Steinhardt vs. Capistrano Unified School District

Defendants’ counsel billed 191.80 attorney hours. Given that this proceeded to the summary judgment stage, this amount appears reasonable. And it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the hours were not reasonably expended. In light of the fact that Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, the Court grants the motion as follows. The only exception to this is Defendants’ counsel’s request for 4 hours for reviewing an opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing on this motion. Given that Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, the Court reduces this requested amount from 4 hours to 0.5 hours.

Timekeeper Hourly Time Gran Total Rate ted Tiffany Hyatt $600 125.60 + Krog 0.5 $75,660 Brianna $550 20.80 Douzoglou $11,440 Tara Karamian $500 4.10 $2,050 Alec Galustian $450 39.10 $17,595 Total $106,745

Costs

Defendants seek reimbursement for $1,308.57 in costs. Defendants timely filed a memorandum of costs, and Plaintiff did not file a motion to tax or strike the memorandum of costs. The Court awards this amount to Defendants in costs.

Defendants shall give notice of this ruling. 4 Steinhardt Defendant Capistrano Unified School District (CUSD)’s motion for attorneys’ fees vs. is DENIED. Capistrano Unified Basis for Attorneys’ Fees School District A party seeking an award of fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours spent, the hourly rates, and that the fees sought were reasonable and necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (569 E. County Blvd. LLC v Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 432).

This court granted Defendant District’s motion for summary judgment on 7/9/26. (ROA 219). Defendant District moves for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1038, which provides:

(a) In any civil proceeding under the Government Claims Act (Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or for express or implied indemnity or for contribution in any civil action, the court, upon motion of the defendant or cross-defendant, shall, at the time of the granting of any summary judgment... determine whether or not the plaintiff, petitioner, cross- complainant, or intervenor brought the proceeding with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, petition, cross-complaint, or complaint or answer in intervention. If the court should determine that the proceeding was not brought in good faith and with reasonable cause, an additional issue shall be decided 15

as to the defense costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by the party or parties opposing the proceeding, and the court shall render judgment in favor of that party in the amount of all reasonable and necessary defense costs, in addition to those costs normally awarded to the prevailing party. An award of defense costs under this section shall not be made except on notice contained in a party's papers and an opportunity to be heard. (b) “Defense costs,” as used in this section, shall include reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, the expense of services of experts, advisers, and consultants in defense of the proceeding, and where reasonably and necessarily incurred in defending the proceeding. (c) This section shall be applicable only on motion made before the discharge of the jury or entry of judgment, and any party requesting the relief pursuant to this section waives any right to seek damages for malicious prosecution.

Failure to make the motion shall not be deemed a waiver of the right to pursue a malicious prosecution action. (d) This section shall only apply if the defendant or cross-defendant has made a motion for summary judgment, judgment under Section 631.8, directed verdict, or nonsuit and the motion is granted.

Thus, “[t]o avoid paying defense costs under section 1038, Plaintiff must show he or she filed and pursued the action with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint.” (Hall v. Regents of Univ. of California (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1585.) Moreover, “[s]ection 1038 applies not only to [] actions initiated in bad faith, but also to actions initiated in good faith but maintained in bad faith and without reasonable cause.” (Id. at p. 1586 [citing to Curtis v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1243, 1250]). See also Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Ctr. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 853 fn.1: “The ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonable cause’ requirements pertain not only to the action’s initiation, but also its continued maintenance.”

Furthermore, “[a] defendant may not recover section 1038 costs simply because it won a summary judgment or other dispositive motion; victory does not per se indicate lack of reasonable cause.” (Kobzoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 856). Finally, “before denying a section 1038 motion, a court must find the plaintiff brought or maintained an action in the good faith belief in the action's justifiability and with objective reasonable cause.” (Id. at 862).

Reasonableness

Under section 1038, the court decides whether reasonable cause exists by analyzing the facts known to the plaintiff when he or she filed or maintained the action and determining whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1273-74). This any-reasonableattorney standard is an objective standard that is applied as a matter of law. (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at 1274).

Defendant’s motion is predominantly based on the application of Educ. Code § 35330, otherwise known as the “field trip immunity.”

Educ. Code § 35330, subd. (d) provides: “All persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident, illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion. All adults taking out-of-state field trips or excursions and all parents or guardians of pupils taking out-of-state field trips or excursions shall sign a statement waiving all claims.”

“ ‘Field trip’ is defined as a visit made by students and usually a teacher for purposes of first hand observation (as to a factory, farm, clinic, museum). ‘Excursion’ means a journey chiefly for recreation, a usual brief pleasure trip, departure from a direct or proper course, or deviation from a definite path.” (Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1219 [internal citations omitted]).

Defendant relies on Kobzoff, supra, wherein the court held: “No reasonable plaintiffs, without some additional legal basis for the action, would maintain a suit against a defendant protected by the conclusive statutory immunity. (See id. at pp. 479–481, 134 Cal.Rptr. 549.) Thus, regardless of the alleged factual strength of plaintiffs' case, section 1038 allows defendants to recover costs when plaintiffs had no reasonable cause for filing or maintaining the action.” (Kobzoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 864).

In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, this court found that the basketball tournament was a field trip or excursion within Educ. Code § 35330. (ROA 219). However, as this court found, Plaintiff had plead allegations regarding 12/31/22 text messages which occurred after the tournament, as well as general allegations regarding communications from Mr. Lutz. (See Compl., ¶¶ 10, 37).

The District argued for the first time in its reply to the motion for summary judgment that these text messages, or any nonphysical conduct, cannot be the subject of Plaintiff’s claims, citing to Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 627 (“Thomas cites no authority imposing on a university a duty to protect students from harm of a nonphysical nature.”).

However, as the moving party, the District had the burden to establish “a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading.” (Doe v. Good Samaritan Hospital (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 653, 661 [quotations omitted, emphasis in the original]). Accordingly, this court found that the District did not establish that the field-trip immunity statute applied to the entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

In its reply to the motion for attorneys’ fees, Defendant District contends that “[a]ll of the pre-tournament text messages were not alleged in the operative Complaint as a basis for her claims. See ROA 2. And even if they were, merely exchanging text messages is not a basis for a negligence claim.” (Reply, 7:9-11), Defendant is relitigating this issue. This court found that Plaintiff had alleged communications in her Complaint that Defendant did not address in its moving papers.

But even with regards to the basketball tournament, the court notes that Plaintiff cited to Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208 in her Opposition. In Doe, the court found that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could accordingly conclude that attendance at [a science camp] was neither a field trip nor an excursion, because it was neither a mere observational visit nor a recreational departure from the usual educational course.” (Id. at 1221). See Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 232, 237: “Certainly the plaintiffs should be provided the forum in which to prove, if they can, that the ROTC ‘summer camp, bivouac and summer training’ was just as much a part of the school curriculum as a school-sponsored band or orchestra performance at an off-premises event.”

While this court ultimately found that the basketball tournament fell within the immunity statute, that finding was not predetermined simply because it was a sport-related, offcampus activity. Rather, this court was required to look closely at the evidence presented to determine how this tournament could be related to the school curriculum, if at all.

Defendant also briefly addressed this court’s finding that no known CUSD official had knowledge of Lutz’s actions or dangerous propensities as required to establish her claims. (See Rancho Cucamonga Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino Cnty. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718, 721 [“Thus, the school district may be liable for hiring, supervising, or retaining an employee if the district's supervisory personnel had actual or constructive knowledge of the employee's dangerous propensities.”]).

In her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant Lutz failed to complete three mandatory trainings for “Coronavirus 101 - What You Need to Know (Full Course)”, “IPM [Integrated Pest Management] for Teachers and Office Staff (Full Course)”, and “Mandated Reporter: Child Abuse and Neglect (California Full).” Plaintiff also presented evidence that Lutz drove Plaintiff to the tournament without completing the required driver form. While this court found that these facts did not create a triable issue for various reasons as set forth in its ruling, the court finds that Plaintiff was not objectively unreasonable in opposing the motion with these facts.

Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff brought and maintained this action with objective reasonable cause.

Good Faith

“The good faith determination, however, involves a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's state of mind.” (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1226).

As the court held in Hall, supra:

“Good faith, or its absence, involves a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's subjective state of mind [citations]: Did he or she believe the action was valid? What was his or her intent or purpose in pursuing it? ... Because the good faith issue is factual, the question on appeal will be whether the evidence of record was sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding.” (Emphasis added, Knight v. City of Capitola, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 932, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 874.) Under the express wording of section 1038, “good faith” is linked to a belief in a “justifiable controversy under the facts and law....” (Emphasis added.)

(Hall, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1586).

“Section 1038 applies not only to tort actions initiated in bad faith, but also to actions initiated in good faith but maintained in bad faith and without reasonable cause.” (Id. at 1586).

In support of Plaintiff’s argument that this action was brought and maintained in good faith, Plaintiff presents the declarations of counsel Kristen Friedman and Plaintiff Avery Steinhardt.

Counsel declares: Plaintiff propounded her final set of written discovery on the District on November 6, 2024. (Decl. of Friedman, ¶ 3). The District propounded its final set of written discovery on Plaintiff on October 11, 2024. Plaintiff completed her responses to the District’s written discovery by March 24, 2025. (Decl. of Friedman, ¶ 4). The District served discovery on Plaintiff showing that Lutz had failed to complete mandatory trainings or comply with school policies on August 30, 2024. (Decl. of Friedman, ¶ 6). The District’s responses and production in response to Plaintiff’s written discovery were not completed until approximately August 2025. During that period, Plaintiff granted the District multiple extensions to provide discovery responses and documents rather than immediately resorting to motion practice. (Decl. of Friedman, ¶ 5).

