Alcantar v. General Motors, LLC

Case No.: 25CV461594

This is a lemon law action. Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) demurs to the first through fifth causes of action alleged in the first amended complaint (“FAC”) filed by plaintiff Monica Alcantar (“Alcantar”).

On April 23, 2026, the court heard argument regarding GM’s demurrer to the FAC. The court requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the statute of limitations period outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 bars Alcantar’s first and second causes of action. The court set out the following briefing schedule: GM was to submit its brief by April 30, 2026, Alcantar was to file a response by May 7, 2026, and GM was to file a reply by May 14, 2026. GM filed its brief on April 29, 2026. Alcantar filed a response on May 8, 2026—the court exercises its discretion to consider Alcantar’s untimely response.

The court addresses below the arguments raised by the parties in their supplemental briefing as to the FAC’s first and second causes of action. The court GRANTS GM’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit A pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). (See GM’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Supplemental Briefing (“RJN”), pp. 1:1-2:11; Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h).)

The court SUSTAINS GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s first and second causes of action with 20 days’ leave to amend. Alcantar appears to contend that Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 did not become operative until July 1, 2025. (Alcantar’s Opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer, pp. 5:23-7:9.) However, Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 and 871.21 went into effect on January 1, 2025. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.20, 871.21.) It was therefore operative when Alcantar filed this action on March 18, 2025.

Furthermore, the opt-in requirement for manufacturers became effective on April 2, 2025 (i.e., after Alcantar filed this action in March 2025). (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.20, 871.29, 871.30.) Thus, GM did not need to opt-in for Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 and 871.21 to be operative when Alcantar filed this action. Moreover, even if GM was required to opt-in to Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 and 871.21, it appears that GM did timely opt-in. (See RJN, Ex. A; Code Civ. Proc., § 871.30.)

Ultimately, then, the court agrees with GM that the statute of limitations period outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 applies to the facts at hand. (See Supplemental Brief in Support of FAC, pp. 1:18-2:21.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, the applicable statute of limitations was six years from the original delivery date. (Code Civ. Pro. § 871.21.) Here, Alcantar purchased a 2015 Chevrolet Cruze (the “Subject Vehicle”) in June 2015. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Alcantar needed to initiate the action by June 2021.

Alcantar did not initiate this action until March 2025.

The court turns to the parties’ due process arguments. Where a “change in remedy, as, for example, the shortening of a time limit provision, is made retroactive, there must be a reasonable time permitted for the party affected to avail himself of his remedy before the statute takes effect. If the statute operates immediately to cut off the existing remedy, or within so short a time as to give the party no reasonable opportunity to exercise his remedy, then the retroactive application of it is unconstitutional as to such party.” (Rosefield Packing Co. v.

Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco (1935) 4 Cal.2d 120, 122-123 (Rosefield), internal citation omitted.) “In California, statutes of limitations, being procedural, are normally retroactively applied to accrued causes of action; but the court must inquire whether, in a given case, that retrospective application may violate due process by in effect eliminating the plaintiff’s right.” (Aronson v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 294, 297.) The Court of Appeal in Rosefield held that a year was “no doubt” a reasonable time and noted that “[m]uch shorter periods have been upheld. [Citations.]” (Rosefield, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 123.)

Here, Alcantar was given such a reasonable time. AB 1755, enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20 et seq., became law on September 29, 2024, but did not go into effect until January 1, 2025. Litigants were given a window of more than three months to file claims that would otherwise expire, like Alcantar’s. Alcantar was given a reasonable amount of time to bring the claims and did not do so. Alcantar’s due process rights have not been violated.

Moreover, to violate due process, Rosefield requires that the “change in remedy” must cut off an existing remedy. Causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act have a four-year statute of limitations which accrues, at the earliest, upon tender of delivery. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 (Mexia).) Four years after June 6, 2015, was June 6, 2019. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Alcantar filed the complaint in March 2025. Thus, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 did not cut off Alcantar’s existing remedy.

The FAC does not allege facts sufficient to invoke any of the tolling doctrines that it references. (FAC, ¶ 32.) As to the discovery rule, the FAC does not explain when and how Alcantar discovered GM’s allegedly wrongful conduct—the generic allegation that Alcantar did so “shortly before” filing the complaint is insufficient. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-41; see Fox v. Ethicon Endo- Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.) As to the “repair doctrine,” the FAC is devoid of allegations that Alcantar notified the manufacturer or seller of their failure to fix any issues within 60 days of completion of repairs or services. (See Civ.

