MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al.

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that effective April 13, 2026, this department has moved to the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye courthouse located at 500 G Street in Sacramento, CA 95814. All hearings noticed for Department 25 will be heard in Department 8D of the new courthouse. Parties who wish to contest the tentative ruling below must: (1) request a hearing by calling the Department 8D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-7719 no later than 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the scheduled CMC, and (2) advise opposing counsel of the request.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the scheduled CMC, the tentative ruling shall become the final order of the Court. The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. If a hearing is requested, the Court assumes that all parties will appear remotely via Zoom unless the Court orders inperson attendance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Cosumnes Corporation and West Palms Communications, Inc.’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Ricardo Mendoza’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendants’ 14 Undisputed Material Facts, which of plaintiff’s 119 Additional Material Facts, and/or which written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Defendants’ Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendants’ counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendants’ counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendants’ counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1116(b) and (c), requiring deposition testimony offered as an exhibit include “only the relevant pages of the transcript” and be highlighted in a manner that calls attention to the cited testimony.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Factual Background

This action arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff while he was attending an “International Horse Show” at an equestrian facility in Rancho Murieta. (Compl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was staying at the facility after the event had ended for the day, along with other horse handlers. At some point before 2:00 a.m., an individual not associated with the facility or the horse show was allowed on the premises and engaged in an altercation with Plaintiff. The individual was asked to leave the premises. At approximately 2:30 a.m., the same individual returned with a firearm, was allowed to enter the facility, and shot two individuals, including Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence and (2) premises liability. This matter is currently set for trial on October 13, 2026.

Moving Papers. Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that there are no triable issues of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claim of liability against the Sacramento International Horse Show for negligence or premises liability. As support for this contention, Defendants rely on Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-14.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that numerous triable issues of material fact exist, requiring denial of the instant motion. In support of his opposition, Plaintiff relies on Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) Nos. 1-119.

Standards for Summary Judgment

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382). The evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must address the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also, Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

Finally, in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, the Court of Appeal explained that a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

Guided by these principles, the Court will now consider the merits of the present motion and the specific contentions advanced therein.

Objection to Evidence

Defendants’ objections are ruled upon as follows.

 Objections to the declaration of Erika Contreras are overruled.  Objection nos. 11, 17, 18, 23-29, 32, and 35 to the declaration of Scott Defoe are sustained. The remainder are overruled.  Objection nos. 43, 44, 46, and 47 to the deposition of Dale Harvey are sustained. The rest are overruled.  Objections nos. 51-55 to the deposition of Shady Schneider are sustained. The remainder are overruled.  Objections nos. 57 and 58 to the deposition of Therese Lynn Williams-Gould are sustained. Objection no. 56 is overruled.  Objection No. 59 to the deposition of Martin Cazares is overruled.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, which was breached by their failure to secure the premises from the reasonably foreseeable risk presented by the unauthorized individual who ultimately shot Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 8-12.) “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for premises liability alleges that Defendants permitted an unauthorized individual to enter the premises, creating a dangerous condition which constituted a substantial and reasonably foreseeable risk of injury or death to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered substantial injuries. (Compl., ¶¶ 17-22.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. Premises liability ‘is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises’; accordingly, ‘mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.’ But the duty arising from possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in negligence cases. In determining whether a premises owner owes a duty to persons on its property, we apply the Rowland [citation] factors. Indeed, Rowland itself involved premises liability.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159 [internal citations omitted.].)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants owed him a legal duty of care, and thus he cannot prove either of his claims. In support, Defendants present UMFs, supported by admissible evidence, which establish that:

 The subject incident occurred on October 5, 2023, at an equestrian facility in Rancho Murieta, during the Sacramento International Horse Show (UMF No. 2);  Plaintiff and the perpetrator were involved in an altercation sometime before 2:00 a.m. (UMF No. 3);  The perpetrator left the facility, returned with a firearm at approximately 2:30 a.m., and shot Plaintiff (UMF No. 4);  The perpetrator, who was not affiliated with the horse show, entered via the exhibitor entrance on foot and exited within approximately three minutes (UMF Nos. 5, 6);  The horse show is jointly managed by Defendants annually (UMF Nos. 7, 8);  Horses at the show are accompanied by personnel such as riders and grooms, as Defendants do not provide equipment or staff for the care of the horses (UMF No. 10); and  This event has been held at the Rancho Murieta facility for 16 years, and there have been no prior shootings at either the Rancho Murieta equestrian facility or the Sacramento International Horse Show (UMF Nos. 12-14).

