Yang vs. General Motors LLC

10 Yang vs. General Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses Motors LLC The court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Ki YANG’s motion for attorney fees and costs.

The parties settled this Song-Beverly case before trial with Defendant agreeing to pay reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses to Plaintiff as the prevailing party. As such, there is no dispute among the parties as to Plaintiff’s right to recover her attorney fees, costs, and expenses.

The Song-Beverly Act provides for attorney fees, costs, and expenses to the prevailing party in a lemon law case. (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) “Determining a reasonable attorney fee award in Song-Beverly Act cases ‘“ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ [which is] the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” ’ [Citation.]” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157-1158.) “The Song-Beverly Act’s attorney fee provision ‘“requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended, and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 1158.)

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; see also Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260 [“reasonable market value” of counsel’s services is measure of reasonable hourly rate].) The relevant “community” is generally based on where the services were rendered, i.e., where the court is located. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242-1243.) “Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate in this case is that charged by consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in Orange County.” (Tidrick, 112 Cal.App.5th at 1157.)

The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009; 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.) The

court may consider various other factors when determining a reasonable hourly rate, including the attorney’s skill and experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s customary billing rates. (Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 632.)

Based on the evidence provided by both parties, and on the court’s own experience, the court finds an hourly rate of $500 is commensurate with the Attorney Lee’s level of skill and experience and consistent with the prevailing rates for consumer attorneys practicing in Orange County in Song-Beverly Act cases.

“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396; Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1367 [declarations of counsel also are “sufficient to meet the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees incurred, without the need to produce copies of counsel’s detailed billing statements”].) “The party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers objectionable.

A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Ibid.) Fee award amounts are matters within the trial court’s discretion because the “trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum v.

Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s counsel’s invoices, the court finds 4.9 hours to be excessive/unreasonable. This includes time spent on modifications to existing pleading templates or other routine work and for routine clerical tasks. The court therefore deducts a total of 4.9 hours from the request of 28.7 hours, which leads to a lodestar of 11,900.00.

Re Multiplier

Plaintiff requests a 1.1 multiplier. As explained by the court in Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, a lodestar figure may be “augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Id. at 819.) “‘The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.

In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’” (Ibid.)

Applying a multiplier is discretionary. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 248.) “Of course, the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) “In each case, the trial court should consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano III.” (Ibid.)

“[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and

experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation.” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1139.)

The court does not find any circumstances that warrant an upward adjustment. As such, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier.

Re Costs

Plaintiffs seeks a total of $600.13 in costs and expenses. Under Civil Code section 1794(d), as the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to all “costs and expenses” that were reasonably incurred in prosecuting the case, including items beyond the statutory costs enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Jensen v. BMW of North Am. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.) Although Defendant contends otherwise, the electronic filing fee for the Case Management Statement is reasonably incurred. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(14) [fees for electronic filing are allowable if the court requires electronic filing of documents].) The court finds all such costs and expenses to be reasonable awards costs in the requested amount of $600.13.

In sum, the court awards Plaintiff attorney fees in the total amount of $11,900.00 and costs in the total amount of $600.13.

Re Settlement

According to both sides, the case has settled. The court therefore orders proceedings suspended pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385. The parties are ordered to comply with rule 3.1385, by filing a dismissal upon completion of settlement terms.

The court VACATES the 7/6/27 trial date.

The court also sets an Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal on Settled Case for 2/22/27 at 9:00 AM in Department W08. No appearance is necessary if dismissal of entire action is filed and entered with the court. If dismissal of entire action is not entered, all counsel of record are to

appear. Failure to appear will result in court dismissal of entire action. Plaintiff SHALL file and serve a status report no later than 10 court days before the hearing.

Plaintiff to give notice of all of the above.

11 Mojica vs. General Motion to Dismiss for Discovery Violations Motors, LLC The court GRANTS Defendant General Motors LLC’s unopposed motion to dismiss action without prejudice and for imposition of costs.

Defendant General Motors, the only named defendant, moves to dismiss this action without prejudice and for costs, pursuant to Section 871.26(j)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiffs JORGE L MOJICA and M&J DESIGN INC. filed this lemon law action on 6/27/25 asserting causes of action for violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(d), violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(b), violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3), breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and fraudulent inducement, based on the sale of a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 with alleged defects.

Defendant argues that under Section 871.26(c) there is an expedited discovery process requiring Plaintiff to submit to deposition upon Defendant’s election within 120 days of the filing of Defendant’s responsive pleading.

While Defendant does not provide evidence of its election under Section 871.29 in this motion, Defendant previously filed a motion to compel Plaintiffs’ compliance pursuant to Section 871.26(c)(1), and for the statutory sanctions in the amount of $1,500 against counsel pursuant to Section 871.26(j)(1), on the basis of its election under this chapter. On 4/27/26, Judge De La Cruz in Dept. CM02 granted Defendant’s motion for compliance and imposed the $1,500 of mandatory sanctions under Section 871.26(j)(1). Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion to compel compliance and did not contest that this chapter applies.

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