10.) There is only one public road, Park Lane, by which the District can access the Reservoir. (Compl., P. 5.)

There are three access roads from Park Lane that lead to the Reservoir, each of which traverses over Miradero's Property to reach the Reservoir (collectively, Access Roads). (Compl., P.P. 5, 14.) The Reservoir cannot be accessed through the Third Party Parcel. (Ibid.; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 11-15.) One of the Access Roads, depicted by a pink line in paragraph 14 of the complaint, runs along or within the Pipeline Easement. (Compl., P.P. 14-15.) Although the District has historically traversed the Property through the Pipeline Easement, it has also routinely accessed the Reservoir through the other Access Roads from Park Lane. (Compl., P. 21; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 14-16.)

The Reservoir is presently in need of significant maintenance and upgrading, including the demolition and removal of the existing roof, the installation of a new roof, the construction of concrete forms with rebar, and the pouring of concrete for the new walls and roof (Project). (Compl., P. 17.) The existing floor will be reused and the new walls will be built within the old walls. (Ibid.) Total construction time of the Project is expected to be 18 months, with concrete being poured over a two-month period. (Ibid.; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 18-21.)

There are two temporary parking areas for the Project (collectively, Parking Areas). (Compl., P. 16.) As shown in the verified complaint, the Parking Areas are not accessible by the Access Road that runs along or within the Pipeline Easement. (Compl., P.P. 14, 16.) The Parking Areas are located along a different Access Road that is further to the east, depicted by a blue line in paragraph 14 of the complaint. (Ibid.) The Parking Area closest to the Reservoir is 2,100 square feet and will be used for day parking of construction vehicles. (Compl., P. 16.)

The other Parking Area is 1,100 square feet and will be used for day parking of concrete trucks while concrete is being poured. (Ibid.; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 16-17.)

The District recently informed Miradero that it needs and plans to traverse the Property to access the Reservoir and to use the Parking Areas. (Compl., P. 19.) Miradero has objected on the grounds that such uses constitute an impermissible expansion of Miradero's rights under the Pipeline Easement. (Compl., P. 20, Ex. 3.) The District filed this action to confirm its right to access the Reservoir via the Access Roads for the Project, including use of the Parking Areas. (Compl., P. 3; see also Kanold Decl., P.P. 21-22.)

After service of the complaint, on March 3, 2026, the District filed a motion for preliminary injunction (PI) requesting an order enjoining Miradero from denying the Distrct access to the Property so that the Distrct may undertake required maintenance on the Reservoir while this action is pending. The motion argues that the District has an access easement or license to traverse the Property for maintenance and operation of the Reservoir under the theory of implied easement, equitable easement, or irrevocable license.

The District argues that a PI is warranted because the District is likely to prevail on the merits and the balance of interim harms favors the District. The District's motion is opposed by Miradero.

Analysis: (1) The 1924 Indentures The March 12, 1924, Indenture was between Frederic and Emma C. Carpenter (collectively, the Carpenters), on the one hand, and the District, on the other hand. (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 1.) The District was "desirous of acquiring for public use the said Reservoir Tract and [R]eservoir ...." (Id. at p. 3.) In exchange for the nominal sum of $10, Frederic conveyed to the District the Reservoir Tract, "[t]ogether with a right of way for all the uses and purposes of laying, operating and maintaining pipe lines." (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 4.)

The right-of-way, or Pipeline Easement, includes several narrow strips (3 to 12 feet) of land for "the free right and liberty, from time to time ... to enter in or upon such ways ... to lay water pipes necessary or convenient ... or to repair said ways or any and all pipe lines installed thereon." (Id. at pp. 4-5.) "And in consideration of the foregoing ... [P.] (a) The District on taking possession [of the Reservoir Tract] will cause the said [R]eservoir to be housed in in (sic) a thorough and substantial manner; [P.] [and] (b) The District will maintain and preserve the retaining banks of said [R]eservoir ...." (collectively, Upkeep Obligations) (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 7.) "The District on the passing of title hereby will assume and discharge all and singular the obligation and agreements undertaken or entered into by [the Carpenters] with their grantees, both present and prospective, in so far as said obligations and agreements concern or affect the [water] ... impounded by said District ...." (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 8.)

