STEINMUELLER v. MONSANTO COMPANY

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: AUGUST 31, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

No. 25CV00168

STEINMUELLER v. MONSANTO COMPANY

DEFENDANT MONSANTO COMPANY’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION

The motion is vacated. The court finds portions of plaintiff’s complaint survive following Monsanto Co. v. Durnell (2026) __ U.S. __ [146 S. Ct. 2001] (Durnell) since certain allegations are not barred by Durnell’s holding that state tort actions are preempted by application of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Because plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed one defendant (Far West Nursery), concedes that his fraud and express warranty claims should be dismissed, and since portions of his surviving claims incorporate failure to warn allegations, the court orders plaintiff to file a second amended complaint eliminating any claim related to failure to warn or labeling.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint shall be filed no later than September 30, 2026. Defendant’s responsive pleading shall be filed in conformance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 et seq.

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on March 10, 2025, with six causes of action: strict liability, design defect; strict liability, failure to warn; negligence; fraud; breach of express warranties; and breach of implied warranties.2 In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff conceded that his claims for fraud and breach of express warranty claims could be dismissed. Therefore, the remaining claims are strict liability, design defect; strict liability, failure to warn; negligence; and breach of implied warranties.

Defendant Monsanto Co. argues that this action may be dismissed under Durnell since it is a failure to warn case preempted by federal law. In Durnell, the issue was whether a claim could be brought against the maker of a product governed by FIFRA under the theory that the label was inadequate. FIFRA’s preemption clause specifies that a “State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.” (7 U.S.C. § 136v, subd. (b).)

The Court, analyzing the plain text, determined that all state law labeling requirements -- including tort actions brought under state law -- are preempted by the broad scope of the statute. (Durnell, 146 S.Ct. at p. 2010.) The court agrees that any claim or allegation related to labeling or failure to warn is preempted by FIFRA and barred by Durnell.

2 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for exemplary damages is a remedy.