Lauren A. Gordon v. Jeffrey B. Hood

As to the first and second causes of action, as against defendant, Jeffrey B. Hood only, plaintiff Lauren A. Gordon prays for recovery of punitive damages. Hood is guilty of malice, fraud, and oppression with respect to the matters alleged in this First Amended Complaint, such that Gordon, in addition to actual damages, is entitled to recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing Hood. Civil Code §3294(a). Hood has engaged in despicable conduct that subjected Gordon to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of her rights, which constitutes “oppression” within the meaning of Civil Code §3294(c)(2).

Hood has engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and/or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Gordon, which Hood knew or should have known was highly probable to cause harm to Gordon, and which constitutes “malice” within the meaning of Civil Code §3294(c)(1). Hood has further recklessly engaged in intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to Hood with the intention of thereby depriving Gordon of property or legal rights or otherwise causing her injury, which constitutes "fraud" within the meaning of Civil Code §3294(c)(3).

Hood was intoxicated, under the influence of alcohol, at the time of the incident. He failed multiple field sobriety tests at the scene of the incident and two blood alcohol concentration tests (BAC 0.25-0.26%). Hood violated Vehicle Code §23152(a) (driving under the influence) and §22107 (unsafe turning movement), He was arrested, charged, and booked into the San Luis Obispo County Jail, on charges of violating Vehicle Code §23153(a) (driving under the influence causing injury) and §23153(b) (blood alcohol content greater than 0.08% causing injury).

Hood drove while intoxicated under circumstances showing his conscious disregard for the probable dangerous consequences of doing so. At all relevant times, he was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. On the date of the incident, he willfully and knowingly drank to the point of extreme intoxication after repeatedly inviting Gordon to his home and for dinner out, knowing that he would later be driving Gordon to her home and/or to dinner while he was still intoxicated.

Said acts constitute malice and oppression within the meaning of Civil Code §3294(c)(1)-(2).

After the incident, Hood engaged in a course of fraudulent conduct, lying repeatedly, to first responders and Gordon, that she was the one driving the golfcart and had caused him to suffer injury, and refusing to provide information to the 911 operator. At the time, Hood knew that his statements were false. Hood admits that at the time he made such fraudulent misrepresentations to first responders and Gordon he knew these statements were false, that Gordon had been ejected from the golf cart he was driving. that she had suffered a severe blow to and bleeding from the head. By making these statements, Hood intended to avoid his own

responsibility for the incident and shift responsibility to Gordon, and Hood intended to deprive Gordon of her legal rights and/or cause severe mental and emotional harm. Hood continued to make such fraudulent statements at the time when he knew Gordon had been hospitalized for traumatic brain injuries, including memory loss. Hood knew and/or willfully and consciously ignored that Gordon was particularly susceptible to neuropsychological, psychological, and/or emotional injury, as a result of her head injury and memory loss, and that it was highly probable that his fraudulent conduct would cause her neuropsychological, psychological, and/or emotional injuries.

Hood intended to cause Gordon to compromise her legal rights and/or suffer mental and emotional injury by fraudulently convincing a brain-injured victim that the incident was her fault. Said acts constitute malice, fraud, and oppression within the meaning of Civil Code §3294(c)(1)-(3).

(Ernst Dec., ¶ 3, Ex. 2, p. 7.) These allegations are made as part of the prayer for damages.

Defendant opposes the motion on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff unreasonably delayed bringing the motion and has had the evidence supporting the amendments since filing the action in 2024 and (2) Defendant is prejudiced by the untimely motion because it adds completely new allegations shortly before trial is scheduled to begin.

Trial is currently set for June 1, 2026. Defendant filed a motion to continue the trial which has been set for hearing on September 3, 2026.1

I.

Legal Standard

The Court may allow the amendment of any pleading at any time in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473(a), 576.) The Court’s discretion is to be exercised liberally to permit the amendment of pleadings. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) If the motion is timely and does not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend. (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596.)