The March 24, 1924, Indenture appears to confirm the prior obligations and agreements in the March 12 Indenture between the Carpenters and the District. (Compl., Ex. 2.) The District indicates that the March 24 Indenture granted an additional easement as to pipelines. (Kanold Decl., P. 10.)

(2) Standard for Preliminary Injunctions "An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 525.) "An injunction may be granted in the following cases: "(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. "(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. "(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. "(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. "(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. "(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. "(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 526, subd. (a).)

"As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim. [Citation.] To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. [P.] Past California decisions further establish that, as a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.... ' The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (White v.

Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, original italics (White).)

"A preliminary injunction is proper only if there is a substantial basis to suppose that the defendant, if not restrained, will actually engage in the conduct sought to be enjoined. Such an injunction 'cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents' fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.' [Citations.]" (Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1410.)

"The trial court's determination must be guided by a 'mix' of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. [Citation.] Of course, '[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.' [Citation.] A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim." (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)

(3) Miradero's Position According to Miradero, the Project exceeds the limited and narrow access permitted by the Pipeline Easement. Miradero argues that it has only granted the District periodic access exceeding the Pipeline Easement under limited circumstances. (Crawford Decl., P. 5.) For example, additional access was granted in June 2013 to repair a driveway and again in December 2017 after the Thomas Fire to repair the Reservoir's wooden roof. (Ibid.) However, according to Miradero, after each temporary and limited event of expanded access granted by Miradero, the District's access reverted to the more restricted access permitted by the Pipeline Easement. (Id. at P. 6.)

As argued by Miradero, the current Project exceeds the previous emergency-based access after the Thomas Fire in 2017. Miradero cites District's approvals under the California Environmental Quality Act. (Compendium, Ex. 11.) Miradero notes the Project will involve the use of various heavy construction equipment including backhoe, concrete/industrial saw, compactor, compressor, crane, excavator, rough terrain forklift, generator, grader, rubber-tired loader, paver, paving equipment, and welders. (Id. at p. 42.)

Additionally, the Project will involve the export of 720 cubic yards of soil material and 483.6 tons of demolition debris. (Ibid.) The Project will also involve 380 one-way delivery trips for concrete. (Ibid.) The Project will generate vehicle trips including 9 to 25 worker trips per day, 0 to 3 vendor trips per day, and 0 to 3 haul trips per day. (Id. at pp. 120-121.) H eavy construction equipment and vehicles involved in the Project will need to traverse and park on Miradero's Property. (Compl, P. 17.)

The District estimates that the Project will take an estimated 18 months. (Ibid.)

According to Miradero, the District's Project exceeds the scope of the Pipeline Easement. The Pipeline Easement is limited to the pink line depicted in paragraph 14 of the complaint. The other Access Roads that the District intends to use for the Project are represented by the yellow and blue lines, even though those are not contained in the Pipeline Easement. (Compl., P. 14.) Furthermore, as argued by Miradero, the Pipeline Easement does not permit the District to drive and park construction vehicles and heavy construction equipment on the Property, nor permit this type of access for an 18-month period.

According to Miradero, the narrow and limited purpose of laying and repairing water pipelines was premised on the condition that Miradero's Property will not incur any damage because of the District's access. Miradero argues that the District's intended use of the Property constitutes an unconstitutional taking. According to Miradero, the District is required to follow eminent domain procedures. Miradero argues that California law "does not permit a public agency to take private property for public use by means of a preliminary injunction." (City of Needles v.

Griswold (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1881, 1895.)

Miradero argues that an "owner of an easement cannot change its character, or materially increase the burden upon the servient estate, or injuriously affect the rights of other persons, but within the limits named he may make repairs, improvements, or changes that do not affect its substance." (Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894) 104 Cal. 248, 252). According to Miradero, "[t]he law never imposes an implied easement ... contrary to the express intent of the parties." (Los Angeles County v. Bartlett (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 523, 529.)

Miradero further argues that an easement based on equity or necessity should not be found under these circumstances, and there is no basis to find an irrevocable license. Miradero argues that the balance of harms weighs against granting a PI because Miradero's constitutional rights for due process and just compensation for the taking of private property for public use will be violated if the motion is granted. Furthermore, as argued by Miradero, the California Constitution confirms these due process rights and requires just compensation prior to any taking. (See Cal.

