Rebecca Esparza, et al. v. City of Ventura, et al.

CONCLUSION In all, Defendant's Motion to Tax is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's costs are ordered taxed in the total amount of $ 271.38. Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of her most recent 998 Offer, February 26, 2026. [1] The 998 Offers attached to Defendant's motion are not properly authenticated. Each is simply attached as an exhibit to Defendant's motion without any declaration.

Plaintiff's exhibits are similarly unauthenticated; the declaration of attorney Sean M. Novak containing two of the offers attached as exhibits is unsigned. Because the parties appear to agree as to the exchange of 998 Offers in this matter (at least as to Plaintiff's June 27, 2024 and February 26, 2026 offers), the Court includes both in its chronology. Defendant's September 23, 2024 offer is not included because there does not appear to be agreement as to that offer. [2] The "items" listed are as numbered and set forth in Defendant's Motion to Tax.

The Court notes that Defendant's motion omits certain item numbers and, accordingly, the item numbers omitted in Defendant's motion are excludes in the Court's analysis. [3] Defendant lists various transactions after the argument that there were "numerous court transaction fees of $2.25 not accounted for" but does not state whether those particular transactions are contested and, if contested, for what reason. (See Mot., p. 4:24-26.) The Court therefore considers any potential dispute as to those claimed costs waived. (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v.

Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1009 ("Failure to offer reasoned analysis of [an] issue constitutes a waiver").) [4] Prior to Item 8, Defendant lists "Item 5. Service of Process - Recoverable. $93.89." (Mot., p. 5:6 (emphasis in original).) Defendant provides no argument or analysis as to Item 5. Given that the total amount Plaintiff claims in her Memorandum of Costs is $93.89 and Defendant provides no argument other than "recoverable" in his motion, the Court finds that either the argument is waived for failure to provide any reasoned objection (see fn. 3) or, alternatively, Defendant does not dispute this claimed cost.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT REBECCA ESPARZA, an individual, AND PATRICIA GARCIA ESPARZA, an individual, vs. CITY OF VENTURA, COUNTY

OF VENTURA, COUNTY OF VENTURA SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, a governmental entity, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a governmental entity and DOES 1-50, Defendants. |))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 26CMCV00196 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF VENTURA AND VENTURA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE'S DEMURRERS TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DATE: September 10, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Defendant County of Ventura and Ventura County Sheriff's Office Responding Party: Plaintiffs Rebecca Esparza and Patricia Garcia Esparza Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Defendants' Demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART.

SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Rebecca Esparza ("Rebecca") is the owner of the subject property where Plaintiff Patricia Garcia Esparza ("Patricia"), an 82-year-old woman requiring a wheelchair, resides. [1] Plaintiffs allege that Defendants County of Ventura ("Ventura County") and Ventura County Sheriff's Office ("VC Sheriff") entered the subject property on February 2,

2025 to perform a raid while Patricia was on the premises. Plaintiffs allege they were never served with a warrant and do not know what Defendants intended to find in the raid. Plaintiffs allege Defendants caused damage to their property and Patricia was left frightened and physically vulnerable and now suffers from high blood pressure. On January 28, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint against Defendants City of Ventura (the "City"), Ventura County, VC Sheriff, and County of Los Angeles ("LA County"), alleging causes of action for: (1) Violation of Fourth Amendment U.S.C Sec. 1983 Unreasonable Search and Seizure; (2) Invasion of Privacy (Intrusion Upon Seclusion); (3) Negligence; (4) Trespass; (5) Violation of the Bane Act--California Civil Code Sec. 52.1; and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On June 8, 2026, Defendants Ventura County and VC Sheriff [2] filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. On July 13, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. On July 21, 2026, Defendants filed a Reply. II. ANALYSIS A.

Legal Standard

A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it "does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 430.10(e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) "A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed." (SKF Farms v.

Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) "The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action." (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) On demurrer, a court does "not accept contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (Simonyan v. Nationwide Insurance Company of America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 889, 895.) Although courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to support the allegations pled to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v.

