Liliana Ogannes Kudbalyan vs. City of Rancho Cordova

34-2022-00320315-CU-CR-GDS: Liliana Ogannes Kudbalyan vs. City of Rancho Cordova 12/15/2025 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 25

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of Defendant City of Rancho Cordova (“Defendant” or “Defendant City”) for judgment on the pleadings is ruled upon as follows.

This matter was initially continued so as to allow the parties to complete the meet and confer requirement. On October 13, 2025, the parties filed their joint statement wherein they indicated they remain at an impasse on all issues. (See Joint Statement Filed 10/13/2025.) Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the merits.

Plaintiffs Liana Ogannes Kudbalyan and Artur Kudbalyan (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their complaint on May 19, 2022, alleging three causes of action: (1) Due Process Clause U.S. Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Fines Clause Eighth Amendment U.S. Constitution, Article I § 19 California Constitution; (3) Equitable Relief Slander of Title. The complaint named the defendants Defendant City, County of Sacramento Assessor’s office, and Does 1-40. On March 28, 2025, Plaintiffs dismissed Defendant County of Sacramento.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that on May 31, 2020, the Rancho Cordova Police Department, in conjunction with the Rancho Cordova Code Enforcement, made a raid at Plaintiffs’ residence located at 10025 Bexley Drive, Rancho Cordova, CA 95827, Sacramento County Tax Assessor's Parcel No. 068- 0350-007-000. (Compl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege that Artur Kudbalyan had previously been provided a prescription by a doctor to allow him to grow 99 plants in his residence due to his serious medical condition of right lower extremity amputation. (Compl., ¶ 7, Exh. 1.) On May 31, 2020, the City of Rancho Cordova Code Enforcement issued an Administrative Citation on Plaintiffs, for $150,100. (Compl., ¶ 8, Exh. 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that their due process rights were violated when the Defendant City held an Administrative Citation and Penalty Appeal hearing on May 31, 2020, at a time when the Plaintiffs were unavailable to testify or defend themselves, as they were subject of a criminal investigation resulting in a criminal case which was filed against them. (Compl., ¶ 8.)

On June 3, 2020, Defendant City filed a Certificate of Nuisance claiming $150,000.00. (Compl., ¶ 9, Exh. 3.) On September 14, 2020, Defendant City sent Plaintiffs a Final Notice of charges for 151,100.00. (Compl., ¶ 10, Exh. 4.) Plaintiffs allege that the criminal charges against them were

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resolved on November 19, 2020, and after which, on February 25, 2021, a Judgment of Forfeiture in Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2020-00284293 returning all funds to Tigran and Azat Kudbalyan was issued by the District Attorney's Office. (Compl., ¶¶ 11-12, Exh. 8.)

On February 25, 2021, Defendant City mailed a notice of Confirmation of Costs Hearing for May 19, 2021, which, according to Plaintiffs, “was unconstitutionally limited” as follows: “At the Confirmation of Costs hearing, the hearing officer shall limit the scope of review to the City's report, describing the violation (s), the work performed (if any), and the itemized account of costs, together withy [sic] any protests or objections to its accuracy. The hearing officer may revise, correct, or modify the Costs Report where it is determined to be unjust. [] At the Confirmation of Costs Hearing, the hearing officer shall not consider evidence regarding the merits of the underlying violation(s) of abatement action.” (Compl., ¶ 13, Exh. 5.) Plaintiffs allege that such a hearing “did not provide Plaintiffs with a full and fair hearing.” (Compl., ¶ 13.)

Plaintiffs allege that on April 19, 2021, the Defendant City mailed their evidence to the Hearing Officer. (Compl., ¶ 14, Exh. 6.) On May 19, 2021, the City sent a letter to Plaintiffs indicating that the $150,100 violation was upheld as Plaintiffs failed to appear at the hearing indicating that the delinquency would be placed with the County Assessor if not paid by July 5, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 15, Exh. 7.) On June 3, 2021, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to the City of Rancho Cordova Administrative Services Officer indicating the perceived violations due process and requesting a new hearing along due to “inadvertence of scheduling the hearing” and including evidence which the City should consider. (Compl., ¶16, Exh. 8.)

