Aleksandra Balinska v. Ohad Broide, et al.

an expert witness.¿¿(Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2034.260, subd. (b).)¿¿On objection of any party who has made a complete and timely compliance with Section 2034.260, the trial court shall exclude from evidence the expert opinion of any witness that is offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to do any of the following: (1) list that witness as an expert under Section 2034.260; (2) submit an expert witness declaration; (3) produce reports and writings of expert witnesses under Section 2034.270; or make that expert available for a deposition.¿(Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 2034.300.)¿ CCP Sec. 2034.230 states "(b) The demand shall specify the date for the exchange of lists of expert trial witnesses, expert witness declarations, and any demanded production of writings. The specified date of exchange shall be 50 days before the initial trial date, or 20 days after service of the demand, whichever is closer to the trial date, unless the court, on motion and a showing of good cause, orders an earlier or later date of exchange."¿ Discussion The central issue in this motion is whether the designation of Dr.

Gardiner and Dr. Gish constitutes a permissible supplemental designation under CCP Sec. 2034.280. Franco argues that Dr. Gardiner and Dr. Gish will rebut Bryan Randles' accident reconstruction and biomechanics testimony for Bender. Franco cites Du-All Safety, LLC v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal.App.5th 485 ("Du-All"), for the position that a party has the right to supplement its expert witness exchange by adding experts to cover subjects on which the other party indicates it plans to offer expert testimony, and on which the opposing party had not previously retained an expert to testify.

In Du-All, the Court of Appeal held that "There is no dispute that Du-All timely and simultaneously designated its initial experts. And also no dispute it timely designated its rebuttal experts in the same fields as plaintiffs' initially designated experts. In short, Du-All complied with the express language of the expert designation statutes. That ends it." (Du-All, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) Here, like in Du-All, there is no contention that Franco failed to comply with the statutory requirements of Sec. 2034, either in her initial disclosure or in her supplemental disclosure.1 Franco's experts are qualified in the areas that Bender indicated Bryan Randles' testimony would cover, nor has Bender shown any gamesmanship or prejudice.

If the parties believe they need additional time to depose the experts, they may stipulate to continue trial or file a motion for a continuance. Any issues as to the scope of Dr. Gardiner and Dr. Gish's testimony are better addressed at the motion in limine phase.

Conclusion

Bender's Motion to Exclude or Limit Testimony of Plaintiff's Supplemental Experts is DENIED.

Aleksandra Balinska v. Ohad Broide, et al., Case No. 26SMCV01743 Defendant Solan Games' Motion to Quash Service of Summons Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Background Plaintiff Aleksandra Balinska sues Defendants Solan Games, Inc. and Ohad Broide for (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) declaratory relief; (6) constructive trust; (7) unjust enrichment; (8) accounting; and (9) inspection of books and records.

Balinska alleges that Solan Games hired her "in a senior operational leadership capacity" on July 22, 2024, and that her compensation included an 8.8 % ownership stake in the company. (Complaint, P. 27.) Balinska alleges that she was terminated a year and a half later and never received the equity she was promised. (Id. at P.P. 31-32.) On March 12, 2026, Balinska filed the complaint. On May 11, 2026, Solan Games filed this Motion to Quash. This motion was continued several times because Balinsk obtained new counsel between the date the motion was filed and the hearing.

On August 27, 2026, Balinska filed opposition. On September 2, 2026, Solan Games replied. Arguments Solan Games moves to quash service of summons on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Solan

Games, a Delaware Corporation managed entirely from Nova Scotia, Canada with no contacts with the state of California. (Motion to Quash, p. 2.) Solan Games argues that its only connection with California is that it briefly contemplated establishing a Santa Monica address and used the potential address to register with Dun & Bradstreet to obtain a DUNS number. (Id. at p. 3.) Solan Games further argues that Balinska signed her employment contract at her home in Warsaw, Poland, and performed all services under the contract from her home in Poland. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)

In the alternative, Solan Games argues that the Court should dismiss or stay this action under the forum non conveniens doctrine because Delaware is a adequate and proper alternative venue. (Id. at p. 11.) In opposition, Balinska argues that Solan Games held itself out to be a California company by using a S anta M onica address online, in invoices, and in its privacy policy. (Opposition, p. 5.) Balinska argues that in doing so, Solan Games purposefully availed itself of California, and became subject to California jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 5-6.)