California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

B. Meet and Confer Prior to filing a demurrer, the moving party "shall meet and confer in person, by telephone or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections raised in the demurrer." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 430.41(a).) Counsel for Defendants, Rocco Zambito Jr. ("Zambito Jr.") attaches a declaration in support of the demurrers attesting to sending a meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs' counsel, Angela Swan, on May 15, 2026 discussing the issues raised in the demurrer and requesting counsel provide her availability for a meet and confer conference. (Zambito Jr.

Decl., P. 4, Exh. A.) Zambito Jr. attests he sent follow up correspondence on May 26, 2026, but Plaintiffs' counsel did not reply. (Id., at P. 5.) Counsel attests his office did not receive a response from Plaintiffs' counsel's office until June 2, 2026 and thus the parties were unable to meet and confer prior to the deadline to filing the instant demurrer. (Id. at P. 6.) The Court finds that Defendants have failed to satisfy the statutory meet and confer requirement. "If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer." (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 430.41(a)(2).) Accordingly, that a deadline was approaching is not a sufficient reason for failure to meet and confer. Because "[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer," the Court proceeds with its analysis. (Id., Sec. 430.41(c).) Counsel are cautioned, however, to ensure compliance with the statutory meet and confer requirements moving forward. C.

Discussion

Moving Defendants demur to Plaintiffs' First through Sixth Causes of Action on the grounds that: (1) the claims asserted in each against VC Sheriff are duplicative of the claims against Ventura County; and (2) each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As to the Plaintiffs' Second through Sixth Causes of Action, Moving Defendants demur on the additional ground that each is subject to dismissal for lack of compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act. As to Plaintiffs' Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action, Moving Defendants demur on the additional ground that each is subject to dismissal because there is no statutory basis for such causes of action.

Finally, Moving Defendants demur to Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action on the ground that the claim is not cognizable in state court and failure to establish municipal liability and to Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for failure to allege negligent conduct.

1. Ventura County Sheriff's Office Defendants demur to each cause of action asserted against VC Sheriff, arguing that since VC Sheriff is a subdivision of Ventura County, naming both VC Sheriff and Ventura County as defendants is "unnecessary and superfluous." (Mot., p. 3:9-11.) In opposition, Plaintiffs "do not dispute [Moving Defendants'] point and are willing to stipulate to dismissal of [VC Sheriff] as a duplicate named defendant, with the causes of action to proceed against the County of Ventura." (Opp., pp. 2:28-3:1.) Because this issue is not in dispute and Plaintiffs stipulate to proceed with only Ventura County as a Defendant, the Court accepts Plaintiffs' offer to stipulate as proposed. VC Sheriff is ordered dismissed from this action without prejudice and the matter will proceed with Ventura County as defendant.

2. Failure to Allege Presentation of a Government Claim - Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action. Ventura County demurs to Plaintiffs' Second through Sixth Causes of Action arguing that Plaintiffs fail to allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims Act and thus the Complaint should be dismissed. In opposition, Plaintiffs agree that the Complaint does not presently allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims Act.

But Plaintiffs argue they did present a claim to Ventura County within six months of the incident, and the County rejected the claim and therefore leave to amend should be granted so that the omission may be rectified. Per the Government Claims Act, a party with a claim for damages against a public entity must first file a claim directly with that entity. The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies or rejects the claim. (Gov. Code Sec.Sec. 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.)

The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim. (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the claims presentation requirement subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Calif. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) Again, there is no dispute here. Plaintiffs agree that Complaint does not allege compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act.

Accordingly, Ventura County's Demurrers

to Plaintiffs' Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action on the ground of failure to allege compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for Violation of Fourth Amendment U.S.C Sec. 1983 Unreasonable Search and Seizure Citing Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658 (" Monell "), Ventura County argues that Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is subject to demurrer because "[t]he only avenue to pursue a federal cause of action against a public entity for an alleged constitutional violation is [by] alleging the public entity's policy or custom caused the injury." (Mot., p. 5:11-14.)

