| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Order to Show Cause
This is enough to decide the case. But the Court has elected to read and consider everything said. Therefore, even if this were not enough to decide the case the Court has considered other arguments.
Plaintiffs have incorrectly relied on a typographical error in the Notice of Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs argue that the Motion to Dismiss is internally unreliable and an attempt to use procedural momentum to avoid merits review. Specifically, they note that the Notice of Motion to Dismiss says that the Passage Contract requires that Plaintiffs' personal injury claims be arbitrated in Miami-Dade County. However, read in connection with the balance of Princess' moving papers, it is obvious that the italicized words contain a typographical error: they should read "non-personal injury claims."
The error is not repeated anywhere else in the moving papers, and the Motion to Dismiss quotes the exact language at issue where it is abundantly clear that the forum-selection clause at issue applies to non-personal injury claims like Plaintiffs' complaint herein. Plaintiffs were not, in fact, misled by the typographical error.
Plaintiffs claim that the Court should reject the motion because there was no contemporaneous evidence, no notice, no assent, inconsistent conduct, timeline defect and legal consequence is without merit. The moving papers were clearly adequate on each and all those meritless claims.
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs seek to address new theories and arguments raised for the first time in Defendant's Reply, including (1) waiver and (2) a "traveling companion" theory as to John Bacon, neither of which was presented in Defendant's moving papers and neither of which is supported by proof of enforceable notice or assent and Plaintiffs object to this new matter raised for the first time in Reply and request that it be disregarded, or alternatively, if the Court is inclined to consider such new matter, Plaintiffs request a brief continuance to permit a full and fair opportunity to respond.
That objection is without merit. There are no new theories or arguments raised for the first time. Plaintiffs merely responded to the arguments raised by the Defendants in their Response. The Court will consider it and will not grant continuance. Additionally, Plaintiffs have already had a chance to respond and indeed attempted to do so in their Sur-Reply, which the Court has read and considered.
Plaintiffs' Opposition does not dispute the central fact raised by the Motion to Dismiss: Princess' Passage Contract contains a forum-selection clause requiring non-personal injury claims, including breach of contract and other consumer-based claims, to be arbitrated in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Plaintiffs nevertheless filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara. To defeat the instant Motion to Dismiss, it is Plaintiffs' burden to show, by citation to both relevant law and admissible evidence, that the forum-selection clause is unenforceable. Plaintiffs' Opposition does not to do so, relying instead on the conclusory and legally unsupported assertion that neither Plaintiff "assented" to arbitration in Miami-Dade County. Princess' Motion to Dismiss must therefore be granted.
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Additionally, Princess set forth in its Memorandum in support of the Motion to Dismiss the Ninth Circuit's two-pronged test of "reasonable communicativeness," used to determine when a passenger is contractually bound by the "fine print of a passenger ticket." Schlessinger v. Holland America, N.V. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 552, at p. 557. The two prongs at issue are: (a) the physical characteristics of the ticket itself (font size, conspicuousness, clarity of notice, ease of perceiving the ticket provisions in question), and (b) an evaluation of "the circumstances surrounding the passenger's purchase and subsequent retention of the ticket/contract," including "extrinsic factors indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed of the provisions.
Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 827 at ps. 835 - 836. Plaintiffs' Opposition does not address either prong, either to explain how Princess' Passage Contract failed to satisfy them or to contend that a different test should apply. As a result, the forum-selection clause in Princess Passage Contract should be deemed to have been reasonably communicated to Plaintiffs, and the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
Tentative Ruling: Ada An Nhien v. Golden State Lumber, Inc. Tentative Ruling: Ada An Nhien v. Golden State Lumber, Inc. Case Number
Case Type
Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 03/25/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Order to Show Cause Tentative Ruling For Petitioner Ada An Nhien, dba Goleta Nails & Spa: Tony T. Liu, J. John Oh, Focus Law For Respondent Golden State Lumber, Inc.: Brian P. Hedstrom, Marc D. Coopersmith RULING For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
Background
This action commenced on January 28, 2026, by the filing of the petition to release invalid mechanic's lien by Plaintiff Ada An Nhien, dba Goleta Nails & Spa (Petitioner) against Golden State Lumber, Inc. (Respondent) and nominal Defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. As alleged in the petition: Petitioner hired Phillip Nguyen of My Windows and Doors Contractor Inc. to perform tenant improvements at the subject premises. (Pet., P. 21.) Nguyen then contracted with Victor Villela, who used his own existing materials account with Respondent to purchase materials and used the premises address for his orders, including those that had nothing to do with the improvements at the premises. (Ibid.)