Balinska argues that her claims arise from Solan Games' contacts with California because she believed Solan Games to be a California company and because the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. (Id. at p. 8.) Balinska also argues that Solan Games is estopped from denying a California presence because it had actual knowledge that it held itself out a s a California company and should not now be able to deny those assertions. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) Balinska also asks the Court to deny dismissal or a stay under the forum non conveniens doctrine. (ID. at p. 9.)

In reply, Solan Games argues that Balinska has not met her burden of establishing jurisdiction. Solan Games argues that Balinska's evidence only establishes what she subjectively understood about Solan Games' California presence, which is not evidence of the c ompany's forum contacts. (Reply, p. 2.) Solan Games argues that the Santa Monica address appeared on several websites because it auto-populated from Solan Games' Dun & Bradstreet profile, which it created while it was contemplating establishing a Santa Monica office. (Id. at p. 5.)

Solan Games argues that it is not estopped from contesting personal jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction can only be intentionally waived and Balinska's waiver argument is based on unintentional representations. (Id. at pp. 8-9.) In the alternative, Solan Games argues that the Court should stay or dismiss this action on forum non conveniens grounds. (Id. at pp. 9-10.) Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Jurisdiction Code of Civil Procedure, section 418.10 states the following: "(a) A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)¿¿ Although the defendant¿is the moving party on a motion to quash service of process, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff in opposing the motion: "[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that 'minimum contacts' exist between defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction." (Mihlon v. Sup.Ct. (Murkey) ¿(1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710;¿ Floveyor Int'l, Ltd. v.

Sup.Ct. (Shick Tube- Veyor Corp.) ¿(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793;¿ Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. ¿(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1313.)¿ The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Sup.Ct. (Grosh Scenic Studios) ¿(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232.)¿ If plaintiff meets this burden, "it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable." (Buchanan v.

Soto ¿(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362;¿ Swenberg v. Dmarcian, Inc. ¿(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 280, 291.)¿¿ Jurisdictional facts must be proved by admissible evidence. This generally requires documentary evidence and declarations by competent witnesses. (Rivelli v. Hemm ¿(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 402;¿ In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II ¿(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.)¿ Request for Judicial Notice Solan Games requests judicial notice of (1) its certificate of incorporation, filed with the Delaware Department of Corporations; and (2) Fusion VC I, LP's SEC Form D Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, filed with the SEC on or about October 15, 2021.

Notice is GRANTED.

Discussion

The extent to which a California court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the nature and quality of defendant's "contacts" with the state.¿ U.S. Supreme Court decisions recognize two types of jurisdiction: (1) "general" and (2) "specific." (See¿ Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup.Ct. of Calif., San Francisco County ¿(2017) 582 U.S. 255, 262.)¿¿ General Jurisdiction General jurisdiction requires¿"substantial . . . continuous and¿systematic" contacts¿with California, i.e., the defendant's contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of a physical presence¿in the state.¿ (Vons Companies Inc. v.

Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 16 Cal.4th 434, 452.)¿ Balinksa does not contend that Solan Games has sufficient contacts with California to establish general jurisdiction. As no party contends that California has general jurisdiction over Solan Games and following a review of the evidence presented showing that Solan Games is incorporated in Delaware and does not lease offices or employ staff in California, the Court finds no general jurisdiction. (See Broide Decl., P.P. 3-4, Exhibit B.) Specific Jurisdiction Specific jurisdiction exists where contacts are insufficient for¿general jurisdiction, but the contact is related to the cause of action presented. (Epic Communications, Inc. v.

Richwave Technology, Inc. ¿(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 314, 327.)¿For specific jurisdiction, "courts consider the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation."¿ (Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4 th 1054, 1062.)¿ A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: "(1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice."¿ (Id.)¿¿¿ Balinska does not meet her burden of proof of showing that Solan Games purposefully availed itself of California. " The first step in specific jurisdiction analysis involves a qualitative evaluation of the defendant's contact with the forum state.