On July 20, 2021, instead of allowing a “new hearing,” Defendant City sent a certified mail letter to Plaintiffs indicating that they were going to assess the delinquent costs of the code enforcement action on Plaintiffs' real property (their residence) located at 10025 Bexley Drive, Rancho Cordova, CA 95827, Sacramento County Tax Assessor's 19 Parcel No. 068-0350-007- 000 as a result of a resolution of the City Council. (Comp., ¶ 17, Exh. 9.)

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer, but may be made after the time for demurrer has expired. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made by a defendant if “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c).) If the allegations state a cause of action on any theory, then the motion must be denied. (Barney v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 966, 973-974.)

Except as provided by statute, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed like a general demurrer. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) “Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual

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allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.” (Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 743-744.) The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 438(d).) Consequently, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a trial court may not consider any “extrinsic evidence” including but not limited to declarations. (See, e.g., Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anonymous v. Narcotics Anonymous World Services, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 950, 962.)

Discussion

Here, Defendant makes its motion for judgment on the pleadings on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies and thus all causes of action are barred 2. Alternatively, Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from pursuing this action as the City’s decision are final and binding 3. Plaintiffs’ slander of title claim is barred by the statute of limitations 4. Plaintiffs forfeited any challenge for failure to preserve the issues by not raising the issues at any hearing before the City.

5. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claims Fail as a matter of law because: a. Due Process was provided. b. Plaintiffs are barred from seeking a federal remedy because state law provides a remedy c. Alternatively, Fifth Amendment Due Process claim fails as against these local officials. d. Alternatively, no such due process rights under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments 6. The Second cause of action for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment fails as matter of law 7. Both the first and second cause of action against the entity under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are insufficiently alleged.

(Ntc. Mot.)

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. First, Defendant argues that all causes of action are barred as Plaintiffs did not exhaust the necessary administrative remedies. Defendant contends that the “administrative exhaustion doctrine bars a judicial remedy by a person to whom administrative remedies were available but who failed to properly invoke those remedies in the administrative process.” (Mov. MPA, citing Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.) In this regard, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to allege (nor

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can they allege) that they availed themselves of the available administrative remedies as provided in Rancho Cordova Municipal Code (the “RCMC”) section 6.90.

“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided by statute, regulation, or ordinance, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.” (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 99-100.) “The exhaustion doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v.

California Public Employment Relations Bd. (Coachella) (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080.) The doctrine is frequently described as a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts. (Campbell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 321; Roth v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 679, 685.) Failure to exhaust may be raised by demurrer/motion for judgment on the pleadings if the allegations in the complaint and/or judicially noticeable facts “indicate that exhaustion has not occurred and no valid excuse is alleged in the pleading to avoid the exhaustion requirement.” (Parthemore v.

Col (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1379.)

The RCMC contains an appeal procedure to contest penalties like the one imposed here:

6.90.080 Appeal from administrative citation.

A. Hearing Request. A person who receives an administrative citation may contest the citation on the basis that there was no violation of the code or that he or she is not the responsible party. To contest the citation, the person shall submit a request for hearing form to the city within 30 days from the date of the administrative citation. Directions on how to obtain the request form will be provided on the administrative citation. The completed request must be submitted together with an appeal hearing fee of $250.00.

B. Notice of Hearing. The person requesting the hearing shall be notified of the time and place set for the hearing at least 10 days before the date of the hearing.

C. Additional Reports. If the enforcement officer submits an additional written report concerning the administrative citation to the hearing officer for consideration at the hearing, then a copy of this report also shall be provided to the person requesting the hearing at least five days before the date of the hearing.

D. Setting the Hearing. A hearing before the hearing officer shall be set for a date that is not less than 15 days nor more than 60 days from the date that the request for hearing is filed. The person requesting the hearing shall be notified of the time

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and place set for the hearing as soon as it is set, and at least 10 days before the hearing. If the enforcement officer submits a written report concerning the citation to the hearing officer for consideration at the hearing, then a copy of the report shall be served on the person requesting the hearing at least five days before the hearing. No hearing shall be held unless the fine has been deposited in advance, under subsection (A) of this section.

E. Failure to Appear. The failure of the person requesting the hearing to appear at the hearing shall constitute a forfeiture of the fine and a failure to exhaust his or her administrative remedies.

