MARTIN ZAZUETA VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL
Case Information
Motion(s)
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT / Notice Of Motion And Motion For Summary Judgment Or, Alternatively, For Summary Adjudication
Motion Type Tags
Motion for Summary Judgment · Motion for Summary Adjudication
Parties
- Plaintiff: MARTIN ZAZUETA
- Defendant: GENERAL MOTORS LLC
Ruling
SF Superior Court - Law & Motion / Discovery Dept 301 - CGC24614531 - July 22, 2025 Hearing date: July 22, 2025 Case number: CGC24614531 Case title: MARTIN ZAZUETA VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL Case Number: | | CGC24614531 | Case Title: | | MARTIN ZAZUETA VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY ET AL | Court Date: | | 2025-07-22 09:00 AM | Calendar Matter: | | MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT / Notice Of Motion And Motion For Summary Judgment Or, Alternatively, For Summary Adjudication; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities | Rulings: | | Matter on the Law & Motion / Discovery calendar for Tuesday, July 22, 2025, Line 2 [Part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling.]
DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment Or, Alternatively, For Summary Adjudication. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. As a matter of law, plaintiff cannot establish causes of action one through three (Song-Beverly Act claims).
"A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code of Civil Procedure section section 437c(a)(1).) "The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c).)
The moving party must make an initial showing, based upon affirmative evidence, that summary judgment must be granted. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists. The court liberally construes the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolves doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1039.) The moving party bears the burden of persuasion "from the commencement to conclusion" to show "that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Ibid.)
Plaintiff cannot establish causes of action one and three (express warranty claims). In Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 196 the California Supreme Court held "that a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a 'motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty' under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)'s definition of 'new motor vehicle' unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale." "[T]he phrase 'other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty' was not intended to cover any used car with an unexpired new car warranty." (Rodriguez, 17 Cal.5th at 202.)
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff purchased the used vehicle from Chevrolet of Watsonville. (Undisputed Material Facts ("UMF") 1-2.) Defendant was not a party to that transaction and it did not issue any new or additional warranty at the time of purchase. (Jensen Decl., Ex. A; UMF 6.) In opposition, plaintiff attempts to paint defendant as a distributor or a substantial player in the sale transaction to shoehorn this case into the Song-Beverly Act. The attempt fails as the cited evidence (e.g. SEC filing) does not show that defendant was a distributor.
Plaintiff cannot establish cause of action two (implied warranty). The undisputed evidence shows that the vehicle was used and as explained, defendant was not a seller or distributor of the vehicle. (UMF 2; Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398 [only distributors or sellers of used goods-not manufacturers of new goods-have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods under the Song-Beverly Act.].)
The court denies plaintiff's request for a continuance per CCP 437c(h). This case has been pending for over a year, the trial is fast approaching, and plaintiff has not been diligent. (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 257 [lack of diligence basis to deny CCP 437c(h) continuance request].) [End of part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling} | |