TORAL VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC

1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME PATTERSON VS FAMILY MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS CVPS2301768 HEALTH & SUPPORT COUNSEL NETWORK, INC Tentative Ruling: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Darelyn Patterson GRANTED.

Motion to withdraw as attorney of record granted upon compliance with CRC Rule 3.1362(e). Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiff, effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed court order upon the client. Jury Trial set for 6.05.26 converted to Trial Setting Conference and Status Hearing re representation for Plaintiff.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES BY TORAL VS GENERAL CVPS2505603 ANGEL TORAL, YANELYS PALMER MOTORS LLC RODRIGUEZ Tentative Ruling: Under Civil Code § 1794(d) (Song-Beverly), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

The parties settled at mediation. The settlement agreement states: “[r]easonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code shall be determined by the court by way of noticed motion. Defendant agrees Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of said fee motion.” (Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Nicholas M. Dillavoy.)

The matter of reasonableness of a party's attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062.) Courts generally consider several factors in determining the reasonableness of a party's attorney's fees. These include "the nature of the litigation, the difficulty of the litigation, the attention given to the issues, the success of the attorney's efforts, and time consumed. [Citation omitted.]” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 693, 708.)

Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, the court is entitled to make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case and the credibility of counsel’s declaration, unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. (See Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; see also Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.) Specifically, in exercising its discretion, the Court may consider all facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award. (Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)

Lodestar is the objective starting point to determine if attorney’s fees are reasonable. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242.) Lodestar is calculated by assessing the reasonable rate for comparable services in the local community, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case. (Id.) Lodestar requires the court to determine what a reasonable rate and number of hours expended is. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.)

A “prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (CCP §1032(b).) A prevailing party is “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Id. at (a)(4).) Neither party disputes that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and entitled to some costs.

CCP §1033.5 provides a list of costs that are allowable and those that are not. CCP §1033.5(c)(4) provides that any items not identified as allowable and not specifically identified as prohibited, may be permitted at the Court’s discretion. “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP §1033.5(c)(2).)

Pursuant to the Song Beverly Act, if the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed to recover, as a part of the judgment, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action. (Civil Code § 1794(d).) The additional term “expenses” was included in this section to cover items that would not otherwise be included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs” under CCP § 1033.5. (Jensen v. BMW of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, overruled on other grounds in Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 205.)

The hourly rate sought by counsel ranges from $745 to $945 an hour. (Declaration of Nicholas M. Dillavoy, Exhibit 5.) The paralegals’ hourly rates are $250. “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc., supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1095.) The rates sought are high for Riverside County. Jon Jacobs’ rate of $945 is reduced to $700. Nicolas Dillavou’s rate is reduced from $745 to $650 an hour. The amount sought for paralegals is also excessive. This rate is reduced to $200 an hour. This reduces the $23,280.50 sought in attorneys’ fees to $16,805.

Defendant also argues that the amount of time billed on this matter is not reasonable. It argues that many entries for.2 or.3 hours are improper because the tasks identified should have taken no more than.1 of an hour. This assertion is correct. There are 9 entries that will be reduced (7/31/25, 8/1/25, 8/26/25, 9/12/25, 9/15/25, 11/18/25, 12/10/25, 3/12/26, and 4/6/26). The tasks at issue were for signing documents, forwarding emails, leaving a voicemail, transferring a call, confirming receipt of a document, receiving emails, and tracking the filing of a complaint. The amount sought is reduced by $240 for this excessive billing (1.2 hours x $200).

Defendant also argues that there are duplicative billing entries. There are duplicative billing entries for the same work done on 8/26/25 and 9/15/25, 12/16/25, 1/14/26, 1/26/26, 1/27/26, and 2/23/26. The amount sought is reduced by another $240 (1.2 hours x $200).

Defendant argues that there are billing entries from March 2026 to April 2026 that were billed by counsel that should have been billed by paralegals. However, it fails to point to any specific entries. Defendant argues that had invoices been provided, this motion could have been avoided. However, it provides no evidence that it attempted to engage with Plaintiff and settle this matter.

Additionally, Defendant argues that no anticipated fees for preparing the reply or attending the hearing should be allowed. It is not unusual for parties to seek and the court to grant anticipated fees in connection with a motion for attorney’s fees. Defendant fails to provide any binding authority that said fees are not allowed.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff awarded $16,325 for fees and $928.01 in costs for total award of $17,253.01. Case Management Conference and OSC re dismissal per settlement confirmed for 6.24.26.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME DEMURRER ON 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR OTHER REAL CVPS2506302 SCOTT VS ZHANG PROPERTY (OVER $35,000) OF RICHARD SCOTT BY WYNNE F ZHANG Tentative Ruling: A party may object by demurrer to a complaint on grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP §430.10(e).)

For the purposes of a demurrer, the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) “In short, the ruling on a demurrer determines a legal issue on the basis of assumed facts, i.e., all those material, issuable facts properly pleaded in the complaint, regardless of whether they ultimately prove to be true.” (State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of America Corp. (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 225, 240.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

In granting a demurrer, courts must only consider properly pleaded or implied factual allegations that appear on the face of the complaint as well as judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

1st Cause of Action Cancellation of Instruments: Cancellation of instruments requires: (1) a written instrument; (2) a reasonable apprehension that it may cause serious injury to someone; and (3) as to whom it is void or voidable. (Civ. Code §3412.) “All that is required under section 3412 of the Civil Code, either in pleading or proof is to show the facts constituting the invalidity of the instrument, whether they involve fraud, duress, accident, and mistake.” (Keele v. Clouser (1929) 101 Cal. App. 500, 502.)

An action to cancel instruments related to the transfer of interest in property requires an interest in the property. (Osborne v. Abels (1939) 30 Cal. App. 2d 729, 731 [holding that a plaintiff without any title or interest in the property cannot maintain an action for cancellation of instruments or quiet title.]) It is undisputed that Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant even held title or any interest in the Subject Property. Plaintiffs allege that the chain of title for the Subject Property includes a Substitution of Trustee, which purports to substitute California TD Specialists as trustee under a DOT encumbering the Subject Property, originally naming Plaintiffs as trustors, Youland, Inc. as beneficiary, and First American Title Company as trustee. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-