Bowden v. Hoskins, DVM

Day’s involvement in the business was to hold on to the wood and when Plaintiff informed him he sold it, he would bubble wrap it, make sure it was safely packaged, and ship it out. (Id., Exhibit C.)

Some sets were sold and some were set to luthiers. (Ibid.) He sent 12 sets to luthiers. (Ibid.)

One set of wood was sent to Day by Plaintiff. (Id., Exhibit D.) Day unpacked it and put it aside. (Ibid.) He has subsequently been unable to locate it. (Ibid.)

Day owns and operates LLC. (Day decl., ¶2.)

A July 27, 2021, an invoice indicates that Plaintiff paid $8,691.83 for equipment from Grizzly Industrial Inc. in Bellingham, Washington, and had it sent to Day in New Galilee, Pennsylvania. (Id., Exhibit H.)

A July 30, 2021, invoice indicates that Plaintiff paid $5,656.94 for equipment from Laguna Tools, Inc. in Grand Prairie, Texas, and had it shipped to Day in New Galilee, Pennsylvania. (Id., Exhibit I.)

On August 10, 2021, Plaintiff sent Day $10,000. (Id., Exhibit F.)

On August 27, 2021, Plaintiff sent Day $5,000. (Id., Exhibit G.)

On October 14, 2021, Day emailed Plaintiff stating he would like set numbers 2, 12, 1, and 10. (Id., Exhibit K.) He stated he could do 3 flat tops and that he would use #2 for the 335. (Ibid.) Day discussed marketing ideas and issues. (Ibid.)

On May 19, 2022, Plaintiff sent Day an email stating all agreements and understandings between him and Plaintiff were terminated and requesting that all of his property be returned to him. (Id., Exhibit L.)

On June 7, 2022, Day caused his attorney to send Plaintiff a letter informing Plaintiff that Day was returning certain tree and guitar materials to Plaintiff and he requested Plaintiff to cease all further communications with Day. (Id., Exhibit E.)

On June 11, 2022, Plaintiff requested $450 from Day for shipping and insurance regarding heritage musical instruments. (Id., Exhibit J.)

In his reply to this motion, Day acknowledges that he sent payment to InArts LLC located in California.

On June 5, 2025, Defendants filed two UCC 5 statements contesting Plaintiff’s right to file a financing statement listing Day as a debtor. (Id., Exhibit M.)

The evidence establishes that Day purposefully directed activities within the forum state by establishing a business plan with Plaintiff; accepting equipment and tree material for use in the business which was intended to be located here; by accepting Plaintiff’s personal property to work on and return; and by accepting payment for services. This direct conduct, connected to California, is such that Day should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here. This action arises out of these activities.

In addition, Defendants have not shown that the burdens outweigh Plaintiff’s and this forum’s interests such that it is unreasonable for this court to exercise jurisdiction.

III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED. Plaintiff is directed to submit a written order consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

4. 25CV07492, Bowden v. Hoskins, DVM

Defendants Redwood Veterinary Clinic (“RVC”) and Richard Hoskins, DMV (“Hoskins”)(together “Defendants”) demurrer and move to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiffs Graig Bowden and Carlye Bowden (“Plaintiffs’).

I. Procedural Issues

Defendants have improperly filed their demurrer and motion to strike as one motion. Filing two motions as one interferes with this court’s ability to manage its workload. In addition, Defendants have not paid the proper amount of filing fees. This court directs Mr. Bacho and his firm in the future to file each motion separately.

II. First Amended Complaint

On March 4, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the FAC against Defendants alleging that on October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs brought their dog, Sierra, to RVC for a femoral head ostectomy surgery. Plaintiffs allege Hoskins negligently performed the surgery and that RVC failed to give Plaintiffs proper discharge instructions. Plaintiffs allege Hoskins represented that he was a board-certified surgeon, which he is not. They allege that due to the Defendants’ negligence, Sierra has suffered from luxation of her femur, suspected torn gluteal muscles, left pelvic limb lameness with excessive external rotation, pain and crepitus of the left joint, and has, as a result, required extensive revision procedures and care.