Notwithstanding the policy requiring great liberality in granting leave to amend a complaint, leave to amend should not be granted where the proposed amendment would be futile. (Rocha v. U- Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 75.)

“Motions to amend are appropriately granted as late as the first day of trial (e.g., Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 176 Cal.Rptr. 704) or even during trial (Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 251–256, 95 Cal.Rptr. 901) if the defendant is alerted

1 The Court denied Defendant’s ex parte application to advance the hearing date. Plaintiff filed a non-opposition to Plaintiff’s ex parte application and states she intends to oppose continuance of the trial date. (May 8, 2026, Declaration of Taylor Ernst, ¶ 5.)

to the charges by the factual allegations, no matter how framed (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 489, 173 Cal.Rptr. 418) and the defendant will not be prejudiced.” (Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.)

II.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s motion is not so untimely as to provide a basis for denying amendment. However, the Court has discretion to impose terms in granting leave to amend.

Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add punitive damages allegations and a punitive damages prayer for relief. Punitive damages are governed by Civil Code section 3294, which permits such damages in actions for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in oppression, fraud, or malice. Each of these terms carries distinct statutory definitions: “fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact made with intent to injure or willful conscious disregard of others’ rights; “malice” includes conduct intended to cause injury or despicable conduct with willful disregard; and “oppression” involves despicable conduct causing cruel and unjust hardship.

“The words, ‘oppression, fraud, or malice’ are in the Disjunctive and any of them may be ‘express or implied.’ Fraud alone is an adequate ground for awarding punitive damages.” (Horn v. Guar. Chevrolet Motors (1969) 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 484 [citation omitted]; Orient Handel v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 684, 697.)

The proposed allegations fall into two categories: (1) malice based on conscious disregard and (2) fraud.

A. Malice Based on Conscious Disregard

The law is well established that “the term ‘malice’ as used in Civil Code section 3294 has been interpreted as including a conscious disregard of the probability that the actor’s conduct will result in injury to others.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [citations omitted] (Dawes).) The California Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, “that driving a vehicle while intoxicated may in appropriate circumstances evidence a conscious disregard of probable injury to others and be sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at 88.)

The Court finds that allegations of knowing intoxication and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s safety state a basis for a prayer for punitive damages pursuant to the negligence cause of action. The allegations regarding Defendant’s conduct before and while driving the golf cart go beyond simply alleging Defendant was intoxicated and support punitive damages.

B. Fraud

The elements of fraud by deceit are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1060.)

Plaintiff’s proposed fraud allegations involve Defendant’s intentional conduct occurring after the accident and cannot, therefore, constitute a basis for punitive damages related to the causes of action for negligence and motor vehicle.2 Neither Plaintiff’s moving papers nor the proposed amended complaint seek to state a fraud cause of action and the allegations are not sufficient to state a fraud cause of action. There are no allegations of justifiable reliance or resulting damage. Even if Defendant intended to induce Plaintiff to compromise her legal rights, there are no allegations and it does not appear that Plaintiff compromised her legal rights in reliance on Defendant’s false statements.

Amendment of the complaint to add the proposed fraud allegations would be futile.

C. Prejudice

Defendant argues that it would be prejudiced if amendment is granted and the trial date is not continued to allow time for Defendant to adequately prepare for and to address punitive damages at trial. (Opposition, p. 8, ln. 27-p. 9, ln. 6.) The Court agrees.

III. Ruling

The motion to amend is partially granted as to the first two paragraphs of page 7 and “punitive damages” on page 3, section 11.g. of the proposed amended complaint. The motion is denied as to all remaining allegations, which allege fraudulent conduct occurring after the accident. The ruling is conditioned on the trial date being continued to allow Defendant reasonable time to address the new punitive damages claim. The parties should be prepared to discuss a continued trial date.

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within five (5) days after notice of ruling. Defendant is directed to serve and file notice of ruling.

2 For example, had Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to ride in the golf cart by misrepresenting he was sober with knowledge he was intoxicated and Plaintiff justifiably relied and was injured as a result, the alleged fraud might be a basis for punitive damages.

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