Lebaron Curtis, et al. v. City of Inglewood, et al.

in rent and $8,829.30 in security deposit. These are damages based on the lease and not based on the separate oral construction contract, and, thus are not a recoverable amount of damages on the Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of construction contract.

In addition, Plaintiff identified an amount of $9,018.74 in payments made for permits. However, again, the only evidence submitted was that these payments were made by 95 Kitchen and not by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's opposition fails to demonstrate where in the trial record there exists legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict. In the opposition, Plaintiff essentially repeats verbatim, and, at length, the jury instructions. Plaintiff also essentially argues that since a general verdict was rendered that there must have been sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Of course, as demonstrated above, this is not the legal standard, otherwise, there would be no value of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Elsewhere, Plaintiff speculates that the jury may have awarded damages for lost profit. However, this argument is based on an inference from sheer speculation rather than from the evidence. "Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence." Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.

Plaintiff's opposition failed to direct the Court to any piece of evidence that would support that the damages awarded in the verdict was for lost profits. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate where, in the evidentiary record, the Court can find support for the arguments that were made in the opposition. The Court notes that the filed opposition was solely a memorandum of points and authorities with no evidence attached that could lead the Court to the admitted evidence at trial that would support the amount of the jury verdict.

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' partial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted. The judgment is hereby modified to award Plaintiff Marcia Chiang $0 in damages on her first cause of action for breach of construction contract. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT - SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Department M Wednesday, September 9, 2026 Calendar No. PROCEEDINGS Preston Lebaron Curtis, et al. v. City of Inglewood, et al.

1. Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC's Demurrer to Complaint TENTATIVE RULING Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC's Demurrer to Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Background

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on October 21, 2024. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs were attending a Chargers' game at SoFi stadium when they were approached by security guards regarding ticket seat assignments. The security guards then assaulted and battered Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Battery; 2. Negligence; 3. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision; 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On May 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a DOE amendment naming DOE 1 as Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC.

Meet and Confer

Defendant set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP Sec. 430.41. (Decl., Andrea J. Lee Sandoval.)

Demurrer

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.)

Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., Sec. 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.)

Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action." (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609-610.)

Under Code Civil Procedure Sec. 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is "uncertain." Uncertainty exists where a complaint's factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)

Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action of the Complaint pursuant to CCP Sec. 430.10(e) and (f) on the grounds that the cause of action fails to state sufficient facts and is uncertain.

Fourth Cause of Action for IIED

Defendant's demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action. "A cause of action for IIED requires proof of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress." Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.

Plaintiffs' Complaint is uncertain. On May 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a DOE amendment naming DOE 1 as Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC. DOE 1 is described in the following manner: "Defendants DOE 1 to 5 were and at all times mentioned herein were residents of the State of California and County of Los Angeles. At all times relevant to the acts and omissions herein alleged, Defendants DOE 1 to 5, were employees, and acted in the course and scope of their employment with Defendants CITY OF INGLEWOOD, a public entity; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; STATE OF CALIFORNIA, a public entity; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, a public entity; SOFI STADIUM, an unknown entity; PINCAY RE, LLC, a Delaware corporation; BLUE AND GOLD TENANT LLC, a Delaware corporation; STADCO LA, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and Does 6 to 50, inclusive." (Complaint, P. 4 (emphasis added)).

It is uncertain how a limited liability corporation can be considered an "employee" of another entity. In addition, it is uncertain how a limited liability corporation, itself, can commit assault and battery, which is the underlying basis for the IIED cause of action. Thus, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 24TRCV04338 Hearing Date: September 9, 2026 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT - SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Wednesday - September 9, 2026 Department M Calendar No. PROCEEDINGS Sherine El Hag, et al. v. GGE Management, LLC, et al. 24TRCV04338 1. Electrolux Consumer Products, Inc.'s Motion to Sever TENTATIVE RULING Electrolux Consumer Products, Inc.'s Motion to Sever is granted.

Background