The FAC alleges causes of action for Negligence, Trespass to Chattel, Breach of Bailment, Breach of Contract, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Concealment, Violation of Civil Code section 1750, Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq., and Violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

III. Demurrer

Defendants demur to the fourth through tenth causes of action on the grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and as being uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. They also demur on the grounds of defect or nonjoinder of a necessary party.

A. Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action – Fraud

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fraud causes of action are not alleged with the requisite specificity. The elements of fraud or deceit (see Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 1710) are: a representation, usually of fact, which is false, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damage resulting from that justifiable reliance. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 72–73.)

To plead fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant knowingly concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result, the plaintiff sustained damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230.)

Every element of a cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made. (Id., at p. 73 [citing case].) This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Ibid. [citing case.])

Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for Intentional Misrepresentation alleges Defendants made “numerous misrepresentations” to Plaintiffs including Hoskins’ ability to perform the surgery adequately. (FAC, ¶65.) Plaintiffs allege Hoskins was represented as being a board-certified surgeon, that he was not, and that he was not competent to perform the FHO surgery. (FAC, ¶¶13, 66.)

Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action alleges fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to disclose “facts” to Plaintiffs “by misrepresentations and omissions.” (FAC, ¶73.) They allege Defendants “concealed their qualifications as well as SIERRA’s need for 7 rehabilitation care following her surgery.” (FAC, ¶73.) Plaintiffs allege that had they been aware that Hoskins was not a board-certified surgeon and that Sierra would need rehabilitation care after the surgery, they would have acted differently. (FAC, ¶75.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they are unable to provide any more specificity regarding the context of the misrepresentations. However, this is not they type of fact pattern wherein Defendants have more knowledge than the Plaintiffs. Here, Plaintiffs allege that they relied upon statements by one of the Defendants that Hoskins was a board-certified surgeon and that Plaintiffs were harmed based upon their reliance of this alleged misrepresentation. The facts that form the basis of this allegation should be readily available to Plaintiffs.

With respect to the concealment claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were under an obligation to disclose and avoid causing Plaintiffs’ emotional harm arising out of the care of Sierra. Plaintiffs have not provided authority to support the existence of a duty to avoid causing Plaintiffs’ emotional harm. Plaintiffs must allege each element of fraud with the requisite specificity. Neither Plaintiffs’ sixth nor seventh cause of action is sufficient. The demurrer to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for misrepresentation and seventh cause of action for concealment are sustained with leave to amend.

B. Fifth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that allegations of veterinary malpractice, even if negligent, do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiffs’ IIED cause of action alleges Defendants “failed” to care for Sierra and take basic precautions for her. (FAC, ¶55.) This is a negligence standard.

The FAC alleges: “On information and belief, the surgery was performed in a negligent manner that breached the standard of care for a surgery under similar circumstances and that left SIERRA in ongoing pain and unable to fully recover from the surgery performed by HOSKINS.” (FAC ¶14.) “To make matters worse, upon her discharge from RVC, discharge instructions provided did not indicate the need for rehabilitation care and did not provide aftercare instructions for the proper care of SIERRA, both of which are a critical component of a surgery like this one.” (FAC ¶15.) “Due to the negligently performed surgery, and the lack of post-operative care and instructions, SIERRA has suffered from luxation of her femur, suspected torn gluteal muscles, left pelvic limb lameness with excessive external rotation, pain and crepitus of the left joint, and required extensive revision procedures and care.” (FAC ¶16.) “At no time were the BOWDENS informed that HOSKINS was not a board-certified surgeon, nor were they informed that they could seek the care of a board-certified surgeon given the complex nature of the required procedure.

Even more alarmingly, the BOWDENS were not informed of the risks and potential complications of SIERRA undergoing this complex surgery with a non-board-certified surgeon. Additionally, the BOWDENS were not informed that the lack of rehabilitative care and post-operative care would have a devastating effect on SIERRA.” (FAC, ¶18.)

There are no allegations of conduct by Defendants beyond negligence of allegedly not fully or properly performing the surgery and not informing Plaintiffs of the risks of the surgery.