Code, 1795.6, subd. (b).) As to the “class action tolling” doctrine, the FAC identifies no class action that could potentially toll any applicable statute of limitations here. (See Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538, 554.) As to the doctrines of equitable tolling, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel, when a plaintiff relies on any of these theories “to save a cause of action that otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or she must specifically plead facts which, if proved, would support the theory. [Citation.]” (Mills v.

Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, internal citations omitted.) For reasons the court has already discussed, the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to support application of these theories here. (See Community Cause v. Boatwright (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 888, 900; Mitchell v. State Dept. of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1008.)

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s third cause of action. Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20 plainly states that it applies to a violation of section 1793.2, subdivisions (b) or (d), not subdivision (a)(3)—the FAC’s third cause of action alleges liability under Code of Civil Procedure section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3). (Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20, subd. (a).)

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s fourth cause of action. GM argues that the “delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims.” (MPA, p. 12:15-21, citing Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2020) 487 F.Supp.3d 845, 854, fn. 3.) GM is incorrect that the delayed discovery doctrine never applies to implied warranty claims. (See Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1309-1311 [stating that “by giving the implied warranty a limited prospective existence beyond the time of delivery, the Legislature created the possibility that the implied warranty could be breached after delivery . . . when a buyer has accepted a tender of goods, he or she must, within a reasonable time after he or she discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy . . . [i]f the Legislature intended the duration provision to impose a deadline for consumers to give notice of defects under the Song-Beverly Act, it could have easily done so . . . [i]t did not . . . we interpret the duration provision as providing the implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act with a limited prospective existence beyond the date of delivery.”]; see also Yeager v.

Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3805, at *7 [stating that “[t]he issue is whether a purchaser can sue more than five years after the purchase on the theory that a latent defect lurked within the vehicle not reasonably discoverable by him until after the year ran such that the fouryear limitations period began only upon discovery . . . [t]he answer is yes. The implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. [Citation]”]; see also Tanner v.

Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 424 F.Supp.3d 666, 671-672 [stating that “the statute of limitations for implied warranty claims does not run at tender . . . [i]t runs at discovery . . . the discovery rule applies to implied warranty claims. [Citation.]”].)

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s fifth cause of action. GM argues that Alcantar “cannot invoke the delayed discovery rule because [Alcantar] affirmatively states that the alleged ‘[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period . . .’” (MPA, p. 13:6-8, citing FAC, ¶ 20.) According to GM, Alcantar fails to plead facts showing that she was not negligent in failing to make “the discovery sooner.” (Id. at p. 13:6-14, citing Hobart v.

Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 437; Johnson v. Ehrgott (1934) 1 Cal.2d 136, 137.) The question of whether Alcantar was “not negligent” in her discovery is a factual issue that cannot be decided on a demurrer—it does not present a deficiency on the face of the pleading. Moreover, Alcantar has alleged a history of repair attempts in which she presented the Subject Vehicle to GM’s authorized repair facility, and these facilities represented that they had repaired the Subject Vehicle. (See FAC, ¶¶ 11-12.)

As to GM’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the allegations supporting the FAC’s fifth cause of action, the FAC alleges that Alcantar entered into a warranty contract with GM, GM advertised to Alcantar regarding the Subject Vehicle, the Subject Vehicle exhibited defects, GM knew of these defects and failed to disclose them, GM intended to defraud Alcantar, and Alcantar would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle had she known of these defects. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-13, 71-100.) These allegations are sufficient. (See Dhital v.

Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-844 (Dhital).) Although the Supreme Court initially granted review in Dhital, it subsequently dismissed review, which means Dhital is precedential authority. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(2).) The court is also not convinced by GM’s economic loss rule argument. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833, 837-841.)

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Case Name: Monica Alcantar v. General Motors LLC Case No.: 25CV461594

This is a lemon law action. Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) demurs to the first through fifth causes of action alleged in the first amended complaint (“FAC”) filed by plaintiff Monica Alcantar (“Alcantar”).