Because Plaintiffs fail to allege any Ventura County policy or custom, Ventura County asserts that its demurrer must be sustained. Additionally, citing Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820 (" Venegas ") and County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters)(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1166 (" Peters "), Ventura County argues that the California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have found that counties cannot be sued under Section 1983 for law enforcement activities and, accordingly, Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action must be dismissed.

In opposition, Plaintiffs agree that a Section 1983 claim against a public entity requires allegations that the alleged constitutional violation resulted from an official policy, custom, or practice, and Plaintiffs do not disagree that their Complaint as currently pleaded does not allege such policy or custom. Plaintiffs further do not argue against Defendants' citations and arguments regarding Venegas and Peters, but instead "recognize that this authority presents a substantial obstacle to municipal liability against the County of Ventura [] for the search itself.

Rather than argue around binding authority," Plaintiffs request leave to amend to allege a "policy, custom, or training deficiency, as distinct from the individual deputies' conduct during the search, that proximately caused the violation alleged." (Opp., p. 3:24-28.) i. Monell and Allegations of Policy or Custom The U.S. Supreme Court has held that local governmental entities and local officials can be liable under Section 1983, provided that an official policy or custom leads to the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. (See Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-91; see also Pierce v.

San Mateo County Sheriff's Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1295 (" Harman ").) The Monell Court further held a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. (See Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 691; see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle (1985) 471 U.S. 808, 818; Harman, supra, 136 CalApp.4th at 1296.) Establishing a custom for the purposes of Section 1983 requires significant proof that the alleged custom is well-settled and

permanent as to constitute the force of law. (See Harman, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.) A single incident of unconstitutional activity is insufficient to hold a municipality liable under Section 1983 and Monell. (See Oklahoma City, supra, 471 U.S. at 823-24; see also Buenavista v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1178-79.) Plaintiffs do not disagree that the Complaint must allege a policy or Custom to properly state a Section 1983 cause of action and further do not disagree that the Complaint, as currently fashioned, does not.

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Ventura County's demurrer on this ground WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. ii. Venegas, Peters, and Law Enforcement Section 1983 Liability In determining whether California sheriffs conducting criminal investigations are subject to Section 1983 liability, the Venegas Court found that "California sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law enforcement duties such as investigating possible criminal activity." (Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 839.) And because "states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity" the Venegas Court concluded that "[t]he rule exempting the state and its officers applies to officers such as sheriffs if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of actions." (Id., at p. 829.)

Citing Peters (among others), however, the Venegas Court noted that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that cities, counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are themselves "persons" for purposes of section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for their subordinate officers' unlawful acts, they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having "final policymaking authority" over the actions at issue." (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs are asserting their First Cause of Action against the County of Ventura but via the actions of sheriffs. (See FAC P. 10 ("In the instant case, Defendants intruded into the home of Patricia Garza Esparza in the absence of a valid warrant and any applicable exception to the warrant requirement").) As is noted above, Ventura County may be sued for a violation of Section 1983, just not via the actions of its sheriffs. Once again, Plaintiff does not disagree but simply seeks leave to amend to properly state a cause of action against Ventura County.

Ventura County's demurrer to Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action on this ground is accordingly SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

4. Government Code Sec. 815 - Plaintiffs' Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action

Ventura County demurs to Plaintiffs' Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action on the ground that Government Code Sec. 815 immunizes a public entity from liability except where provided by statute and, since Plaintiffs have not set forth any statutory basis for liability, the causes of action are inadequately pleaded. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Government Code Sec. 815.2, which makes a government entity liable for "injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action against that employee" provides the statutory basis for the contested causes of action. (Opp., p. 4:5-9 (quoting Gov't Code Sec. 815.2(a).)

Ventura County relies primarily upon the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659 (" Wright ") for its argument that public entities are immune for suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Reply, p. 2:22-26.) This reliance is misplaced. Wright involved a suit by a state prison inmate for injuries resulting from an alleged failure to provide medical care that resulted in an extensive loss of vision. (Wright, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 663.)

