Banks, et al, v. General Motors LLC, et al

Here, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wang had “illegally claimed” an interest in Plaintiff’s and her late husband’s assets through the creation and use of the fraudulent lease agreement [TAC, ¶23], this allegation is insufficient to demonstrate a violation under the CITA because Defendant Wang did not obtain credit, goods, services, money, or property from a third-party claimant. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that she has submitted an FTC identity theft report.

Twelfth cause (civil conspiracy): The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation of a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages. (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 212.)

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is insufficiently pleaded because the TAC does not sufficiently allege resulting damages because no assets were alleged to be wrongfully detained. However, here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy with each other by deceiving Plaintiff into relinquishing the keys to the Subject Property to Defendant Wang, who subsequently allowed Defendant King to move into the Subject Property without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.

As a result, Defendants stole and obtained fair market value rental funds that Plaintiff could have earned from the rental of the Subject Property. Plaintiff further alleges that she suffered additional damages due to the following: (1) a Dyson vacuum cleaner was no longer working, (2) a whole set of brand new tableware is missing, (3) a cross is missing, (4) a piano was damaged, (5) a wall was damaged, and (5) electric bills were left unpaid. (TAC, ¶¶171-175, 181, 185, & 191.) Such allegations are sufficient to demonstrate the existence of resulting damages for a civil conspiracy claim in the pleading stage.

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18. Banks, et al, v. General Motors LLC, et al, Case No. CIVSB2203661 (w/ consol. matters) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set 1 5/20/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17

Tentative Rulings The Court would GRANT Plaintiff’s motion and order Defendant to comply with this Court’s June 26, 2025, order as to request 10. The Court would find substantial justification to forgo sanctions at this juncture, as objections were not waived in the prior order and there appears a good faith attempt to comply. Notably, “[d]iscovery sanctions are intended to remedy discovery abuse, not to punish the offending party.” (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1223.)

Case Summary This is a putative wage-and-hour class action. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on February 17, 2022. On July 12, 2022, Plaintiffs Banks and Salazar, filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging (1) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL); (2) failure to pay overtime; (3) failure to pay minimum wages; (4) failure to provide meal periods; (5) failure to provide rest breaks: (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (6) failure to pay wages when due; and (7) violation of the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).

Notably, the UCL and PAGA claims are underpinned by the purported wage-and-hour violations. Importantly, on January 13, 2025, the Court consolidated this action with both matters filed by Plaintiff Spears against Defendant [CIVSB2213324 (wage-and-hour) and CIVSB2218871 (PAGA)]. Relevant here, Plaintiff served the salient Requests for Production, Set One (RFP1) on May 6, 2024. After various extensions and attempts to meet and confer, Plaintiff successfully moved to compel responses to RFP1 on June 26, 2025. (See Tentative, 6/26/25.)

Importantly, the order included the at-issue RFP1, number 10.

Analysis

RFP1, number 10, specifically requests production of “all wage or earnings statements issued to PLAINTIFF and CLASS MEMBERS during the CLAIM PERIOD.” (Sep. Statement, p.4.) This Court, on June 26, 2025, granted Plaintiff’s prior motion to compel as to this request. Defendant was required to produce “all wage or earnings statements,” for all Class Members in the Claim Period. Plaintiff now argues that Defendant has not fully complied and specifically seeks “unmanipulated wage statements for all Class Members . . .” as well as “complete wage statements for all Class Members for the entire claim period.” (Mot., pp. 3 & 7.)

Defendant has previously provided (1) the entirety of the pay data for the putative class; (2) Plaintiff’s wage statements; (3) redacted exemplars of wages statements for a sampling of 23 different employees. (Opp., 7:5-7; Chemers Decl., ¶10.) Defendant does not dispute that it has not provided all the requested physical class member wage statements. Moreover, Defendant “does not dispute that wage statements are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.” Instead, Defendant essentially argues that “Plaintiff is not entitled to every wage statement for every putative class member for the entire covered period before a class is certified.” (Opp., p.7.)

Notably, Defendant’s written response to number 10 asserts that the request is “overly broad and burdensome,” among other things. (Sep. Statement, p.4.) Though, again notably, Defendant clearly agreed to “produce the redacted pay data of the putative class for the covered period.” (Sep. Statement, p.5.) “To the extent that the formatting of wages statements for other putative class members has differed in the proposed liability period, Defendant will provide copies of the same.” (Ibid.) Thus, there appears to be a good faith effort to produce the requested information, if not the actual statements per se, as requested.

As to the argument that a sampling of the actual wage statements (in addition to the data already provided) is sufficient, certainly, many parties stipulate to a sampling prior to certification for purposes of valuation prior to mediation, or they argue that a random sampling in response to pre-certification discovery is proper because full production would be unduly burdensome at that stage. However, these arguments were more appropriately set out at the June 26, 2025, motion to compel. Defendant’s Opposition to that prior motion did not argue that the scope was burdensome or that a sampling was an appropriate response.

Rather, it simply indicated that Defendant was “willing to further supplement its responses to identify what documents/ data are being produced as responsive to each of Plaintiff’s individual requests.” (Opp, filed April 17, 2025, p.6 [argument as to request nos. 1-2, 10, 30-32, and 41- 50].) Thus, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for all wage statements for the Class Period (though, the Court notes it did not require waiver of objections). Here, while it may seem reasonable that the information is provided, the Court is constrained to the context and ruling on the June 26, 2025, motion.

Therefore, the Court would grant the motion. However, given the context and good faith attempt to provide the requested data, the Court would forgo sanctions.

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