Ajalon Temple of Truth v. Ned Ebbs, Jr., et al.

Defendant has properly objected to Plaintiff's costs and shifted the burden of proof to Plaintiff. However, if the costs appear proper on their face, in order to carry her burden, Defendant must make some showing challenging the reasonableness or necessity of Plaintiff's costs. (Oak Grove School Dist. of Santa Clara County v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 699)

The mere fact of filing a motion to tax costs is insufficient to carry Defendant's burden. Where costs appear proper on their face, the initial burden is on the challenging party to show that those costs were not necessary or reasonable. However, where costs do not appear to be proper, the initial burden is on the party requesting costs to show that they were reasonably and necessarily incurred. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff has requested $1,111.95 in filing and motion fees, $940.1 in service fees, $1,403.01 in electronic filing and service fees, and $109 in "other" fees. Filing and motion fees, service fees, and electronic filing and service fees are expressly allowed by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5, and are therefore proper on their face, irrespective of a lack of itemization in the memorandum of costs. As such, the burden of showing that these fees were not reasonably or necessarily incurred is on Defendant, and as previously noted, Defendant has not carried this burden.

However, unspecified "other" fees are not proper on their face, such that the burden is on Plaintiff to show that these fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred. In their opposition, Plaintiff contends that this fee was for the recordation of a notice of pendency. This fee is neither expressly allowed nor disallowed by Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5. However, a plaintiff is required by statute to record a notice of pendency with the county recorder after filing a complaint for partition. (Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 872.250.) The court therefore finds this cost was reasonably and necessarily incurred.

3.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendant's motion to tax Plaintiff's memorandum of costs. Defendant is ordered to give notice. DATED: September 9, 2026 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT AJALON TEMPLE OF TRUTH, Plaintiff, vs. NED EBBS, JR., et al.,

Defendants. |)))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 26CMCV00507 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT THE GLORY CHURCH LA'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT Dept. A DATE: September 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. COMPLAINT FILED: 03/17/2026 TRIAL: 03/01/2027 | MOVING PARTY: Defendant The Glory Church LA RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Ajalon Temple of Truth 1.

Background

This is an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff Ajalon Temple of Truth ("Ajalon") alleges that defendant Ned Ebbs, Jr. served as Ajalon's pastor and exercised control over

its property. Ajalon alleges that Defendant Ebbs, after being removed as Ajalon's pastor, continued to exercise control over Ajalon's church property, rental income, and financial assets, and has failed to return or account for those assets.

2.

Discussion

Defendant The Glory Church LA ("Glory") moves to set aside the default entered against it on April 24, 2026. Glory contends that its default was taken based on its excusable neglect, mistake, or surprise. Glory also contends that the default was entered before the expiration of its time to answer or demur.

Ajalon's opposition was untimely filed on September 1, 2026. Ajalon requests that the court exercise its discretion to consider its opposition under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300. The court will consider Ajalon's opposition.

There are four bases upon which a defendant may seek to set aside a default: (1) relief for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), (2) the default judgment was void as a matter of law, (3) lack of actual notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a), or (4) equitable relief for extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982 (Rappleyea).)

A prematurely entered default is void. (Schwab v. Southern California Gas Co. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1320 [overruled in part on other grounds].) A default may only be entered after the defendant has been served with a summons and has failed to file responsive papers within the time prescribed in the summons. (Ibid.)

According to the proof of service filed on March 25, 2026, the summons and complaint were personally served on Glory on that date. Glory's responsive pleading deadline was therefore April 24, 2026, as under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 412.20, the time to file a responsive pleading to the summons and complaint is thirty days from service of the summons and complaint where service is personal.

Glory's default was taken on Friday, April 24, 2026, its last day to file a responsive pleading. Glory filed an answer to the complaint on Monday, April 27, 2026, one day after the deadline to respond. As default was entered within Glory's time to respond, the default was entered prematurely and is therefore void. This is grounds to set aside the default that was entered against Glory.

3.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendant The Glory Church LA's motion to set aside default. The default entered against it on April 24, 2026 is vacated. The court accepts the answer filed April 27, 2026 as Glory's responsive pleading. Glory is ordered to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: September 9, 2026 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley

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