Plaintiffs cite Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590 for their position that emotional distress damages are available when distress is the result of a defendant’s commission of the distinct torts of trespass, nuisance, or conversion. Plotnik is easily distinguishable. In that case, the defendant hit the plaintiff’s dog with a baseball bat, causing the dog injuries to the dog’s leg which required surgery, and he later threatened to kill the dog. A person's intentional injuring or killing a pet will support recovery of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id., at p. 1611.) The FAC does not allege any intentional injury to Sierra.

Plaintiffs also cite Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, which is also readily distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff alleged she procured the defendant’s services for a humane euthanasia for her cat. Instead, defendant was alleged to have, without plaintiff’s informed 8 consent, performed the euthanasia by means of an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection, resulting in a horrific and painful death for her cat and causing the plaintiff great emotional distress. The plaintiff alleged that defendant represented that she could hold the cat and would give it a sedative.

Then, once the plaintiff said goodbye, he would give it a second injection to end its life. Instead, he attempted to insert a catheter, claimed the oral medication that had been prescribed for the cat would take too long, and suggested a “heart stick” injection. The defendant claimed it was quick, the cat would not suffer, and it wouldn’t even know what was happening. The plaintiff did not view the euthanasia but later learned that it was generally considered extremely painful and inhumane when performed on a conscious cat.

The plaintiff noted that in 2006, the legislature made it illegal to perform on a conscious animal.

Plaintiffs’ allegations of Defendants’ failure to take unspecified “basic precautions” for Sierra’s wellbeing do not sufficiently plead a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

C. Eighth Cause of Action – CLRA

This cause of action alleges Defendants violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) by making misrepresentations about its services: that they offer the best possible veterinary care, that they strive to provide the best service, that they have a state-of-the-art surgical suite, that they are equipped to provide diagnostic and therapeutic services, and that they offer evaluation by board-certified specialists. (FAC, ¶81.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action under the CLRA fails for multiple independent reasons. First, Plaintiffs fail to allege compliance with the CLRA’s mandatory prelitigation notice requirement. Civ. Code § 1782 requires that, at least 30 days prior to filing an action for damages under the CLRA, a plaintiff must provide written notice identifying the alleged violations and demanding correction. (Civ. Code, § 1782, subd. (a).) This requirement is a prerequisite to recovering damages under the statute. (Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, Inc. (2018) 239 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1206.). Here, the FAC contains no allegation that Plaintiffs provided the required notice.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not cited authority that they must plead such notice in the FAC. Statutory causes of action must be alleged with particularity. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) This would include an allegation of notice under Civil Code section 1782.

Defendants also argue that no conduct is alleged that violates Civil Code section 1770. In opposition, Plaintiffs allege this ignores their allegation that the surgery was performed in a negligent manner that breached the standard of care for surgery. Plaintiffs again refer to a negligence standard. It is not clear to this court which section of Civil Code section 1770 Defendants are alleged to have violated. Based upon the foregoing, the demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

D. Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action (UCL and FAL)

Defendants argue that the ninth cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500 et seq. and the tenth cause of action for Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. are insufficiently alleged. Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action alleges Defendants made misleading and false statements and representations in marketing materials and advertisements on their website regarding Defendants’ skill, training, and capabilities. Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action references the prior allegations without specifying what conduct it alleged to support the cause of action.

It appears that these causes of action refer to the statements that Defendants allegedly made that they offer the best possible veterinary care, that they strive to provide the best service, that they have a state-of-the-art surgical suite, that they are equipped to provide diagnostic and therapeutic services, and that they offer evaluation by board-certified specialists. Mere expressions of opinion are not actionable. (Willson v. Municipal Bond Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 144, 150.) Here, it is not clear what alleged advertisements were allegedly made upon which Defendants relied.

Allegations such as “we strive to provide the best veterinary care” are statements of opinion and are not actionable. However, a statement such as “all surgical staff are boardcertified” when they are not is not merely an opinion. Here, it appears that Plaintiffs intend to rely upon the statement in the FAC that board-certified veterinarians are available for consultation. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged that no board-certified veterinarians were available; or, that all RVA’s veterinarians were advertised as being board-certified.

Currently, Plaintiffs only allege that RVA represented board-certified specialists were available for consultation, which they have not alleged is untrue. As noted above, statutory causes of action must be alleged with particularity. The demurrer to these causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.