Const. Art. I, Sec. 19; Civ. Code Sec. 1002, subd. (b).) Miradero argues the District will not suffer irreparable harm because the harm identified by the District can be avoided if the District pays Miradero just compensation for the use of the Property. Miradero reasons, therefore, that the only harm to the District is pecuniary in nature. As argued by Miradero, any loss can be mitigated if the District pays Miradero just compensation.

(4) The District's Position According to the District, Miradero improperly conflates the Pipeline Easement with the District's Upkeep Obligations. The District argues that its access rights under the 1924 Indentures are not limited to the Pipeline Easement. Rather, the 1924 Indentures require the District to house the Reservoir in a thorough and substantial manner and to maintain and preserve its banks. (See Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 7.) The District argues that its Upkeep Obligations necessarily encompass the periodic and complete replacement of major structural components required to ensure the continued and safe operation of the Reservoir.

The District argues that these Upkeep Obligations imply access that, from time to time, exceeds what is expressly granted in the Pipeline Easement pertaining to water pipelines. According to the District, the key issue is whether the Project is necessary to properly house the Reservoir and preserve its banks. If it is, then the Project falls within the type of activity and access contemplated by the 1924 Indentures. And because this periodic access in addition to the Pipeline Easement is implicitly permitted pursuant to the 1924 Indentures, the District's use of the Property for purposes reasonably related to its Upkeep Obligations do not constitute an unconstitutional taking.

The District argues the balance of the harms weighs in favor of granting the PI because delays would cause the District to miss its funding deadline and the public would incur unnecessary firefighting and safety impacts if the PI is not issued.

(5) The District's Evidence of Irreparable Harm "In general, if the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied." (Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.) However, money damages "are not typically an adequate remedy when the contract involves unique real property." (Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1380.) The District notes the Reservoir is the third largest water storage facility owned or operated by the Distrct. (Kanold Decl., P. 4.)

The Property and the Reservoir Tract lie "within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone." (Kanold Decl., P.P. 25-26.) The Reservoir "is a critical component of the District's water system and provides potable water storage, fire-flow capacity, and system-wide pressure regulation." (Kanold Decl., P. 4.) According to the District, reservoirs "provide immediately available stored water that can be delivered at high flow rates to support firefighting operations and are key to maintaining minimum system pressure." (Kanold Decl., P. 27; see also Compendium, Ex. 8.) "Reservoir storage allows the District to maintain system pressure, respond to outages, and provide fire-flow capacity.

Without adequate storage, service interruptions could occur." (Kanold Decl., P. 28.)

The Project will replace the wooden roof previously impacted by the Thomas Fire with a concrete, two-way slab. (Kanold Decl., P. 28.) This will offer greater protection to the Reservoir and the community during fire season. (Ibid.) The District provided evidence that new reinforced concrete walls and foundations are required to meet current seismic standards. (Kanold Decl., P. 29 & Compendium, Ex. 9 at pp. 17, 58.) The District has secured public funding for the Project, which will cost approximately $5,574,367. (Kanold Decl., P. 31.)

The funding agreement with the State Water Resources Control Board requires completion of the Project by September 30, 2027. (Kanold Decl., P. 31 & Compendium, Ex. 14.) Without timely access, the District will lose the grant funding. (Kanold Decl., P. 31.) The District has caried its burden to demonstrate the Reservoir is a unique property providing a unique service to the community and that money damages are insufficient if the PI is not granted. The court is particularly persuaded as to the firefighting and community safety issues.

Miradero concedes "the potential firefighting and safety benefits that this Project can bring ...." (Opp., p. 15, l. 23.)

(6) Likelihood of Success on the Mertis " 'An easement is an interest in the land of another, which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of the other's land. [Citations.] [P.] An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in another's possession and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.' [Citation.] [E]asements may be created by an express grant, an implied grant, or by prescription." (Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 295, 304-305, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The first cause of action seeks a judgment confirming an easement by implication that the District is entitled to reasonable access to the Property to perform its Upkeep Obligations under the 1924 Indentures. (Compl., p. 8, l. 20 - p. 10, l. 21.) The second cause of action seeks similar relief on the basis of an equitable easement. (Compl., p. 10, l. 22 - p. 12, l. 12.)