F. At the Hearing. The administrative citation, and any additional report submitted by the enforcement officer, shall constitute prima facie evidence of the respective facts contained in those documents. At the hearing, the party contesting the citation shall be given the opportunity to testify and to present evidence concerning the citation. If a party does not proficiently speak or understand the English language, he or she may provide an interpreter, at that party’s own cost, to translate for the party. An interpreter shall not have had any personal involvement in the issues of the case prior to the hearing.

G. Continuances. The hearing officer may continue the hearing and may request additional information from the enforcement officer or the person receiving the citation before issuing the decision.

H. Hearing Officer’s Decision. After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing officer shall issue a written decision to uphold, dismiss, or modify the administrative citation. The hearing officer shall state the reasons for the decision and shall send a copy of the decision to the person that requested the hearing and to the enforcement officer. The decision of the hearing officer shall be final.

(RCMC, § 6.90.080.)

As stated above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant City held an Administrative Citation and Penalty Appeal hearing on May 31, 2020, at a time when the Plaintiffs were unavailable to testify or defend themselves, as they were subject of a criminal investigation resulting in a criminal case which was filed against them. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs also allege that on May 19, 2021, the City sent a letter to Plaintiffs indicating that the $150,100.00 was upheld as Plaintiffs failed to appear at the hearing indicating that the delinquency would be placed with the County Assessor if not paid by July 5, 2021. (Compl., ¶ 15, Exh. 7.) Plaintiffs further allege that they sought to reschedule the hearing, which was denied. (Compl. ¶ 16, Exh. 8.) As such, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true and construing them liberally, Plaintiffs have alleged that they

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utilized the administrative process.[1]

Further, as Plaintiffs argue in opposition, it was the administrative hearing process itself which allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights. (Opp’n, pp. 4-6.) Indeed, Plaintiffs’ complaint both alleges that an administrative process took place, but perhaps more importantly, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant City violated Plaintiffs’ Due Process rights through the applicable administrative process itself. (See Compl., ¶¶ 22-24.)

Considering the allegations in the complaint, taking the allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, as the Court must in the context of this motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged exhaustion of the administrative process. At the very least, a factual issue is raised as to merit of Plaintiffs’ underlying allegations, and this cannot appropriately be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion on the basis that the complaint is barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is DENIED.

Exhaustion of Judicial Remedies/Collateral Estoppel. Next, to the extent Defendant contends that Plaintiffs were required to appeal the order to the Superior Court, the Court addresses that argument in the context of failure to exhaust judicial remedies/collateral estoppel.

Defendant argues that because “Plaintiffs never challenged any decision to administer the fines by way of a writ proceedings in court, those matters stand as decided and Plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of collaterally [sic] estoppel from pursuing this action. In other words, by failing to seek judicial review/appeal of the administrative proceedings, Plaintiffs cannot now seek review via this lawsuit.” (Mov. MPA, pp. 8:27-29.)

RCMC § 6.90.080(N), provides:

N. Right to Judicial Review. A person aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision on an administrative citation may obtain review of the decision by filing a lawsuit with the superior court in Sacramento County within 20 days after service of the final decision in accordance with the timelines and provisions set forth in Section 53069.4 of the California Government Code.

Government Code section 53069.4 “authorizes local governments to enact an administrative process to enforce violations of any ordinance through the imposition and collection of administrative fines or penalties. [Citation.] The law was intended ‘to provide a faster and more cost-effective enforcement mechanism than a criminal prosecution for the violation of a local ordinance.’” (County of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 298, 305.) The statute provides, “The legislative body of a local agency may by ordinance make any violation of any ordinance enacted by the local agency subject to an administrative fine or penalty. The local agency shall set forth by ordinance the administrative procedures that shall govern the imposition, enforcement, collection, and administrative review

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by the local agency of those administrative fines or penalties.” (§ 53069.4(a)(1).)