Noting that "a specific statute takes precedence over a general statute," the Wright Court found that Government Code Sec. 815.2 is a "general liability statute" making a public entity liable if its employee is liable but there were "two immunity provisions of the California Tort Claims Act specifically related to a public entity's immunity for a prisoner's medical care." (Id., at p. 672.) Thus, the Wright Court's holding that the public entity defendants were immune from suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not a blanket statement of prohibition but rather a determination based upon the specific facts presented; the finding of immunity from suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was the result of the specific statutes related to immunity for a prisoner's medical care.

And Ventura County's second argument, that "if Plaintiffs were correct [in their argument that Government Code Sec. 815.2 authorized their causes of action], it would swallow the rule established by Government Code Section 815" is unpersuasive. (See Reply, p. 2:19-22.) As is quoted by Ventura County, Government Code Sec. 815 provides, in part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." (Gov't Code Sec. 815(a).)

However, the remainder of Government Code Sec. 815 states that "[t]he liability of a public entity established by this part [] is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person." (Id., Sec. 815(b).) Section 815 therefore acknowledges that there is "liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814)" - which liability includes the liability imposed by Section 815.2.

The "rule" established by Section 815 is not swallowed by the inclusion of vicarious liability, instead "[t]he Legislature has recognized that the imposition of vicarious liability on a public employer is an appropriate method to ensure that victims of police misconduct are compensated. It has done so by declining to grant immunity to public entities

when their police officers engage in violent conduct." (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 202, 215.) Ventura County's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action on the ground of failure to state a statutory basis for liability is OVERRULED.

5. Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for Negligence Ventura County demurs to Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action on the ground that Plaintiffs fail to allege negligent conduct and "alleged intentional conduct cannot be a basis for a negligence claim." (Mot., p. 8:17-18.) Again, Plaintiffs do not (entirely) disagree, conceding that "Defendants correctly not that the Third Cause of Action, as currently pleaded, incorporates allegations describing the entry as intentional, which is in conflict with a negligence theory grounded in the same conduct." (Opp., p. 5:5-8.)

However, Plaintiffs note that they may plead in the alternative consistent with California law and seek leave to amend to do so. The Court finds Plaintiffs' argument persuasive. "When a pleader is in doubt about what actually occurred or what can be established by the evidence, the modern practice allows that party to plead in the alternative and make inconsistent allegations." (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402; see also Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593.)

Accordingly, Ventura County's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action on the ground of failure to allege negligent conduct is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act--California Civil Code Sec. 52.1 Ventura County demurs to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action on the ground that Plaintiffs only allege interference by threat, intimidation or coercion in a conclusory fashion and fail to allege that it acted with "specific intent" to violate a right. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that the coercion element of Civil Code Sec. 52.1 "need not be independent of the underlying constitutional violation, and [] specific intent is satisfied by showing the defendant acted 'in reckless disregard of constitution or statutory prohibitions or guarantees,' it does not require that the defendant recognized the unlawfulness of the conduct. (Opp., p. 4:20-23 (quoting Cornell v.

City & County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 799-803.) The elements of a Bane Act claim are: (1) defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) plaintiffs reasonably believed that if they exercised their constitutional right the defendant would commit violence against them or their property; (3) defendant injured plaintiffs or their property to prevent them from exercising their constitutional right or retaliated against plaintiffs for having

exercised their constitutional right; (4) plaintiffs were harmed; and (5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 882.) Ventura County's argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs' SAC alleges that Defendants: (1) failed to properly execute a lawful "knock and announce," instead knocked and forcibly entered almost immediately (Complaint, p. 3:22-23); (2) ignored Rebecca's husband questioning via a ring camera (id., p. 3:24-4:2); (3) did not present a warrant or explain why they were there (id., p. 4:3-4); (4) broke a window, broke a door, and damaged security cameras (id., p. 4:4-6); and (5) prevented Patricia from answering her phone by threatening her safety if she did so (id., p. 4:8-11).

