Havilah Tillmon v. Jesus Sotelo

explains that the immediately adjacent chaparral vegetation is no longer undisturbed due to the fire damage. But the injunction uses "undisturbed chaparral vegetation in the surrounding area" as the relevant comparison. Even if some vegetation became disturbed by the fire, other undisturbed vegetation in the surrounding area would remain. Thus, Defendant's second requested modification is also unwarranted.

Finally, Defendant argues that the ends of justice require modification of the injunction because the resources of the trust are insufficient to fund compliance costs for a property which produces no income. The Court does not find that the ends of justice require modification or dissolution: the hardship imposed on the trust arises out of the violations prior parties were adjudicated to have committed. Defendant does not present further separate arguments in support of her other requested modifications to the injunction. Moreover, the Court believes that the interests of justice would be served by the parties following the direction of the Injunction and trying to work together as contemplated to arrive at a negotiated approach to compliance with the Injunction. No effort has been made in that regard. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is denied. C.

Conclusion

The Court denies the motion.

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Rosie Lopez v. Vanessa Brenda Jaquez, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 24STCV26305, set for hearing on September 11, 2026. Vanessa Brenda Jaquez and Susie Lulu Zorrilla Jaimes (collectively, Defendants) move for the Court to provide notice of the appraised fair market value of the property located at 611, 629, 629 1/2, 635 W 8th St, Pomona, CA 91766 (the Property). Rosie Lopez (Plaintiff) has not filed an opposition to the motion.

Defendants' motion is granted. Tenants in common may bring an action to partition real property owned by all. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 874.311, et seq.) In such cases, the Court shall determine the fair market value of the property by ordering an appraisal through the appointment of a disinterested real estate developer. (Id., Sec. 874.316, subds. (a), (d).) If an appraisal is conducted in such a way, not later than 10 days after the appraisal is filed the Court shall send notice to each party with a known address stating: "(1) The appraised fair market value of the property. (2) That the appraisal is available at the court clerk's office. (3) That a party may file with the court an objection to the appraisal not later than 30 days after the notice is sent, stating the grounds for the objection." (Id., Sec. 374.316, subd. (e).)

Here, Defendants filed the appraisal with the Court on July 2, 2026. (Resnick Decl. P. 4, Ex. 3.) Thus, the Court must issue notice of the appraisal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 374.316, subdivision (e). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion.

Case Number: 26STCV04803 Hearing Date: September 11, 2026 Dept: 400 MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Havilah Tillmon v. Jesus Sotelo, Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 26STCV04803, set for hearing on September 11, 2026. Havilah Tillmon (Plaintiff) moves for orders compelling Jesus Sotelo (Defendant) to provide responses to Plaintiff's special interrogatories, set one (SPROGs) and requests for production of documents, set one (RFPs). Plaintiff also requests a total $5,000 in sanctions.

Plaintiff's motions are granted. The Court imposes $1,200 in sanctions on Defendant's counsel. If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, that party waives any objection, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response, and the Court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully opposes such a motion unless they acted with substantial justification. (Id., Sec. 2030.290.) And if a party to whom an inspection demand is directed fails to serve a timely response, that party waives any objection, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response, and the Court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully opposes such a motion unless they acted with substantial justification. (Id., Sec. 2031.300.)

Here, Plaintiff filed their original complaint on February 13, 2026. They served all relevant written discovery requests via email on April 16, 2026. (Teshale Decl. P. 3, Ex. A.) After Plaintiff granted an extension, Defendant's responses were due on June 18, 2026. (Id. P.P. 5-6.) Defendant did not serve responses by that date, and Plaintiff attempted to resolve the lack of responses informally. (Id. P.P. 7-14.) But as of July 21, Defendant still failed to provide any responses, so Plaintiff filed the present motions. (Id. P. 7.) Because of Defendant's failure to respond, Plaintiff's motions to compel discovery pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290 and 2031.300 are proper. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motions are granted.

"The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.290, subd. (c).) The same sanctions are imposed when a party unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel responses to requests for production. (Id., Sec. 2031.300, subd. (c).) The Court need not impose sanctions with respect to a motion to compel if the Court finds that circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. (Id., Sec.Sec. 2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.300, subd. (c).) Such sanctions are authorized even when no opposition to a motion to compel is filed. (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).)

Here, Defendant has offered no brief in opposition or explanation as to why responses were not provided. Thus, sanctions are warranted. Plaintiff's counsel alleges an hourly rate of $625, which the Court credits. (Teshale Decl. P. 15.) Counsel testifies to having spent 2 hour reviewing the relevant discovery and drafting a brief, along with an additional 1.5 hours reviewing any opposition and drafting a reply and 0.5 hours spent appearing at the hearing on this matter with respect to each motion. (Id. P.P. 16-19.) Due to the simplicity of the present motions and their similarity, the Court credits counsel with 1.5 total hours for preparing the motions. It also credits counsel 1 hour for appearing at the hearing on this matter. Accordingly, the Court awards $1,562.50 in sanctions ([$625 per hour] x [2.5 hours] = $1,562.50).

Conclusion: The Court grants Plaintiff's motions. The Court imposes $1,562.50 in sanctions on Defendant's counsel, payable to Plaintiff.

Case Number: 26STCV15490 Hearing Date: September 11, 2026 Dept: 400 DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

The Court tenders the following tentative decision in the matter Robert Reed, et al. v. EQR-Vantage, LP, Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 26STCV15490, set for hearing on September 11, 2026. EQR-Vantage, LP (Defendant) demurs to the sixth and seventh causes of action contained within Robert Reed, Vanessa Baris, and William Chadwick's (collectively, Plaintiffs) complaint. Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages, statutory penalties, and attorney's fees. Defendant's demurrer is overruled. Its motion to strike is granted in part. Plaintiffs are granted 20 days' leave to amend. A.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is sustained where "[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.10, subd. (e).) "A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint." (Yalung v. State (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.) In reviewing a complaint's legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist.

Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547, 552.) It is well settled that a "demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]" (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) "We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context." (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Tit. Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v.

Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.) When ruling on a demurrer, a court may only consider the complaint's allegations or matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations pleaded or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations. (Ion Equipment Corporation v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer is properly sustained only when the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Kramer v.

Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)

The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 436, subd. (a).) The Court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court. (Id., Sec. 436, subd. (b).)