Petitioner did not contract with Respondent and did not control Villela's materials account with Respondent. (Pet., P. 22.) Respondent issued invoices aggregating $10,505.35, but only $4,100.02 in materials were delivered to and used at the premises. (Pet., P. 23.0 Petitioner paid that amount in full, and responded accepted payment. (Id., at P. 23.) The remaining materials were not delivered to or used at the subject premises and were instead used on an unrelated jobsite. (Id., at P. 24.) Respondent recorded a Claim of Mechanic's Lien on December 5, 2025. (Pet., P. 10, 11 & Exh.
A.) The property subject to the mechanics lien is in Santa Barbara County and Petitioner is the tenant in possession of the property and an interested person within the meaning of Civil Code section 8480. (Id., P.P. 12, 13.) The lien claims $5,619.80. (Id., at P. 14.) On January 5, 2026, Petitioner's landlord, and the owner of the property, recorded a Release of Mechanic's Lien Bond pursuant to Civil Code section 8424, in the amount of $7,024.75, substituting the bond for the lien. (Pet., P. 16 & Exh.
B.) Notwithstanding the bonding of the lien, Respondent continues to assert the lien claim against the bond, necessitating the petition for a release order and determination of invalidity. (Pet., P. 18.) On March 9, 2026, Respondent filed an opposition to the petition. On March 16, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition.
Analysis
" 'A mechanic's lien is a claim against real property, which may be filed if a claimant has provided labor or furnished materials for the property and has not been paid. [Citation.]' " [Citation.] Thus, " ' "[it] is a procedural device for obtaining payment of a debt [owed] by a property owner for the performance of labor or the furnishing of materials used in construction." ' [Citation.]" [Citation.]" (Precision Framing Systems Inc. v. Luzuriaga (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 457, 464.) " 'While the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is to protect those who have performed labor or furnished material towards the improvement of the property of another (citation), inherent in this concept is a recognition also of the rights of the owner of the benefited property.
It has been stated that the lien laws are for the protection of property owners as well as lien claimants * * *.' " [Citations.]" (R. D. Reeder Lathing Co. v. Allen (1967) 66 Cal.2d 373, 379; accord Rental Equipment, Inc. v. McDaniel Builders, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 445, 449-450.)
Petitioner' first ground for relief is: "As a material supplier, Respondent was required to serve a Preliminary 20-Day Notice as a condition precedent to lien rights. Respondent did not do so. This failure extinguishes all lien rights as a matter of law." (Pet., P. 28.) In support, Petitioner's Chief Executive Officer, Ivy Mai (Mai), declares: "To my knowledge, Respondent never served a Preliminary 20-Day Notice on Petitioner, the property owner, or any construction lender, as required by Civil Code Sec.Sec. 8200-8204.) (Mai Decl., P. 11.) "None of the documents provided by Respondent contained the statutory warning language required by Civil Code Sec. 8202, nor were any notices served within the statutory 20-day period." (Id., at P. 12.)
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, before recording a lien claim, giving a stop payment notice, or asserting a claim against a payment bond, a claimant shall give preliminary notice to the following persons: "(1) The owner or reputed owner. "(2) The direct contractor or reputed direct contractor to which the claimant provides work, either directly or through one or more subcontractors. "(3) The construction lender or reputed construction lender, if any. "(b) The notice shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 8100) of Title 1. "(c) Compliance with this section is a necessary prerequisite to the validity of a lien claim or stop payment notice under this title. "(d) Compliance with this section or with Section 8612 is a necessary prerequisite to the validity of a claim against a payment bond under this title. "(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions: "(1) A laborer is not required to give preliminary notice. "(2) A claimant with a direct contractual relationship with an owner or reputed owner is required to give preliminary notice only to the construction lender or reputed construction lender, if any." (Civ. Code, Sec. 8200.)
"(a) The preliminary notice shall comply with the requirements of Section 8102, and shall also include: "(1) A general description of the work to be provided. "(2) An estimate of the total price of the work provided and to be provided. "(3) The following statement in boldface type: NOTICE TO PROPERTY OWNER EVEN THOUGH YOU HAVE PAID YOUR CONTRACTOR IN FULL, if the person or firm that has given you this notice is not paid in full for labor, service, equipment, or material provided or to be provided to your construction project, a lien may be placed on your property.