Specifically, we look for 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' This purposeful availment requirement is the test for the fundamental determination of whether 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonable anticipate being haled into court there.'" (Lake v. Lake (2001) 817 F.2d 1416, 1421, quoting Hanson v.

Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 253; World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1979) 444 U.S. 286, 297.) It is Plaintiff's burden to establish that Solan Games purposefully availed itself of California. (Murkey, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d 703.) Balinska's evidence shows that she believed that Solan Games was operated out of Santa Monica, California; that a privacy policy referenced a Santa Monica address, and that the Santa Monica address was used on invoices. (See Balinska Decl., P. 5, Exhibit s 1, 5.) The Invoices Balinska references are invoices for her own work, that she appears to have generated. (See Balinska Decl., Exhibit 1, p. 1 ["Person authorized to issue the invoice P.

Alkesandra Balinska "].) Balinska produces no case law showing that a subjective belief that a company is based in California is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Solan Games' evidence shows that they never operated out of the Santa Monica address, though they used it to obtain a DUNS number, which they subsequently used. Thus, the maximum interaction between Solan Games and the state of California is that Solan Games' product is sold in California and that Solan Games used a California address to obtain a DUNS number.

These contacts are insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277 Balinska also contends that Solan Games is estopped from contesting personal jurisdiction because it held itself out as a California corporation to her, in its privacy policy, and in invoices. (Opposition, p. 8.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, waiver requires intentional representation that a business operates in a jurisdiction to support a waiver finding. (Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 705.) A ll uses of Solan Games' Santa Monica address are explained by fact that it is the address associated with Solan Games' DUNS number. This single use of the Santa Monica address when registering with Dun &

Bradstreet is insufficient to support waiver finding. Second, the case Balinska cites to support this argument is not even about personal jurisdiction. It primarily addresses establishing jurisdiction in Federal Court as a Rule 37 sanction, a fundamentally different legal issue from the one before this court. (Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 695 ["May a district court, as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order directed at establishing jurisdictional facts, proceed on the basis that personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party has been established?"] .) 1 California does not have jurisdiction over Defendants.

Conclusion

Solan Games' Motion to Quash Service of Process is GRANTED. This case is dismissed as to Defendant Solan Games. Case Number: 26SMCV02744 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Belina Louise Bolser v. Zuri Akida Murrell, M.D., et al., Case No. 26SMCV02744 436 Beverly Hills, LLC's Demurrer with Motion to Strike Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Background Plaintiff Belina Louise Bolser sues Defendants Zuri A. Murrell, M.D. and 436 Beverly Hills, LLC d/b/a 436 Beverly Hills Surgery Center for (1) professional negligence; (2) lack of informed consent; (3) medical battery; (4) intentional misrepresentation/fraud; (5) fraudulent concealment; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) negligent misrepresentation; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) violation of Health & Safety Code Sec.Sec. 123110, 123120; and (10) unfair competition under Bus. & Prof.

Code Sec. 17200. This is a medical malpractice case. Bolser alleges that on September 6, 2024, Murell negligently performed a skin-tag removal and anal rejuvenation procedure on her, causing fecal and gas incontinency and persistent diarrhea. On May 15, 2026, Bolser filed the complaint. On August 10, 2026, 436 Beverly Hills filed this demurrer and Motion to Strike. On September 2, 2026, 436 Beverly Hills filed a notice of non-opposition to its demurrer. As of September 9, 2026, the Court has not received opposition to 436 Beverly Hills' demurrer.

On August 17, 2026, Murrell filed a demurrer to the complaint, which is set for hearing on November 19, 2026. Argument 436 Beverly Hills demurs to Plaintiffs eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action for IIED, violations of Health & Safety Code Sec.Sec. 123110 and 123120; and unfair competition. 436 Beverly Hills argues that the Complaint fails to allege "extreme and outrageous" conduct that would state a claim for IIED, that the complaint fails to allege specific statutory pre-requisites to claims under Health & Safety Code Sec.Sec. 123110 and 123120, and that the complaint does not allege specific unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and therefore does not state a claim for violation of the UCL.

Governing Law Demurrer I n a demurrer proceeding, the defects in the complaint must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿"A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v.

Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, "[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause