Yejide Jackson v. Alfredo Corona Sanchez

(Compton Courthouse: Dept. E) September 10, 2026 DEPARTMENT E LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT YEJIDE JACKSON, Plaintiff, vs. ALFREDO CORONA SANCHEZ and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Defendants. |))))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 23CMCV00349 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: (1) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TAX/STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS; AND (2) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Sec. 998 AND CIVIL CODE Sec. 3291 DATE: September 10, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Parties: Defendant

Alfredo Corona Sanchez (Tax Costs) Plaintiff Yejide Jackson (Prejudgment Interest) Responding Parties: Plaintiff Yejide Jackson (Tax Costs) Defendant Alfredo Corona Sanchez (Prejudgment Interest) Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT I. BACKGROUND This is an action for personal injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiff Yejide Jackson alleges that, on or about March 7, 2021, she was driving at or near the address of 15727 Downey Avenue in Paramount, CA 90723 when Defendant Alfredo Corona Sanchez so negligently entrusted, managed or controlled his vehicle such that Defendant's vehicle struck Plaintiff's vehicle, resulting in Plaintiff's injury.

On March 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) Negligence. A jury trial was held on April 7 - 10, 2026. On May 5, 2026, the Court entered a Judgment on Special Verdict After Jury Trial in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $5,002.48. (See Judgment on Special Verdict, 5/5/26.)

On June 10, 2026, the Court heard and partially ruled upon Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest. (See Minute Order, 6/10/26.) Because part of Plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest appeared to be dependent upon whether costs were awarded, the Court reserved ruling on a portion of Plaintiff's motion pending a determination of Defendant's motion to strike and/or tax Plaintiff's costs. (See id., at p. 5.)

On May 5, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike/Tax Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs. On August 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. As of September 9, 2026, Defendant has not filed a Reply. Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1005(b), all reply papers must be filed and served at least five court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1005(b).) Accordingly, any reply papers now filed are untimely, and the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider untimely filed papers. (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1300(d); Mackey v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ.

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657.) II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard 1. Motion to Tax Costs - Code of Civil Procedure Sec.Sec. 1032, 1035 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1032(b).)

Costs recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 are restricted to those that are both reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1033.5(c)(2), (3).) Costs "merely convenient or beneficial" to the preparation of a case are disallowed. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1033.5(c)(2); see Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 (expenses for attorney meals incurred while attending local depositions not "reasonably necessary").)

A party challenging the amounts claimed may file a motion to tax costs, which must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1700(b)(1), 8.278(c)(2).) "Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion ... must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable." (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)¿

"In ruling upon a motion to tax costs, the trial court's first determination is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face. If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show the costs to be unnecessary or unreasonable." (Foothill De Anza Cmty. College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 2930.) "Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court." (Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

2. Motion for Prejudgment Interest - Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998/Civil Code Sec. 3291 "If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which the defendant does not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the date of the plaintiff's first offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by the judgment, and interest shall accrue until the satisfaction of judgment." (Civ. Code Sec. 3291.) B. Discussion 1. The Parties' 998 Offers, Trial, the Resulting Judgment

On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant with a Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998 settlement offer (a "998 Offer") of $15,000.00. (Novack Decl., P. 3; see Mot., Exh. C.) On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant with another 998 Offer of $12,000.00. (Novack Decl., P. 3, Exh. A; see Mot., Exh. C) [1] As is noted above, a jury trial in this matter was held on April 7 - 10, 2026. On May 5, 2026, the Court entered a Judgment on Special Verdict After Jury Trial in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $5,002.48. (See Judgment on Special Verdict, 5/5/26.)

2. Motion to Strike and Tax Costs On April 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs itemizing costs in the total amount of $20,569.15. (See Memorandum of Costs (Summary), filed 4/27/26.) Defendant moves to strike and/or tax Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs in its entirety on the ground that Plaintiff is not entitled to all costs claimed because the judgment Plaintiff obtained could have been obtained in a limited civil action. Alternatively, Defendant moves to strike or tax various items in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, arguing that certain of the claimed costs are not recoverable.

i. Striking the Entirety of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs Defendant first argues that the Court should exercise its discretion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033(a) to disallow any costs because the judgment Plaintiff ultimately obtained could have been obtained in a limited civil matter. In opposition, Plaintiff generally argues that Defendant had the opportunity to resolve this matter prior to trial but refused Plaintiff's settlement offers, mediation, and participation in a mandatory settlement conference. Plaintiff argues that Defendant instead chose to proceed to trial and, "[i]n spite of this arrogant behavior, Defendant now tries to appeal to the 'mercy' of the Court in trying to avoid the legal consequences of a Judgment against the Defendant." (Opp., p. 4:11-14.)

In reviewing the entirety of the record, the Court declines to strike Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs in its entirety. While it is true that the judgment Plaintiff ultimately obtained could have been obtained in a limited civil action, there does not appear to have been a way to concretely ascertain that piece of information prior to trial and the trial itself contained evidence that could have resulted in a different outcome. The Court finds no good reason to intervene at this point in the proceedings by unilaterally striking Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs in its entirety.

Plaintiff is correct in that Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1032(b) provides that a "prevailing party includes the party with a net monetary recovery" and the prevailing party is entitled "as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1032(b), (c).) Plaintiff ultimately obtained a judgment in her favor and, as a result, the Code of Civil Procedure allows Plaintiff to recover certain costs as the prevailing party.

ii. Plaintiff's 998 Offers - Inclusion of Pre and Post-Offer Costs "Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial . . . any party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or an award to be entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. The written offer shall include a statement of the offer, containing the terms and conditions of the judgment or award, and a provision that allows the accepting party to indicate acceptance of the offer by signing a statement that the offer is accepted." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 998(b).)

"If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiff, in addition to plaintiff's costs." (Id., Sec. 998(d).) For matters where an offer made by a defendant is not accept by a plaintiff, "[i]n determining whether the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the court or arbitrator shall exclude the postoffer costs." (Id., Sec. 998(c)(1)-(c)(2)(A).)

Plaintiff contends that her 998 Offers allow her to recover both pre and post-offer costs, which costs she argues - when combined with the jury's verdict - means that she "beat" her 998 Offer. As to the statutory exclusion of postoffer costs, Plaintiff argues that "this provision is argued solely to apply to instances where the Plaintiff has rejected a Defendant's Offer to Compromise and a determination is being made as to whether the Plaintiff's result is more favorable in comparison to the Defendant's Offer to Compromise," citing Simers v. Los Angeles Times Commc'ns, LLC (1991) 104 Cal.App.5th 940 (" Simmers ") and Stallman v. Bell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 740 (" Stallman "). (Opp., p. 3:3-27.) Defendant does not reply to Plaintiff's argument.

In answering the question: "[w]hen a plaintiff makes a section 998 offer that the defendant rejects, and the plaintiff obtains a verdict which, standing alone, is less than the offer, what additional costs, if any, are added to the verdict for purposes of determining whether the plaintiff received a more favorable judgment than the statutory offer[?,]" the Second District Court of Appeal in Stallman held "[t]here is . . . no reason to limit the plaintiff to damages plus preoffer costs for purposes of determining whether the judgment exceeds the offer.

Rather, both pre-and postoffer costs should be added to the verdict to determine the amount of the judgment." (Stallman, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 748; accord Simer, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 951-951 (Noting that Section 998 requires the exclusion of postoffer costs applies to a 998 Offer made by a defendant and rejected by the plaintiff and contrasting Stallman's rationale as to a 998 Offer made by a plaintiff and rejected by a defendant).) In the absence of any contrary argument, the Court finds the Stallman decision binding and decisive of the issue at hand.

iii. Reasonableness of Plaintiff's claimed costs "If the items appearing in a¿cost¿bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to¿tax¿costs¿to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774,)¿¿However, "[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the¿costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party]."¿(Id., at p. 699.)

The Court's first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face. If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show it to be unnecessary or unreasonable. (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

(a) Item 1: [2] Filing and Motion Fees Defendant does not seek to tax Plaintiff's $437.25 filing fee, two stipulation fees of $22.45 each, or service of process fees of $93.89. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not recover the fees for USA express, rush process service of Wilker custodian of records, and rush process service of custodian of records for Goodlife because "no documents were submitted into evidence and there was no testimony by any custodian of records." (Mot., p. 4:18-3.) Defendant also argues that the court transaction fees are not accounted for. [3]

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5(14) permits recovery for fees related to electronic filing of documents with the Court. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5 allows recovery for "[f]iling, motion and jury fees," "[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means [subject to certain restrictions]," and "fees for the electronic filing or service of document through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1033.5(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(14).) Upon review of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, the Court finds that Plaintiff is allowed to recover for fees related to Defendant's contested Item 1. Defendant's Motion to Tax is DENIED as to Plaintiff's filing and motion fees and service of process costs.

(b) Item 2: Jury Fees Defendant contests $170.62 of Plaintiff's claimed $568.59 in jury fees because "Plaintiff has produced a receipt for $ 397.42. Plaintiff did not product a receipt for $170.67." (Mot., p. 5:1-3 (emphasis in original).) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she "has in fact paid the full amount of these fees, as indicated by the full receipts attached to this Opposition as Exhibit 'B' to the Declaration of Sean M. Novack." (Opp., p. 7:18-20.) Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs attaches receipts indicating $170.67 paid in full to USA Express as an advance jury fee deposit, including a fee for filing a Notice of Posting Jury Fees, and also $397.92 paid to the Court for jury fees. (See Memorandum of Costs, Exh. G.) Plaintiff has sufficiently documented her claimed jury fees. Defendant's Motion to Tax is DENIED as to Plaintiff's jury fees.

(c) Item 4: Deposition Costs Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot recover deposition costs because Plaintiff did not attach a receipt for those costs. Plaintiff argues in opposition that she is entitled to the recovery of costs related to taking Defendant's deposition because Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5(3)(A) expressly permits recovery of this cost. Deposition costs are an expressly allowed cost. (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1033.5(a)(3)(A)(Allowing as a recoverable cost under Section 1032 costs incurred for "[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions").)

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs lists as Item 4 $1,951.70 in deposition costs for the deposition of Defendant Sanchez and Plaintiff attaches as Exhibit E to her Memorandum of Costs an invoice from Network Deposition Services for the Deposition of Alfredo Sanchez totaling $1,951.70. (See Memorandum of Costs, Exh. E.) The Court finds that the costs incurred for Defendant's deposition are not taxable. Plaintiff reasonably incurred this cost and is entitled to recover this cost pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5(a)(3)(A). Defendant's Motion to Tax is DENIED as to Plaintiff's deposition costs.

(d) Item 8: Witness and Expert Fees [4] Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover her claimed witness fees because neither Dr. Wilkes nor Goodlife's Person Most Qualified appeared at trial and their records were not introduced at trial. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's expert fees incurred for Dr. Meier are not recoverable because Plaintiff did not obtain a jury verdict above her lowest 998 Offer and these fees are expressly not recoverable pursuant to Section 998.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues she is entitled to recover expert and witness fees because Plaintiff timely served her 998 Offer and recovered a verdict in excess of the $12,000.00 offer. Plaintiff argues that her retained expert, Dr. Steven Meirer, testified at trial and that his work on the matter totals $16,500, citing her Memorandum of Costs P.8(b), Exh. H. (See Opp., p. 5:12-16.)

The Court first determines that Plaintiff's incurred witness fees for Dr. Wilkes and Goodlife's PMQ are not recoverable. Defendant argues that neither testified at trial and Plaintiff presents no contrary argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claimed $271.38 in witness fee costs for Dr. Wilkes and Goodlife's PMQ are taxable and GRANTS Defendant's motion as to those costs.

As to Dr. Meier's expert witness fees, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff is entitled to the inclusion of both awardable pre and post-offer costs in determining whether she received a more favorable award than her 998 Offer. (See Section II, B, 2, ii, supra.) Plaintiff's expert witness fees are expressly authorized by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998 and, as Plaintiff correctly notes, Dr. Meier testified at trial and Plaintiff attaches his invoice as Exhibit H to her Memorandum of Costs. (Memorandum of Costs, Exh. H.) Dr. Meier's costs of $16,500 combined with Plaintiff's jury trial award of $5,002.48 totals $21,502.48, which means that Plaintiff indeed obtained a more favorable award that her operative 998 Offer.

Defendant's Motion to Tax is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff's witness and expert fees. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs is taxed in the amount of $271.38 representing the claimed fees for Dr. Wilkes and Goodlife's PMQ. As to the remaining $16,500, representing the fees charged by Plaintiff's expert Dr. Meier, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

(e) Item 13: Models, Enlargement and Photocopies of Exhibits Defendant argues the models, blowups, and photocopies or exhibits are not recoverable because Plaintiff has not produced receipts of these costs and Plaintiff did not introduce documents into evidence. Plaintiff argues in opposition that she prepared five separate binders that the expert and witnesses used during the trial, that Plaintiff displayed at trial, and that Defendant used during the trial. "[T]he burden is on the party challenging [claimed] costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary." (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 (cleaned up).)

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5 provides that "[m]odels, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1033.5(a)(13).) Defendant has not demonstrated that Plaintiff's claimed costs for models, blowups and photocopies or exhibits were not reasonable or necessary or that these models/enlargements/photocopies were not reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. Defendant's Motion to Tax is DENIED as to Plaintiff's models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits.

(f) Item 15: "Other" Costs Citing to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5, Defendant argues messenger fees and attorney service fees are not recoverable because allowable costs must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient. The costs included in Plaintiffs' "other" category do not appear to be either specifically allowed pursuant to Section 1033.5 or specifically disallowed. In reviewing Plaintiff's "other" costs, the Court determines that Plaintiff's "other" costs were reasonably incurred in preparing for trial and in presenting evidence at trial. Defendant's Motion to Tax is DENIED as to Plaintiff's "other" costs.

3. Prejudgment Interest Plaintiff contends she is entitled to prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% per annum from June 27, 2024 to April 10, 2026 because her total judgment amount, including litigation costs, exceeds her Section 998 Offers. Defendant opposes arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs includes amounts not recoverable pursuant to statute.

Prejudgment interest under Civil Code Sec. 3291 is an item of costs and therefore must be claimed in a memorandum of costs. (See Jones v. John Crane, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 990, 1012; Wagy v. Brown (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Although Plaintiff has not included her request for prejudgment interest in her Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiff has filed a formal motion for prejudgment interest which the parties have not objected to and have fully briefed. Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff's timely-filed formal motion for prejudgment interest as part of her Memorandum of Costs, finding no due process or procedural issues in doing so.

The Court has previously determined that Plaintiff the prevailing party given the inclusion of both awardable pre and post-offer costs in determining whether Plaintiff received a more favorable award than her 998 Offer. (See Section II, B, 2, iii(d), supra.) Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of her most recent 998 Offer, February 26, 2026. III.

CONCLUSION In all, Defendant's Motion to Tax is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's costs are ordered taxed in the total amount of $ 271.38. Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of her most recent 998 Offer, February 26, 2026.

[1] The 998 Offers attached to Defendant's motion are not properly authenticated. Each is simply attached as an exhibit to Defendant's motion without any declaration. Plaintiff's exhibits are similarly unauthenticated; the declaration of attorney Sean M. Novak containing two of the offers attached as exhibits is unsigned. Because the parties appear to agree as to the exchange of 998 Offers in this matter (at least as to Plaintiff's June 27, 2024 and February 26, 2026 offers), the Court includes both in its chronology. Defendant's September 23, 2024 offer is not included because there does not appear to be agreement as to that offer.

[2] The "items" listed are as numbered and set forth in Defendant's Motion to Tax. The Court notes that Defendant's motion omits certain item numbers and, accordingly, the item numbers omitted in Defendant's motion are excludes in the Court's analysis.

[3] Defendant lists various transactions after the argument that there were "numerous court transaction fees of $2.25 not accounted for" but does not state whether those particular transactions are contested and, if contested, for what reason. (See Mot., p. 4:24-26.) The Court therefore considers any potential dispute as to those claimed costs waived. (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1009 ("Failure to offer reasoned analysis of [an] issue constitutes a waiver").)

[4] Prior to Item 8, Defendant lists "Item 5. Service of Process - Recoverable. $93.89." (Mot., p. 5:6 (emphasis in original).) Defendant provides no argument or analysis as to Item 5. Given that the total amount Plaintiff claims in her Memorandum of Costs is $93.89 and Defendant provides no argument other than "recoverable" in his motion, the Court finds that either the argument is waived for failure to provide any reasoned objection (see fn. 3) or, alternatively, Defendant does not dispute this claimed cost. Case Number: 26CMCV00196 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT REBECCA ESPARZA, an individual, AND PATRICIA GARCIA ESPARZA, an individual, vs. CITY OF VENTURA, COUNTY