Plaintiff declares that her claims against the District were never based solely on what happened during the basketball tournament in San Diego in December 2022, and that her interactions with Mr. Lutz began months before that tournament and occurred during the regular school semester. (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 3). She declares: “During the months before the tournament, Assistant Coach Brandon Lutz gave me inappropriate and excessive personal attention. He communicated with me privately on his personal cellphone and Snapchat, offered me private basketball practices, bought me food and Starbucks, spent time at the Starbucks where I worked, contacted hundreds of colleges on my behalf, and gave me a $100 massage gift card.” (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 4).

She further declares: “Because Mr. Lutz’s conduct toward me began months before the tournament, I believed that the District’s responsibility for failing to supervise him could not be reduced to the fact that some of the misconduct happened during a field trip.” (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 6). She also declares: “As this lawsuit proceeded, I learned through my attorneys and the litigation process that District records showed Mr. Lutz had been repeatedly notified that he had not completed required District training and had not signed the District’s policies and procedures handbook for that school year.

I understood that these requirements included student safety training and mandated child abuse reporter training. I also learned of issues concerning his driver paperwork and the District’s supervision, chaperone, and transportation arrangements for the tournament.” (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 7).

She declares that these facts reinforced her belief that there were legitimate questions about whether the District had properly supervised Mr. Lutz and whether it could or should have identified problems with his compliance with its policies before the events in San Diego occurred. (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 9).

She also declares: “I relied upon my attorneys to advise me regarding the legal issues in the case. They never advised me that continuing the case was frivolous or unreasonable. Based upon their advice and the facts that continued to be developed through discovery, I believed there remained legitimate factual and legal issues for the Court to decide. Much of that information continued to be developed through the District’s document production and through depositions that took place after May of 2025. At no point did I continue this 19

lawsuit because I wanted to harass the District, punish it through the litigation process, cause it to incur unnecessary attorney’s fees, or force it to incur unnecessary litigation expenses.” (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶¶ 12, 13).

In support of the District’s contention that this action was not brought in good faith, the District argues that Plaintiff took the position that the tournament was a “field trip”/ “excursion” on two prior occasions during litigation, yet took the opposition position in her Opposition to the motion for summary judgment. First, the District notes Plaintiff’s complaint at paragraph 41, wherein she alleges: “Defendant and its employees have a duty to Avery Steinhardt to ensure she is kept safe at school and during school sponsored excursions.”

Next, Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for leave to amend, at Pg. 11:24-27, wherein she states: “Plaintiff’s causes of action are openly and obviously derived from the events that took place during a school sponsored field trip at the end of 2022. There is no case to be made for the District having recently discovered this field trip. It is a material, essential, and central fact to the case.” (See ROA 129).

In response, Plaintiff argues that she opposed the notion that the tournament was a “field trip” for purposes of the immunity statute and never conceded that the tournament was subject to immunity when referring to the tournament as a “field trip” or “excursion”.

Plaintiff declares: “I understood that the District later raised a defense based on the fact that some of the misconduct occurred during a field trip. I never understood that defense to mean that my entire case necessarily lacked merit or that the District could not be held responsible for any of its conduct concerning Mr. Lutz.” (Decl. of Steinhardt, ¶ 10). She also declares: “I also never intended, by acknowledging that the San Diego basketball tournament was likely a field trip, to concede that the District could not be held responsible for what happened to me. I understood those to be different issues.” (Decl. Of Steinhardt, ¶ 11).

The court finds that Plaintiff did not concede the issue of immunity. First, as mentioned above, not all the alleged conduct was subject to the immunity statute. Second, as the court found in Doe, supra, and the similar cases cited by both parties, the determination of whether an off-campus event falls within the immunity statute requires an analysis of various factors, and goes beyond one’s reference to the term “field trip” or “excursion.”

Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff brought and maintained the action in good faith, and the motion is denied.

Defendant CUSD shall give notice. 5 Bren Plaintiffs Angela Bren and Cary Bren’s motion for leave to amend to file a second amended vs. Rebeil complaint is DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to file a second amended complaint that adds allegations that Defendants added an illegal fifth floor basement to their property to the already existing causes of action, which is against the CC&Rs. Plaintiffs do not seek to allege additional causes of action.

Defendants oppose, arguing that Plaintiffs fail to offer a factual basis for the new allegations, that the claims are time-barred, and that granting leave to amend would severely prejudice Defendants as they no longer live at the property and given the expanding costs of discovery. 20