Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporterservices-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel defendant Lewis’ answers to certain deposition questions is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and the opposing party of the specific deposition questions that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1116, requiring a deposition transcript used as an exhibit not only include the cover page with the name of the deponent and the date of the deposition and only the relevant pages of the transcript” but also be “highlighted” “in a manner that calls attention to the testimony.” Instead, it appears moving counsel merely attached the entirety of the subject deposition transcript to one of the moving declarations.

Factual Background

In this action, plaintiffs Joseph and Vincent Lara allege against defendant Lewis causes of action for intentional interference with expected inheritance and declaratory relief. In brief, plaintiffs contend defendant befriended their father, Alan Lara (“Alan”), in 2019 and has since then “engaged in a scheme to defraud Alan of money,” including through “fraud, manipulation, undue influence and duress.” (Compl., ¶12.) According to plaintiffs, their father Alan died in 2022 but they later learned that in August 2021, Alan had changed the beneficiary designation on an annuity account from being split equally between plaintiffs to giving defendant 80%, with the remaining 20% allocated equally to each plaintiff.

Plaintiffs allege defendant stole Alan’s computer login credentials and changed the beneficiary designation herself by forging Alan’s electronic signature. Trial of this action is currently set for 10/6/2026.

The Court notes that on 7/29/2026, the day before the present motion to compel was filed, defendant Lewis filed a motion for protective order related to her deposition on 7/16/2026. This motion for protective order was noticed for hearing on 3/4/2027 and it remains scheduled for that date as defendant did not seek (via ex parte application) permission from the Court to specially advance the 3/4/2027 hearing date despite the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

fact trial is set for 10/6/2026.

Moving Papers. According to plaintiffs’ moving papers, defendant Lewis refused during her deposition on 7/16/2026 to answer 49 separate questions put to her after asserting her rights under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs indicate that these questions relate to “a commercial escort-advertising website, PrivateDelights, that bears [defendant’s] photograph, a distinctive left-arm tattoo, and aliases attributed to her” and insist “[this] subject is central to Plaintiffs’ theory that Defendant provided--at least-- commercial escort and companionship services to decedent Alan Lara for money and used that relationship to procure an August 9, 2021 change of beneficiary on his Nationwide annuity.” (Mov.

MPA, p.1:3-8.) The moving papers insist “Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment as to discrete questions supported by an identified, real risk of criminal liability” but “[i]nstead, she asserted a running privilege objection across dozens of questions--including foundational questions concerning her social-media and email accounts, whether a photograph depicted her, and the meaning of words appearing on the website--while simultaneously denying any affiliation with the website and answering selected adjacent questions.” (Id., at p.1:9-14.)

Plaintiffs concede that the Fifth Amendment privilege is “vital where a responsive answer may reasonably expose a witness to criminal prosecution” but contend that “the witness does not unilaterally decide its scope” and it is ultimately for the Court to “assess the privilege claim in the context of each question. (Id., at p.1:14-17.)

Plaintiffs add that the deposition of defendant Lewis “was further obstructed when defense counsel instructed Defendant not to answer questions on a ground other than privilege or a protective-order suspension, passed notes, communicated a potential answer while a question was pending, and made suggestive speaking objections.” (Mov. MPA, p.1:18-21.) As a result, plaintiffs now seek “a focused order compelling answers where no valid privilege exists, requiring a sufficient question-specific basis for any remaining privilege claim, regulating the resumed examination, and awarding the monetary sanctions caused by the obstruction. (Id., at p.1:21-24.) More specifically, plaintiffs request an order providing the following relief:

1. Overruling Defendant’s Fifth Amendment objections to the extent the Court determines, question by question, that a responsive answer cannot reasonably tend to incriminate defendant; and, as to any question for which the Court cannot make that determination from the present record, requiring defendant to provide a sufficient, non-incriminating explanation of the basis and scope of the claimed privilege so that the Court may conduct the required particularized inquiry.

2. If the Court sustains a claim of privilege as to any question, imposing an appropriate order to prevent unfair surprise at trial, including precluding defendant from offering her own testimony or declaration on the same subject

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

matter unless she timely gives notice of a waiver and plaintiffs receive a fair opportunity to re-depose her and conduct reasonable ancillary discovery on that subject.

3. Ordering that, upon resumption of the deposition, counsel shall not instruct defendant not to answer except to preserve a privilege or other protected right, to enforce a court-ordered limitation, or to suspend the deposition to seek a protective order; shall state only concise, non-suggestive objections; and shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, with defendant concerning the substance of a pending question or supply an answer while a question is pending.

4. Awarding monetary sanctions against defendant and her counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $5,087.00, under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2023.040, and 2025.480, subdivision (j). (Not. of Mot., p.ii:1-27.)

Opposition. Defendant Lewis opposes, arguing “Plaintiffs do not seek to compel questions [sic] relevant to [their claim for Intentional Interference with Expected Inheritance (“IIEE”)]” but instead primarily seek answers to questions which “concern listing pages from an escort-advertising website, PrivateDelights, and aliases, photographs, rates, ‘donations,’ non-refundable deposits, and sexual acronyms, drawn from exhibits bearing the legend ‘Bumped: July 2, 2026,’ four years after the decedent’s death and five years after the beneficiary designation Plaintiffs claim was wrongfully changed.” (Opp., p.1:26-p.2:4.)

The opposition concedes plaintiffs may “inquire into the decedent’s financial dealings with Ms. Lewis” but the 49 questions at issue in this motion are “different” in that “[t]hey do not bear on what Plaintiffs must prove about the August 9, 2021 designation, and whatever marginal relevance they might carry cannot outweigh the constitutional privilege, the privacy interests, and the burden of the inquiry Plaintiffs propose.” (Id., at p.2:5-10.) According to defendant, whether or not she “advertised commercial services to strangers in 2026 proves nothing about changes to a 2021 beneficiary designation” and any “character evidence” these questions would generate “is inadmissible to prove conduct.” (Id., at p.2:10-14.)

