Holcomb vs. Raging Bull Enterprises, Inc.

and is often done where there is legally recognized basis for recovery in both contract and tort.” (Gebert v. Yank (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 544, 591.)

Finally, the Court notes that Defendant repeatedly asserts that Plaintiff lacks evidence of negligence; however, Plaintiff clearly declares that there was $50,000 within the safe deposit box on August 26, 2022. (¶11 of McMillen Declaration.) Plaintiff additionally declares that he did not remove anything from the box, authorize anyone else to remove anything from the box, or take any action that would assist anyone in removing anything from the box. (¶12 of McMillen Declaration.) Despite the above, the box was empty when he returned on February 26, 2024. (¶13 of McMillen Declaration.)

The above is sufficient evidence of negligence to avoid summary judgment.

As noted by Plaintiff, “[e]xcept where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411.)

Additionally, “[a] court generally cannot resolve questions about a declarant’s credibility in a summary judgment proceeding [citations] unless admissions against interest have been made which justify disregard of any dissimulation.” (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1065.) No such admissions have been made herein.

Moreover, the above is sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. “Res ipsa loquitur, when translated, means simply ‘the thing, or affair, speaks for itself,’ and, so speaking, authorizes the inference of negligence in the absence of a showing to the contrary.” (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1952) 39 Cal.2d 436, 440 [internal quotations cleaned up].)

“Where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of proper care.” (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1952) 39 Cal.2d 436, 441.)

This presumption has been applied, wherein a “sum of money” was abstracted from a safe deposit box. (See Cussen v. Southern California Sav. Bank (1901) 133 Cal. 534, 537.)

Based on all the above, the Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication brought by Defendant is DENIED. 3 Holcomb Motion for Attorney Fees. vs. Raging Bull Defendants Raging Bull Enterprises, Inc. dba Orange County Singles and Monique Butler Enterprises aka Nikki S. Bianco move for an award of attorney’s fees against Plaintiff Jessica, Inc. Holcomb. For the following reasons, the unopposed motion is GRANTED IN A REDUCED AMOUNT.

Plaintiff shall pay Defendants the amount of $106,745 in attorney’s fees and $1,308.57 in costs.

If a cause of action is “on a contract,” and the contract provides that the prevailing party shall recover attorneys’ fees incurred to enforce the contract, then attorneys’ fees must be awarded on the contract claim in accordance with Civil Code section 1717. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615–617; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 706–707.)

Here, Plaintiff filed this action alleging Defendants breached a dating service contract. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff entered into this contract in May 2023. (Complaint, Ex. A.) Plaintiff generally alleges Defendants breached this contract and misrepresented that Defendants had members that met Plaintiff’s preferences.

The Membership Agreement executed by Plaintiff on May 12, 2023 states:

“If any claim, legal action or any arbitration or other proceeding is brought for the enforcement of this Agreement or because of a dispute, breach or default in connection with any of the provisions of this Agreement, the successful or prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with that claim, action or proceeding.” (Krog Dec., Ex. 1.)

On March 30, 2026, judgment was entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. (ROA 174.)

Prevailing Party

Civil Code § 1717(b) states: (1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.

Defendants are the prevailing parties because judgment was entered in their favor on March 30, 2026. (ROA 174.)

Lodestar Method

The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a lodestar figure b ased on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. (Robertson, 144 Cal.App.4th at 819, citing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48–49.)

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) Factors that may be considered in determining whether counsel’s rates are reasonable include: level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.)

The party requesting fees has the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support t he reasonableness of the billing rates requested. (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.) If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposi ng party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to show that the rates requested are not re asonable. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [fin ding court erred in reducing rates where evidence of reasonableness of rate requested was u ndisputed]; Davis v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal.App.4th at 904.)

Defendants’ counsel requested the following hourly rates:

Timekeeper Requested Hourly Rate Tiffany Hyatt Krog $725 Brianna Douzoglou $725 Tara Karamian $475 Alec Galustian $525

The only evidence Defendants offer regarding the reasonableness of their counsel’s rate is the following: My hourly rate is $725.00, attorney Brianna Douzoglou’s hourly rate is $725.00, attorney Tara Karamian’s hourly rate is $475, and attorney Alec Galustian’s hourly rate is $525.00. Hyatt Krog has practiced law since 2001, Douzoglou has practiced law since 2015, Karamians has practiced law since 2020, and Galustian has practiced law since 2024.

In other words, Defendants’ justify their counsel’s hourly rates with only their dates of bar admission. Counsel does not detail the work they have been doing since they earned their license to practice law, where they practiced law, or their role or title with any particular law firm. Based on the Court’s understanding of the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to attorneys for comparable work, the Court sets counsel’s hourly rates as follows:

Timekeeper Reasonable Hourly Rate Tiffany Hyatt Krog $600 Brianna Douzoglou $550 Tara Karamian $500 Alec Galustian $450

Hours Reasonably Expended

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id.)

Plaintiff has not challenged the reasonableness of the number of hours billed by Defendants’ counsel.

Defendants’ counsel billed 191.80 attorney hours. Given that this proceeded to the summary judgment stage, this amount appears reasonable. And it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the hours were not reasonably expended. In light of the fact that Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, the Court grants the motion as follows. The only exception to this is Defendants’ counsel’s request for 4 hours for reviewing an opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing on this motion. Given that Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, the Court reduces this requested amount from 4 hours to 0.5 hours.

Timekeeper Hourly Time Gran Total Rate ted Tiffany Hyatt $600 125.60 + Krog 0.5 $75,660 Brianna $550 20.80 Douzoglou $11,440 Tara Karamian $500 4.10 $2,050 Alec Galustian $450 39.10 $17,595 Total $106,745

Costs

Defendants seek reimbursement for $1,308.57 in costs. Defendants timely filed a memorandum of costs, and Plaintiff did not file a motion to tax or strike the memorandum of costs. The Court awards this amount to Defendants in costs.

Defendants shall give notice of this ruling. 4 Steinhardt Defendant Capistrano Unified School District (CUSD)’s motion for attorneys’ fees vs. is DENIED. Capistrano Unified Basis for Attorneys’ Fees School District A party seeking an award of fees has the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours spent, the hourly rates, and that the fees sought were reasonable and necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (569 E. County Blvd. LLC v Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 432).

This court granted Defendant District’s motion for summary judgment on 7/9/26. (ROA 219). Defendant District moves for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1038, which provides:

(a) In any civil proceeding under the Government Claims Act (Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or for express or implied indemnity or for contribution in any civil action, the court, upon motion of the defendant or cross-defendant, shall, at the time of the granting of any summary judgment... determine whether or not the plaintiff, petitioner, cross- complainant, or intervenor brought the proceeding with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the complaint, petition, cross-complaint, or complaint or answer in intervention. If the court should determine that the proceeding was not brought in good faith and with reasonable cause, an additional issue shall be decided 15