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s first through third causes of action. GM argues that these causes of action are barred by the statute of repose and statute of limitations outlined in Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 and 871.21. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of GM’s Demurrer (“MPA”), pp. 10:6-11:27.) First, Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20 plainly states that it applies to a violation of section 1793.2, subdivisions (b) or (d), not subdivision (a)(3)—the FAC’s third cause of action alleges liability under Code of Civil section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3). (Code Civ.

Proc. § 871.20, subd. (a).) Moreover, in order for GM to rely on sections 871.20 or 871.21, it needs to have “elect[ed] to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles . . .” (Code Civ. Proc. § 871.29, subds. (a), (b); see also Code Civ. Proc. § 871.30, subd. (c).) GM has not demonstrated that it has met this requirement—the FAC does not allege that GM made any such election, GM does not argue or demonstrate that it much such an election in its memorandum of points and authorities in support of demurrer, and GM does not request that the court judicially notice any election. (E-Fab, Inc. v.

Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 [“In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.”], internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Instead, GM states in its reply, for the first time, that it complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21’s opt-in provision and directs the court to a website link. (GM’s Reply in Support of Demurrer, p. 3:1-11.)

A court cannot rely on this type of extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer. (Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 597, fn. 1.)

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s fourth cause of action. GM argues that the “delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims.” (MPA, p. 12:15-21, citing Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2020) 487 F.Supp.3d 845, 854, fn. 3.) GM is incorrect that the delayed discovery doctrine never applies to implied warranty claims. (See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1309-1311 [stating that “by giving the implied warranty a limited prospective existence beyond the time of delivery, the Legislature created the possibility that the implied warranty could be breached after delivery . . . when a buyer has accepted a tender of goods, he or she must, within a reasonable time after he or she discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy . . . [i]f the Legislature intended the duration provision to impose a deadline for consumers to give notice of defects under the Song-Beverly Act, it could have easily done so . . . [i]t did not . . . we interpret the duration provision as providing the implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Act with a limited prospective existence beyond the date of delivery.”]; see also Yeager v.

Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3805, at *7 [stating that “[t]he issue is whether a purchaser can sue more than five years after the purchase on the theory that a latent defect lurked within the vehicle not reasonably discoverable by him until after the year ran such that the four-year limitations period began only upon discovery . . . [t]he answer is yes. The implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. [Citation]”]; see also Tanner v.

Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 424 F.Supp.3d 666, 671-672 [stating that “the statute of limitations for implied warranty claims does not run at tender . . . [i]t runs at discovery . . . the discovery rule applies to implied warranty claims. [Citation.]”].)

The court OVERRULES GM’s demurrer to the FAC’s fifth cause of action. GM argues that Alcantar “cannot invoke the delayed discovery rule because [Alcantar] affirmatively states that the alleged ‘[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period . . .’” (MPA, p. 13:6-8, citing FAC, ¶ 20.) According to GM, Alcantar fails to plead facts showing that she was not negligent in failing to make “the discovery sooner.” (Id. at p. 13:6-14, citing Hobart v.

Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412, 437; Johnson v. Ehrgott (1934) 1 Cal.2d 136, 137.) The question of whether Alcantar was “not negligent” in her discovery is a factual issue that cannot be decided on a demurrer—it does not present a deficiency on the face of the pleading. Moreover, Alcantar has alleged a history of repair attempts in which she presented the 2015 Chevrolet Cruze she purchased (the “Subject Vehicle”) to GM’s authorized repair facility, and these facilities represented that they had repaired the Subject Vehicle. (See FAC, ¶¶ 11-12.)

As to GM’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the allegations supporting the FAC’s fifth cause of action, the FAC alleges that Alcantar entered into a warranty contract with GM, GM advertised to Alcantar regarding the Subject Vehicle, the Subject Vehicle exhibit defects, GM knew of these defects and failed to disclose them, GM intended to defraud Alcantar, and Alcantar would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle had she known of these defects. (FAC, ¶¶ 6-13, 71-100.) These allegations are sufficient. (See Dhital v.

Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-844 (Dhital).) Although the Supreme Court initially granted review in Dhital, it subsequently dismissed review, which means Dhital is precedential authority. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(2).) The court is also not convinced by GM’s economic loss rule argument. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833, 837-841.)

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