Orange County Sanitation District vs. Jackson

that either the client or attorneys Tabak or Olsen consent to the requested withdrawal.

4 Orange County Motion for Leave to Amend (re First Amended Complaint) Sanitation District vs. Jackson The court GRANTS Plaintiff ORANGE COUNTY SANITATION DISTRICT’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint against Defendants DONALD A. ISKIERKA, VIRGINIA L. ISKIERKA, PHILIP J. RIZZO, ANDREA L. RIZZO, HOOMAN K SHAHIDI, NAZANIN GHAFFARIZADEH, BEVERLY K. UERLING, DEREK J. UERLING, MARK GERSON, MYRA GERSON, OLEG VOLF, YANINA GINZBERG, DEAN E. WEST, DEBORA A. WEST, FRANCIS LA PLACA, GAETANO LA PLACA, SHERI LA PLACA, KOZO TERAJIMA, FRANK H. CLARKE III, GERARD F. MCCABE, CATHERINE F. MCCABE, and HELEN J. LOWELL.

The court may, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(a)(1).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324 governs a motion for leave to amend.

California courts generally allow great liberality, at all stages of the proceeding, in permitting the amendment of pleadings in order to resolve cases on their merits. (IMO Development Corp. v. Dow Corning (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 451, 461.) Thus, leave to amend to more clearly state a plaintiff’s theories of liability should be liberally allowed. (Rainer v. Buena Community Memorial Hospital (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 253-254.) This liberality only applies so long as there is no prejudice to the opposing party. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564.)

Finally, the court generally does not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleadings in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. After leave to amend is granted, the opposing party will have the opportunity to attack the validity of the amended pleading. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.)

Plaintiff seeks to include the Doe defendants by name and add allegations specific to each Doe defendant. Plaintiff

also seeks to allege that defendants are being sued individually and, where applicable, in their capacity as trustee. For instance, for one Defendant (DOE 11, Eric Spear), property was transferred from Spear individually to the Eric Spear Separate Property Trust after this action commenced. Plaintiff seeks to clarify that the first cause of action is for public and private nuisance consistent with the court’s ruling on 11/15/24. (ROA 173.) And Plaintiff seeks to amend the declaratory relief sought to be consistent with the language in Plaintiff’s easement.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has delayed in seeking leave to amend and has not justified that delay. There is insufficient evidence presented however that Plaintiff has delayed in seeking leave to amend. Further, delay alone is generally an insufficient basis to deny leave to amend.

If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (See Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial,” absent prejudice to the adverse party. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.)

Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence or added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488; see P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345.)

Defendants argue that granting leave to amend would prejudice them because they would incur additional costs in conducting discovery because “these new allegations will essentially make Defendants have to start discovery all over again.” (Opp’n at 7:16-17.) Defendants have not provided sufficient evidence to support this contention. Defense counsel’s declaration does not describe any additional discovery that will need to be conducted, for example.

Defendants also argue that amendment is futile because the proposed First Amended Complaint removes allegations that Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiff’s easement must be “unreasonable” to be actionable. Plaintiff responds that Defendants mistakenly rely on cases concerning privately negotiated easements, whereas the easement in this matter was acquired through eminent domain and prohibits structures that interfere with Plaintiff’s “full use and enjoyment.” Where the opposing party claims the proposed pleading is futile, “[l]eave to amend should be denied only where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff’s claim is clear, but under substantive law, no liability exists and no amendment would change the result.” (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Defendants have not met this burden.

In sum, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff SHALL separately file and serve the proposed First Amended Complaint within 10 days of this ruling.

Plaintiff to give notice.

5 Calvillo Martinez Motion to Advance Trial Date vs. Martinez The court DENIES Plaintiffs CLAUDIA VERONICA CALVILLO MARTINEZ and KAMAL ALEXANDER BENITEZ’s motion to advance the trial date.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1335 provides in relevant part, “A the party seeking to advance.... A case for trial must make this request by noticed motion or ex parte application under the rules in Chapter 4 of this division.” (Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1335(a).) “The request may be granted only upon an affirmative showing by the moving party of good cause based on a declaration served and filed with the motion or application.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1335(b).)

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