Foreclosure of the lien may lead to loss of all or part of your property. You may wish to protect yourself against this by (1) requiring your contractor to provide a signed release by the person or firm that has given you this notice before making payment to your contractor, or (2) any other method that is appropriate under the circumstances. This notice is required by law to be served by the undersigned as a statement of your legal rights. This notice is not intended to reflect upon the financial condition of the contractor, or the person employed by you on the construction project.
If you record a notice of cessation or completion of your construction project, you must within 10 days after recording, send a copy of the notice of completion to your contractor and the person or firm that has given you this notice. The notice must be sent by registered or certified mail. Failure to send the notice will extend the deadline to record a claim of lien. You are not required to send the notice if you are a residential homeowner of a dwelling containing four or fewer units. "(b) If preliminary notice is given by a subcontractor that has not paid all compensation due to a laborer, the notice shall include the name and address of the laborer, and any person or entity described in subdivision (b) of Section 8024 to which payments are due. "(c) If an invoice for material or certified payroll contains the information required by this section and Section 8102, a copy of the invoice or payroll, given in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 8100) of Title 1, is sufficient." (Civ.
Code, Sec. 8202.)
In support of the opposition to the petition, Respondent's Accounts Receivable Analyst, Analyn Elloso (Elloso), declares, and provides proof, that the required 20-day notice was served on August 21, 2025, via certified mail, return receipt requested, and issued invoices with respect to the property at issue. (Elloso Decl., P. 4 & Exhs. 4, 5.) The court has reviewed the documents, and they fully comply with the requirements of Civil Code section 8200, et seq. By way of reply to the opposition, Petitioner does not contest, or even address, the evidence that proves compliance with the 20-day notice requirements. The court finds that the evidence of Respondent's compliance with the 20-day notice requirements satisfies Respondent's burden of proof.
Petitioner's next three grounds for relief are: "Lien rights exist only for materials furnished for the work of improvement and actually delivered to and used on the project. Respondent included charges for materials not delivered to or used at the Premises, rendering the lien invalid." (Pet., P. 29.) "By including non-lienable charges and asserting a claim inconsistent with its own invoicing and delivery history, Respondent forfeited all lien rights under Civil Code Sec. 8422. Respondent recorded the lien after receiving written notice of these defects, establishing willful overstatement and bad faith." (Id., at P. 30.) "Petitioner paid 100% of all lienable materials actually used at the Premises. No lienable balance exists." (Id., at P. 31.) Because these three grounds for relief are closely related, the grounds will be discussed concurrently.
In support, Mai declares: "Respondent issued invoices aggregating $10,505.35 under Subcontractor's account. Only $4,100.02 in materials were actually delivered to and used at the Premises." (Mai Decl., P. 5.) "The remaining materials were not delivered to and not used at the Premises and were instead used on an unrelated jobsite in Livermore, California." (Id., at P. 6.) "Respondent has never produced any delivery tickets, bills of lading, or other documentation showing delivery of the disputed materials to the Premises." (Mai Decl., P. 7.) "I contacted Respondent's Credit Manager, Analyn Elloso, who confirmed that Respondent does not have proof of delivery to the Premises and that the materials were picked up by Subcontractor, not delivered by Respondent." (Id., at P. 8.) "On behalf of Petitioner, I paid Respondent $4,100.02, representing 100% of the materials actually used at the Premises, through Respondent's payment system.
Attached hereto as 20 Exhibit 'A' is a true and correct copy of the confirmation of the payment to Respondent." (Mai Decl., P. 9 & Exh. A.) [Note: Exhibit A does show a payment of $4,100.02 but does not indicate that it represents payment for 100 percent of the materials used.) "Respondent accepted the payment but did not provide a lien waiver and nevertheless proceeded to assert a lien for additional amounts unrelated to Petitioner's project." (Id., at P. 10.) "Before any lien was recorded, Petitioner, through counsel, sent Respondent a written demand not to record a mechanic's lien, explaining that: "a.