"The law does not favor the implication of easements. Such implication can only be made in connection with a conveyance, and[,] in view of the rule that a conveyance is to be construed against the grantor, the court will imply an easement in favor of the grantee more easily than it will imply an easement in favor of a grantor. Whether an easement arises by implication on a conveyance of real estate depends on the intent of the parties, which must clearly appear in order to sustain an easement by implication. In order to determine the intent, the court will take into consideration the circumstances attending the transaction, the particular situation of the parties, and the state of the thing granted." (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 (Thorstrom).)

An "easement will be implied when, at the time of conveyance of property, the following conditions exist: 1) the owner of property conveys or transfers a portion of that property to another; 2) the owner's prior existing use of the property was of a nature that the parties must have intended or believed that the use would continue; meaning that the existing use must either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have been so obviously and apparently permanent that the parties should have known of the use; and 3) the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement. [Citation.] 'The purpose of the doctrine of implied easements is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances.' [Citation.]

An easement by implication will not be found absent clear evidence that it was intended by the parties." (Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.) "The question of whether an easement by implication arose is a question of fact for the determination of the trier of fact in the trial court. [Citation.] [A] subsidiary question of fact is whether the claimed easement is reasonably necessary." (Leonard v. Haydon (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 263, 274.)

Here, the 1924 Indentures conveyed a portion of the Carpenter Tract--namely, the Reservoir Tract--to the District. (Compl., Exs. 1-2.) At the time of the 1924 Indentures, it appears there was a prior existing use of the Reservoir for purposes of storing and distributing water. (Compl., Ex. 1 at pp. 1-11.) It appears the parties to the 1924 Indentures intended for the District to maintain and upkeep the Reservoir "for public use," subject to certain existing water rights described therein. (Id. at p. 3.)

To that end, the 1924 Indentures require the District to "maintain and preserve the retaining banks" of the Reservoir and to "cause the said [R]eservoir to be housed in [] a thorough and substantial manner." (Id. at p. 7.) The parties do not reasonably dispute this intent as evidenced by the 1924 Indentures. The parties do dispute whether the District's access rights are limited solely to the Pipeline Easement. As discussed, the Upkeep Obligations require the District to "cause the said [R]eservoir to be housed in [] a thorough and substantial manner" and to "maintain and preserve the retaining banks of said [R]eservoir." (Compl., Ex. 1 at 7.)

In comparison, the Pipeline Easement is for "the free right and liberty, from time to time ... to enter in or upon such ways ... to lay water pipes necessary or convenient ... or to repair said ways or any and all pipe lines installed thereon." (Ibid.) The Pipeline Easement appears to address issues pertaining to "water pipes" running to or from the Reservoir and does not appear to address the District's distinct Upkeep Obligations of the Reservoir itself. The Upkeep Obligations appear distinct from the Pipeline Easement.

The District has presented evidence that the parties to the 1924 Indentures intended for the District to have periodic, reasonable access to the Property in order for the District to carry out its Upkeep Obligations. (Kanold Decl., P.P. 12-32.) The Upkeep Obligations are mandatory and were part of the consideration exchanged for the 1924 Indentures. (Compl., Ex. 1 at p. 7.) It is reasonable to infer that the parties intended that the District would have reasonable access to the Property to carry out these mandatory duties.

The District has presented evidence that it cannot reasonably carry out the Upkeep Obligations without use of the Access Roads and Parking Areas. (Kanold Decl., P.P. 12-32.) Miradero has not presented contrary evidence. (See Crawford Decl., P.P. 2-6.) The District has preliminarily demonstrated a likelihood that the 1924 Indentures conveyed an implied easement for reasonable access to the Reservoir for purposes of carrying out the District's Upkeep Obligations. (See Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.)

Alternatively, the District has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its second cause of action for equitable easement. (See Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1008-1010.)