And Plaintiff alleges that in addition to the property damage, Defendants actions "Patricia now suffers from high blood pressure that runs high enough to cause a brain aneurism." (Id., p. 4:17-18.) Plaintiffs' allegations are neither conclusory nor a mere recitation of the elements of the Bane Act; they are sufficient to allege interference with a constitution right by threat, intimidation or coercion. And Ventura County's citation to federal authority, Reese v. County of Sacramento (2018) 888 F.3d 1030 (" Reese "), does not support its contention that Plaintiffs are required to plead "specific intent."

First, Reese is federal authority and is therefore not binding. Second, the Reese Court merely held that "the Bane Act does not require the 'threat, intimidation or coercion' element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged [and] the Bane Act requires a 'a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.'" (Reese, supra, 888 F.3d at p. 1043.) And that "specific intent" is a factual determination to be made by the trier of fact; it is not a pleading requirement. (See Murchison v.

County of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867, 896 ("There are two requirements for a finding of specific intent. First, the court must make the legal determination of whether the right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case. Second, if the first condition is answered in the affirmative, the jury must make the second, factual, determination. Did the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that ... right?

If both requirements are met, even if the defendant did not in fact recognize the [unlawfulness] of his act, he will be adjudged as a matter of law to have acted [with the requisite specific intent]--i.e., in reckless disregard of constitutional [or statutory] prohibitions or guarantees")(internal citations and quotations removed)(emphasis added).) Ventura County's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

7. Failure to Allege Employee Personal Liability Finally, Ventura County demurs to Plaintiffs' Complaint in general arguing that Plaintiffs fail to name any

specific public employee and, since a public entity may only be held liable where it is established that public employee would be personally liable, Plaintiffs causes of action fail. Plaintiffs do not oppose but rather seek leave to amend to name the individual deputies involved in the incident. Because Plaintiffs believe that "the identities of the deputies involved will be ascertained through initial discovery, including incident reports and body-worn camera footage that are presently within Defendants' exclusive possession," Plaintiffs seeks leave to amend once that information has been obtained. (Opp., p. 5:15-18.)

Ventura County is correct in its assertion that "[a] public entity may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), only if it is established that the employee would be personally liable for the conduct upon some acceptable theory of liability." (Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 819; Gov't Code Sec. 815.2(a).) And Ventura County is also correct that Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.10(a)(1) only requires a complaint to contain "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 425.10(a)(1).) In reviewing the SAC, the Court finds that Ventura County's demurrer on this point is well taken. While Plaintiffs are not required to name the individual sheriffs involved at this stage, the allegations of the SAC simply assert that "Defendants" took various actions. The "Defendants" include the City of Ventura, the County of Ventura, the County of Ventura Sheriff's Office (at least prior to the instant demurrer and Plaintiffs' stipulation), and the County of Los Angeles.

While it could be inferred that the Defendant sheriffs took the actions described in the SAC, at this point it is uncertain who is references given the all-encompassing use of the term "Defendants." Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Ventura County's Demurrer on this point WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, but notes that a description of the individuals along with their known or alleged affiliation is sufficient; it is not required at this point that individuals be set forth by name if their names are unknown.

8. Leave To Amend "Although leave to amend is to be liberally granted, it is not error to deny leave to amend when there is no 'reasonable possibility' that the plaintiff can state a cause of action." (Tola v. Bryant (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 746, 755 (citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967).) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient argument that they may be able to amend their Complaint to properly state causes of action. Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend is GRANTED.

III. CONCLUSION Ventura County's Demurrers to Plaintiffs' Complaint are SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART. Where sustained, Plaintiffs are granted 30 days' leave to amend. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is ordered to be filed and served no later than October 12, 2026. [1] Given Plaintiffs' identical surnames, the Court uses Plaintiffs' first names for clarity. [2] Ventura County and VC Sheriff are collectively referred to herein as the "Moving Defendants." | Home -->)" -->