“The doctrine of exhaustion of judicial remedies, as explained by the court in Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235, 240–244, 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 (Knickerbocker), is distinct from the jurisdictional rule that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing suit in certain circumstances. ‘Rather, it is a form of res judicata, of giving collateral estoppel effect to the administrative agency’s decision, because that decision has achieved finality due to the aggrieved party's failure to pursue the exclusive judicial remedy for reviewing administrative action.’ [citations].” (Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (Y.K.A.) (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 355.) However, as the appellate court in Y.K.A. explained, there are conditions or predicates to the doctrine’s application:

A prior decision precludes relitigation of an issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel only if two prongs of that doctrine are met. First, five threshold requirements must be satisfied: “ ‘First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]

[¶]

If all of these threshold requirements of collateral estoppel are met, the analysis determining whether that doctrine applies to give preclusive effect then looks to “ ‘the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that [it] should be applied in a particular setting.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]

(Id. at pp. 356-357, citations omitted.)

Having failed to address all the factors as laid out in Y.K.A., Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish the necessary elements to assert collateral estoppel. Further, considering the allegations in the complaint, taking the allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, as the Court must in the context of this motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged that collateral estoppel would not be applicable to bar their claims. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that the Administrative Citation and Penalty Appeal hearing was conducted at a time when Plaintiffs were unable to testify or defendant themselves (Compl., ¶ 8); the Confirmation of Costs Hearing was “unconstitutionally limited,” and “did not provide Plaintiffs with a full and fair hearing” (Compl., ¶ 13); and although Plaintiffs requested a new hearing, this request was denied. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-17.)

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Defendant’s failure to meet its burden on this procedural posture, and considering the allegations in the Complaint, the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the complaint is barred by the failure to exhaust judicial remedies is DENIED.

Statute of Limitations – Slander of Title. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s slander of title claim is barred by the statute of limitations. However, in support of this argument, Defendant again points to the fact that, under the authority granted by Government Code section 53069.4, the City of Rancho Cordova has adopted a procedure for the imposition of administrative civil penalties within the City. (Mov. MPA, p. 9:5-17.) According to Defendant, because Plaintiff did not, “obtain review of the [Defendant City’s] decision by filing a lawsuit with the superior court in Sacramento County within 20 days after service of the final decision in accordance with the timelines and provisions set forth in Section 53069.4 of the California Government Code,” Plaintiffs’ slander of title cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. (Id., p. 9:17-23, citing RCMC, § 6.90.080(N).)

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the slander of title claim should not be dismissed, as it can be amended to allege that the conduct at issue was the mortgage company’s payment of the lien assessed by the County of Sacramento. (Opp’n, pp. 8- 10.) As such, it appears that Plaintiffs’ position is that at least part of the conduct supporting the slander of title cause of action occurred after the administrative proceeding. (Ibid.)

Because Plaintiffs do not directly address the statute of limitations argument, aside from asserting the desire to amend to provide additional facts regarding the basis for the cause of action, the Court interprets this as a non-opposition to the argument at this time. (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion “it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes” that ground].)

Defendant’s motion on this ground is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Forfeiture of Arguments Not Raised in Administrative Proceeding. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs forfeited any of the objections raised in the complaint as they failed to appear at or raise any of these objections/defenses during the applicable administrative hearing. However, Plaintiffs alleged due process violations and Section 1983 claims are predicated on the applicable process itself and the alleged inability to raise arguments on the merits. As such, for similar reasons as discussed above and based on the procedural posture of this motion, Defendant’s motion on this ground is DENIED.

Failure to State a Claim – Due Process. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Plaintiffs’ due process rights were violated under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 fail as a matter of law. Namely, Defendant argues that due process was provided, and further, Plaintiffs are barred from seeking a federal remedy because state law provides a remedy. Alternatively, Defendant contends that the Fifth Amendment due process claims fail against these local officials and that there are no such due

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process rights under the Fourth or Eight Amendments.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause subjects local public entities to most constitutional provisions and constitutes the major constitutional foundation for 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, and cases have arisen under virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. (See McDonald v City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742 [noting that the Court has incorporated almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights under the Due Process Clause and listing examples of specific rights incorporated.].) To state a Section 1983 claim for relief, two fundamental allegations are required: Plaintiff was deprived of a right protected under the U.S. Constitution or federal law; and deprivation of that right was caused by a “person” acting under color of state law. (Gomez v Toledo (1980) 446 U.S. 635, 640.)