E. Privity / Consumer / Economic Injury

Defendants argue Plaintiffs fail to allege the necessary privity, that they are a consumer or entered into a transaction with Defendants, or that they incurred an economic injury. To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, including mutual assent and consideration. (CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239.) The CLRA, FAL, and UCL require a plaintiff to be the consumer or person who engaged in the transaction and suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct. (Civ.

Code, § 1761, subd. (d); Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17535.) The FAC sufficiently alleges Plaintiffs entered into a contract with Defendants for veterinary care including diagnosis, treatment, and hospitalization, that they sustained damage to their dog Sierra, and that they have incurred further veterinary costs as a result; i.e., economic losses. (FAC, ¶¶47-51.) The demurrer on this ground is overruled.

F. Indispensable Party

Defendants argue that the FAC is subject to demurrer for failure to add an indispensable party because the trainer who allegedly injured Sierra and caused her to need the subject surgery is not joined as a party to the action. Here, the allegations are based upon the surgery—not the initial injury. Therefore, the trainer is not an indispensable party. The demurrer on this ground is overruled.

G. Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs allege a breach of a bailment contract may be asserted by the bailor when the bailee fails to return that which was bailed or deposited. Plaintiffs allege Defendants allege Bailey was returned in a worse condition than when she was delivered to Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are seeking damages that are beyond what is recoverable under a bailment theory. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs can only recover the value of the damage to the personal property—not emotional distress and punitive damages. Defendants also argue that the remedies under the statutory causes of action are limited, such that the requests for damages under those causes of action should be stricken.

While the bailment cause of action notes that Plaintiffs suffered “severe emotional distress,” that cause of action does not actually seek emotional distress damages. Each cause of action specifically states it seeks damages as requested in the prayer. Defendants have not established that no causes of action support an award of emotional distress damages, restitution, or injunctive relief.

Defendants also argue that a breach of contract or bailment cause of action does not support a punitive damages request absent an independent tort. Here, subsequent to the above ruling on the Defendants’ demurrer, the remaining causes of action in the FAC are for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of bailment contract. None of these support an award of punitive damages.

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Sixth Cause of Action for Misrepresentation, Seventh Cause of Action for Concealment, Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of CLRA, Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code section 17500 et seq., and Tenth Cause of Action for Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200 et seq., is sustained with leave to amend. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action for Breach of Contract and for nonjoinder of a necessary party is overruled.

Conditioned upon Defendants paying an additional filing fee of $60, Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with leave to amend. Defendants’ motion to strike is otherwise DENIED. Defendants’ counsel is directed to submit a written order to this court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

5. 25CV08885, Vargas Flaherty v. Kerston

Plaintiffs Casilda Vargas Flaherty and Christopher Flaherty (“Plaintiffs”) move for an order advancing and specially setting the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Sever the defaulted Defendants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 579, which is presently set for October 14, 2026.

The motion sought to have the hearing continued to the now-past date of August 12, 2026, to be heard concurrently with Defendant’s motion to expunge the lis pendens. The motion is made on the grounds that the only substantial asset from which any judgment in this action can be satisfied, i.e., the real property owned by defaulted defendant CBK, LLC, is actively listed for sale by defendant Peter Kerston such that if defendant Kerston’s motion to expunge the lis pendens is granted, a subsequent sale of the real property would defeat Plaintiffs’ ability to recover against the defendants in this action.

Plaintiffs argue the defendant Kerston has a documented history of not satisfying outstanding judgments unless a lien is placed on his property, as presented in Plaintiffs’ application for leave to record the lis pendens granted by this court on April 15, 2026.

Even if Plaintiffs had shown good cause to advance the hearing, this court does not have any available hearing dates before the motion is set to be heard on October 14, 2026. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED. This court’s minute order shall constitute the order of the court.

6. 26CV00824, Bohanan v. LWP Claims Solutions, Inc.

Defendant LWP Claims Solutions Inc. (“Defendant”) demurs to the first through seventh causes of action in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Lucas Bohanan (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

I. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges on February 26, 2023, he suffered an injury during work as a Firefighter Engineer and paramedic for the Santa Rosa Fire Department. He states that while he was assisting with lifting 11