Duty is a question of law for the Court to determine. (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 237.) “Foreseeability is the ‘...chief factor in [the] duty analysis.’” (Laabs

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1272.) In determining whether a duty exists, the Court is not to decide whether the plaintiff's particular injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but instead is to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the type of harm that was experienced so that it would be appropriate to impose liability on the negligent party. (Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Paseman (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 958, 964.) The proper focus is on the “general character of the event and inquiring whether such event is ‘likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take into account of it in guiding practical conduct [citation omitted].’” (Laabs, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273.)

In the premises liability context the proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land is “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others . . .” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119.) A premises owner is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619; CACI 1000 and 1003.) However, a possessor of property is not an insurer of safety. (Lucas v. George T. R. Murai Farms, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1578.)

Defendants' argument rests on the rule that a “high degree of foreseeability,” ordinarily shown only by prior similar incidents, is required before a proprietor's duty extends to the burdensome measure of hiring security guards. (Citing Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 666, 678-679; Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 1205, 1214-1215.) Defendants' evidence that there had been no such prior shooting is undisputed.

However, while the absence of heightened foreseeability means only that a proprietor owes no duty to provide guards or other similarly burdensome measures, it does not negate the separate duty to respond to events unfolding in its presence by undertaking reasonable, relatively simple, and minimally burdensome measures. (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 224, 239.) Here, Plaintiff does not argue that the hiring of a full security force was necessary. Rather, he contends Defendants had already established after-hours access controls — a single monitored exhibitor gate staffed around the clock, with instructions to admit only authorized persons, to turn away anyone who could not justify his presence after hours, not to leave the post, and to report and escalate incidents — and failed to follow them. (AMF Nos. 3, 4, 48-51.)

Enforcing an access-control policy already in place is a minimal burden, and under the sliding scale it does not require proof of prior similar shootings.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

Further, Defendants' contention that prior similar incidents are categorically required in every premises case overreads the law. The California Supreme Court has disapproved the language in Hassoon v. Shamieh suggesting that heightened foreseeability is required in all premises liability cases regardless of the burden imposed. (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, supra, 36 Cal. 4th at pp. 242-244.) The Court in Delgado explained that while heightened foreseeability may be established by a showing of similar incidents, the existence of nearly identical incidents is not required.

Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff was an invitee on premises they possessed, controlled, and profited from, and owed him at least the duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the access-control measures they had undertaken. Defendants have not negated the existence of that duty for the purposes of summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet its initial burden of production pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2).

The Court is similarly not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that because they did not cause the violent criminal act by the third party and that the violent act constitutes a superseding cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, they cannot be held liable for such. The undisputed evidence before the Court, which must be viewed in the non-moving party’s favor, includes surveillance footage showing the perpetrator walk onto the property through the exhibitor gate while the night guard had left the post unattended (Defs’ Ex.

E), testimony that the other victim was waved in without any identification check (AMF No. 76), and expert testimony from Scott DeFoe that Defendants' security operation fell below the applicable standard of care. (DeFoe Decl., ¶¶ 18, 19, 21.) Whether the steps Defendants took were reasonable under the circumstances — including whether leaving the single monitored gate unattended and admitting an unauthorized person violated Defendants' own policies — is a question for the jury which cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden and that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants’ conduct constituted a breach of their duty of care.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be DENIED because the moving papers were insufficient to satisfy Defendants’ initial burden of production and even if they met this initial burden, there are triable issues of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV007494: MENDOZA vs WEST COAST EQUINE FOUNDATION, et al. 09/09/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 8D

fact in connection.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).