(7) Balance of Harm Located on Miradero's Property is a single family home, a pool cottage, a caretaker's residence, and other improvements (collectively, the Residence). (Crawford Decl., P. 2.) Miradero objects to the Project because it will interfere with the use and enjoyment of the Residence. Miradero argues that this dispute could be avoided if the District fairly compensated Miradero for the use of the Property in excess of what is permitted under the Pipeline Easement. Miradero submits evidence that the Property has been rented out to third parties "over the years" and that one tenant paid rent in the amount of $100,000 per month. (Crawford Decl., P. 4.)

However, Miradero does not submit evidence of actual rental income that will be lost as a result of the Project. (See Crawford Decl., P.P. 2-6.) Miradero submits evidence that the Residence serves as a seasonal residence whereby the owners spend a minimum of 90 days a year. (Crawford Decl., P. 3.) Moreover, a year-round property manager resides in the caretaker's residence and the cottage is also occupied from time to time. (Ibid.) However, Miradero does not submit evidence that the Residence cannot be occupied during the Project. (See Crawford Decl., P.P. 2-6.)

According to the evidence submitted by the District, both Parking Areas are well covered by trees, meaning that the parked vehicles will not be readily visible from the Residence. (Kanold Decl., P.P. 16-17 & Compendium, Exs. 3, 4, 5, 7.) The Property is sizable and the Residence is located on the west side of the Property. (Kanold Decl., P.P. 16-19.) The District's access can follow a historic Access Road located on the east side of the Property that is away from the Residence, which is often referred to as, "the service entrance route." (Kanold Decl., P.P. 14, 16, 19.)

Any construction-related parking will be temporary, located toward the rear of the Property, and screened by mature trees. (Kanold Decl., P. 19.) The Reservoir is 650 feet away from the house and not visible from it. (Ibid.) Construction activities will be undertaken only during working hours, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, with no work on Federal Holidays. (Ibid.)

If a PI is not granted permitting the District access pertaining to its Upkeep Obligations, the potential increased fire and safety risk to the community cannot be reduced to monetary damages. In comparison, based on the evidence presented, it appears that Miradero can be fairly compensated with monetary damages pertaining to any lost rent if the District does not ultimately prevail in this action. It does appear the Project may impact Miradero's use and enjoyment of the Property, but Miradero's ownership of the Property is subject to the Upkeep Obligations of the District. Moreover, Miradero could file a cross-claim against the District seeking monetary damages pertaining to lost rent and the value of any alleged taking.

The court has considered Miradero's constitutional argument that the District is imposing an easement for public use without just compensation. "[W]hen private property is taken for public use, '[t]he just compensation to which the owner is constitutionally entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken. [Citation.]' This 'means substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been taken. ' " (Redevelopment Agency v.

Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 796-797, original italics.) If the District is successful on the merits that an easement was already implied for public use, there would not be a taking. If the District is unsuccessful, just compensation for any taking can be calculated, plus interest. (Ibid.) "[I]f the government pays for condemned property only after taking and using it, the owners 'are entitled to have the full equivalent of the value of [its] use at the time of the taking paid contemporaneously with the taking. ' An award in the nature of interest 'at a proper rate' is a 'fair and reasonable' reimbursement for the deferred payment." (Ibid.)

Based on the evidence before the court, the balance of the harm weighs in favor of granting the PI requested by the District. (See White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554.) The public interest also weighs in favor of granting the PI. (See People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 272.)

(8) Undertaking "On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 529, subd. (a); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1130.) However, this undertaking requirement does not apply to a public entity, including "[a] county, city, or district, or public authority, public agency, or other political subdivision in the state, or an officer of the local public entity in an official capacity or on behalf of the local public entity." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 529, subd. (b)(3), 995.220, subd. (b).)

(9) Request for Judicial Notice The District requests that the court take judicial notice of the demurrer filed by Miradero on April 16, 2026. The court already has access to these documents. A citation is sufficient. Further, Miradero's arguments in its demurrer were not material to the court's ruling. "There is ... a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form--any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue." (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.) The court will deny the District's request for judicial notice.

(10) Conclusion After weighing the likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of interim harm, and considering all the evidence presented by the parties, the court will grant the District's motion for PI. (See White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554.)

Tentative Ruling: Conservatorship of Ted Marshall Kent Tentative Ruling: Conservatorship of Ted Marshall Kent