Petitioner did not contract with Respondent, "b. the materials were not delivered to the Premises, "c. the only lienable materials had been paid in full, and "d. any lien would be wrongful and overstated." (Mai Decl., P. 13.) "Despite receiving this notice, Respondent recorded a Claim of Mechanic's Lien against the real property that includes the Premises." (Mai Decl., P. 14.)
"(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), erroneous information contained in a claim of lien relating to the claimant's demand, credits and offsets deducted, the work provided, or the description of the site, does not invalidate the claim of lien. "(b) Erroneous information contained in a claim of lien relating to the claimant's demand, credits and offsets deducted, or the work provided, invalidates the claim of lien if the court determines either of the following: "(1) The claim of lien was made with intent to defraud. "(2) An innocent third party, without notice, actual or constructive, became the bona fide owner of the property after recordation of the claim of lien, and the claim of lien was so deficient that it did not put the party on further inquiry in any manner. "(c) Any person who shall willfully include in a claim of lien labor, services, equipment, or materials not furnished for the property described in the claim, shall thereby forfeit the person's lien." (Civ. Code, Sec. 8422.)
"[T]he mechanics' lien should not be held invalid unless the recorded lien notice was fraudulent or misled innocent third persons or the owner of the property on which the labor or materials were used. [Citation.] This position was taken to counteract the previous practice or tendency to strike a recorded lien notice due to technical mistakes in the notice." (Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 562, 573; accord RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 422.)
In opposition to the petition, Elloso declares: "The invoices show that Golden State intended that the materials sold on credit to My Windows And Doors Contractor Inc were intended to be incorporated into the work of improvement at the Property." (Elloso Decl., P. 5 & Exh. 5.) "Attached as Exhibit " '6' " is a true and correct copy of an account statement (also attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint and First Amended Complaint) evidencing the transactions on My Windows And Doors Contractor Inc account, current as of November 30, 2025.
With respect to the job account related to the Property, it is still accurate but for the finance charges (which finance charges are only owed by My Windows And Doors Contractor Inc pursuant to its written contract with Golden State). It is not current as to the job account for 1682 Blue Spruce Way as Golden State recently settled a mechanics lien on that Milpitas, California property. Only select employees, such as me, have access to these statements, and even fewer employees may enter charges or credits on the statements.
All of the charges and credits appearing on My Windows And Doors Contractor Inc's account were entered in the ordinary course of business, and are correct. The outstanding principal balance on the job account for the Property is $5,619.80 after giving credit for the $4,100.02 payment identified in the Petition." (Elloso Decl., P. 6.) "To the best of my knowledge, Golden State charged My Windows And Doors Contractor Inc a fair and reasonable price for the materials it sold for incorporation into the work of improvement at the Property because the prices charged were their then fair-market value." (Elloso, Decl., P. 7.) "To the best of my knowledge, all oi the materials identified in the invoices were incorporated into the work of improvch1ent at the Property.
Victor Villela, the principal (and 'Owner,' according to Mr. Villela) of My Windows and Doors Contractor Inc, told me this over the telephone a number of times, copied me on an October 30, 2025, email stating as much, and provided me photos of materials in the Property Mr. Villela claims he purchased from Golden State. I believe him because the photos of materials appear to match the materials identified in the invoices attached hereto collectively as Exhibit '5.' True and correct copies of the aforementioned October 30, 2025 email admitting that My Windows and Doors Contractor Inc purchased the materials appearing in the unpaid invoices from Golden State on credit and used them at the Property but had yet to pay Golden State for them, and photos of the materials at the Property are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit '7.' " (Elloso Decl., P. 8 & Exhs. 5, 7.)
Clearly there is a dispute regarding whether there is erroneous information contained in a claim of lien. As stated by the above authority, that alone will not invalidate the lien. Rather, it must be shown that: (1) The claim of lien was made with intent to defraud, or (2) An innocent third party, without notice, actual or constructive, became the bona fide owner of the property after recordation of the claim of lien, and the claim of lien was so deficient that it did not put the party on further inquiry in any manner, or (3) Respondent willfully included in the claim of lien labor, services, equipment, or materials not furnished for the property described in the claim.
There is no evidence presented that Respondent intended to defraud Petitioner or willfully included, in the claim of lien, labor, services, equipment, or materials not furnished for the property. There are no other grounds that Petitioner sets forth for granting the requested relief. As such, the petition fails and will be denied. As the petition is being denied for the above reasons, the court declines to address Respondent's additional arguments.