Norberto Ayon Osuna v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

Apex Class Action Administration is ORDERED APPOINTED as settlement administrator. The award of attorneys' fees and costs is the requested $91,666.67 in counsel's fees and $15,015.74 in counsel's costs. The Court shall enter an Order and Judgment as requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff Treasure Chardonnay Lenarz is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept731@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party's email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

DEFENDANTS FCA US, LLC AND REDLANDS CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES Moving Party: Defendants, FCA US LLC and Redlands Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Opposing Party: Plaintiff, Norberto Ayon Osuna Notice: Defective, No Remedy Per Case Law

Background Facts Pleadings Plaintiff Norberto Ayon Osuna sues Defendants FCA US LLC ("FCA"), Redlands Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram ("Redlands Chrysler"), and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to a June 10, 2025, First Amended Complaint alleging (1)-(4) breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("SBA") against FCA, (5) negligent repair against Redlands Chrysler, and (6) fraud-concealment against FCA. The claims arise from allegations related to defects that arose during the warranty period for a motor vehicle leased by Plaintiff on or about August 13, 2021, from Redlands Chrysler, as manufactured and/or distributed by FCA.

Motion Before the Court Now before the Court is Defendants FCA and Redlands Chrysler's opposed motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the six claims alleged in the FAC. Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication a.

Legal Standard

A notice of motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication and supporting papers must be served on all other parties to the action at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(2).) If the notice is served by mail, the required 81-day period of notice must be increased by 5 days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is outside the United States.

If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 81-day period of notice must be increased by two court days. (Ibid.) Critically, California trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings. (McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) Cal.App.4th 112, 115-116, fn. 2 (McMahon) ["The Legislature's decision not to give trial courts discretion to shorten the notice period for summary judgment motions should be contrasted with the authority granted trial courts to shorten the notice period for a host of other motions under section 1005, subdivision (b)," citation omitted] & 118 ["In sum, we hold that, in light of the express statutory language, trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings"].) b.

Discussion

Despite not being raised by the opposition papers, the Court finds that Defendants' motion is untimely and that pursuant to McMahon, this Court lacks authority to proceed with a discussion on the merits. Specifically, Defendants served their motion on Plaintiff on June 20, 2026. (Motion, Proof of Service ["On June 20, 2026, I served" the motion papers "BY ELECTRONIC MAIL"].) However, per statute, the motion needed to be served at least 81 days prior to the hearing, yielding an initial due date of Sunday, June 21, 2026, which is pushed back to Friday, June 19, 2026, by operation of law related to calculating of retroactive deadlines as based on a 'last day to perform' (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec.Sec. 10, 12, 12a, 12c), and is further pushed back by operation of law by two court days for electronic service (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(2)), yielding a final due date for service of Wednesday, June 17, 2026. Because Defendants' notice of motion was served on June 20, 2026, i.e., beyond the statutorily permissible timeframe for electronic service, Defendants' motion is untimely. And because this Court lacks authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings, as expressly held in McMahon and quoted above, the Court cannot proceed with an analysis of the merits of Defendants' motion. c.

Conclusion

Defendants FCA US LLC and Redlands Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is accordingly DENIED. Defendants FCA US LLC and Redlands Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept731@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party's email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Case Number: 25STCV04002 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: 731 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT OLGA RODRIGUEZ, TRUSTEE OF THE JHR TRUST'S ANSWER Moving Party: Plaintiff, Marian Piceny Opposing Party: None Notice: OK

Background Facts Plaintiff Marian Piceny sues various Defendants--(1) Jose Hilarion Ruiz Aguilera, as trustee of the Jose Hilarion Ruiz Aguilera Living Trust, (2) Jose Hilarion Ruiz Aguilera, as an individual, (3) Doe 1, The Estate of Jose Ruiz, (4) Doe 2, Olga Rodriguez, (5) Doe 3, Olga Rodriguez, Trustee of the JHR Trust, and Does 4 through 100--pursuant to an October 29, 2025, First Amended Complaint, alleging claims of (1) Negligence, (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Civil Penalties for Harassment in Violation of Los Angeles Anti-Harassment Ordinance, LAMC Section 45.30 et seq., and (4) Violation of Civil Code, Sec.1942.4. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to strike a May 29, 2026, Answer to the FAC filed by Doe 3, "Olga Rodriguez" "In Pro Per" on behalf of "Olga Rodriguez trustee of the JHR trust." Motion to Strike Answer a.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 436, subds. (a), (b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 ["Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded"].)

For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections 435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term "pleading" generally means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint, (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 435, subd. (a)), and an immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or