Considering the allegations in the complaint, taking the allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, as the Court must in the context of this motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged violation of their due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Namely, Plaintiffs have alleged that the applicable administrative process lacked notice, a fair hearing, and/or a fair opportunity for judicial review. As such, Defendant’s motion on this ground is DENIED.

Further, with respect to Defendant’s alternative arguments, that any assertion under the Fifth (or Fourth) Amendment must be dismissed, the Court notes that “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, cannot be granted as to only a portion of a cause of action.” (Santa Clarita Organization etc. v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1143, 1165; see Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 849, 861-862; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452 [a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, “does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the demurrer will be overruled [or motion for judgment on the pleadings denied]”]; see also Southern California Pizza Co., LLC v.

Certain Underwriters at Llyod's, London etc. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 140, 154 [“‘[a] demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained’”].) Because this would not dispose of the entire cause of action for alleged violation of due process, the motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis is also DENIED.

Failure to State a Claim – Excessive Fines. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment would fail as a matter of law. Specifically, Defendant argues that here, “the Rancho Cordova Municipal Code clearly states there is to be a fine of $1,000 per plant over 6, thus the fine levied was indeed authorized by the statute (including Government Code section 530693.4(a)(2)(D)(“Administrative fines or penalties that are immediately imposed pursuant to an ordinance adopted under subparagraph (B) shall not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation ”) and thus did not and could not violate the Eighth Amendment. There were 156 plants found on the property; 150*$1,000 = $150,000.00.” (Mov. MPA, p. 13: 22-27.)

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In opposition, citing to the case Timbs v. Indiana (2019) 586 U.S. 146, Plaintiffs maintain that the fines here are excessive, and in violation under the due process clause of the US Constitution. (Opp’n, pp. 1:22-2:14.)

Indeed, as the United State Supreme Court in Timbs held, the protection against excessive fines guards against abuses of government’s punitive or criminal enforcement authority is a safeguard which is fundamental authority to ordered liberty and deeply rooted in history and tradition that is therefore incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Timbs, supra, 586 U.S. at p. 149.) The Supreme Court acknowledged that “civil in rem forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive.” (Id. at p. 154.)

The United States Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” (United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334.) The Court directed that, “in applying this standard,” trial courts “must compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.” (Id. at p. 336-337; see Duckworth v.

U.S. ex rel. Locke (D.C. Dist. 2010) 705 F.Supp.2d 30 [applying standard to review fine on summary judgment].) The Court also reasoned that because “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature” and “judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise,” the standard of gross disproportionality was adopted. (Id. at p. 336.)

In addition to the allegations highlighted herein, Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendant City of Rancho Cordova's $150,100.00 fine is a punitive action and one which Defendant City of Rancho Cordova utilizes to steal real property of individuals such as Plaintiffs.” (Compl., ¶ 33.) Considering the allegations in the complaint, taking the allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, as the Court must in the context of this motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the second cause of action at this stage of the proceedings. At the very least, a factual issue is raised as to merit of Plaintiffs’ underlying allegations, and this cannot appropriately be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant’s motion on this ground is DENIED.[2]

Disposition

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth herein.

Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs may file and serve an amended complaint no later than December 29, 2025. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the amended

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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complaint.

Defendant’s requests for judicial notice are unopposed and granted for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] While the Court need not reach this issue in light of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court

notes its concerns regarding the applicability of an administrative exhaustion requirement in causes of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Williams v Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 841 [“the purposes underlying section 1983 - i.e., to serve as an antidote to discriminatory state laws, to protect federal rights where state law is inadequate, and to protect federal rights where state processes are available in theory but not in practice. . . - must still be served, and may not be frustrated by state substantive limitations couched in procedural language”]; see also Brosterhous v.

State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 336 [“The Supreme Court has made it clear that a section 1983 plaintiff need not have exhausted alternative remedies before initiating a section 1983 action.”].) As neither party addresses this issue, the Court makes no finding at this time. [2] As with Defendant’s argument under the Fifth Amendment, its claims regarding the viability

of a claim under Article 1, section 19 does not dispose of the entire claim; as such, the Court cannot grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis. (Santa Clarita Organization etc., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at 1165.)