Additionally, while “[t]he Motion claims that Defendant made a blanket, running assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, and 47 of the 49 entries of their [sic] Separate Statement cite one passage for that charge [, t]hat passage is not the witness’s invocation” but rather “defense counsel’s relevance and privacy objection, and it ran to later questions by agreement of both counsel, a courtesy Plaintiffs’ examining counsel herself formalized ‘to save you the trouble.’” (Id., at p.2:18-23.)

The moving separate statement confirms defendant Lewis “invoked the privilege personally, in her own words, question by question, 49 times.” (Id., at p.2:23-25.)

With respect to “Plaintiffs’ theory that Defendant ‘provided--at least--commercial escort and companionship services to decedent Alan Lara for money,’” the opposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

contends Penal Code §647(b) criminalizes soliciting or engaging in prostitution on specified compensation terms and defines prostitution to include “any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration” and as a result, plaintiffs’ questions intended to obtain evidence of “commercial sexual activity” cannot be “incapable of furnishing a link in a criminal chain against the witness who answers it.” (Opp., p.2:25-p.3:3.) Additionally, defendant maintains that the deposition “did not fail for lack of cooperation” as “[her] counsel repeatedly offered questions regarding [her] relationship with Alan, the elements of intentional interference, the annuity, and the allegations of the Complaint” but plaintiffs’ counsel “did not accept the offer but continued with questions about the listing pages from the escort-advertising website.” (Id., at p.3:4-11.)

However, “[w]hen examining counsel would not stop asking the same or similar questions, Defendant suspended the deposition [and] then renewed in writing the same day the offer to resume on the remaining topics [but] Plaintiffs never responded.” (Id., at p.3:12-14.)

Finally, the opposition requests the Court to hear defendant’s pending Motion for Protective Order together with the present motion to compel but for the reasons cited above, the Court declines to do so because defendant has made no effort to advance the 3/4/2027 hearing date for the motion for protective order and because plaintiffs’ opposition thereto is not yet due.

Legal Standards for Discovery

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v.

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v.

Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) The party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections has the burden to justify its objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

Discussion

A. At the outset, Code of Civil Procedure §2025.480 provides in pertinent part:

(a) If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production. (b) This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040(a) provides in its entirety:

A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Plaintiffs’ moving papers include two separate declarations, one by plaintiff Vincent Lara and one by plaintiff/plaintiffs’ counsel Joseph Lara. The former’s declaration neither addresses nor purports to address the meet-and-confer requirements of §2016.040 and instead only pertains to an attestation regarding defendant’s counsel passing a note to defendant during the 7/16/2026 deposition. As to the second declaration which is made by Joseph Lara, it asserts in Paragraph 1 as being intended to satisfy the meet-andconfer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040.

However, nothing in the following four (4) paragraphs which constitute the remainder of Joseph Lara’s declaration contains any attestation which even addresses, much less actually shows, that prior to filing this motion to compel there was any attempt to meet and confer with defendant’s counsel relative to any (much less all) of the issues presented in this motion or that any such attempt to meet and confer was done either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, as expressly mandated by the above-cited language of §2016.040(a).

Instead, Joseph Lara’s declaration merely attaches the 7/16/2026

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

deposition transcript and exhibits thereto constituting over 280 pages, but nothing more.

As noted above, the moving papers by their own terms take issue with defendant Lewis’ assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination not “as to discrete questions supported by an identified, real risk of criminal liability” but “[i]nstead, she asserted a running privilege objection across dozens of questions--including foundational questions concerning her social-media and email accounts, whether a photograph depicted her, and the meaning of words appearing on the website--while simultaneously denying any affiliation with the website and answering selected adjacent questions.” (Mov.

MPA, p.1:9-14.) The moving papers also contend that plaintiffs’ deposition of defendant Lewis “was further obstructed when defense counsel instructed Defendant not to answer questions on a ground other than privilege or a protectiveorder suspension, passed notes, communicated a potential answer while a question was pending, and made suggestive speaking objections.” (Id., at p.1:18-21.) However, the moving declaration by Joseph Lara includes no indication that plaintiffs, prior to filing this motion, made any attempt to meet and confer with defendant’s counsel on any of the aforementioned issues raised in the moving papers, much less did so either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference.

Although not obligated to do so, the Court has briefly reviewed the 220-page deposition transcript (exluding the attached index and exhibits) and finds it falls short of demonstrating that plaintiffs, before filing the present motion, made a “reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion,” as mandated by Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040(a). While Pages 179-186 include an on-the-record discussion between counsel about defendant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, this is not sufficient especially to the extent that plaintiffs’ counsel (Ms. Feffer) stated the following on Pages 179-180:

I believe your objections would be -- I believe the Fifth Amendment objections are not well taken. That is for a judge to decide. Counsel, you and I can't decide that here today. A judge is going to have to decide that. And I know that she offered the Fifth Amendment without referencing you, so I – there’s little point in meeting and conferring, other than to assert the position as I already have. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Then on Page 181, Ms. Feffer states in pertinent part:

Tell you what. We’re just going to make our objections for the record, and I want to give you all the time you need to make them so we have a very clear record. This is our meet and confer. It will save us some time later. (Underline added for emphasis.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

According to Young v. Rosenthal, the purpose of requiring meet-and-confer efforts is “to obtain a negotiated resolution of a discovery dispute without having to expend judicial time to sort out which party is correct and what relief should be granted. What the court seeks is an agreement by the parties which resolves the dispute.” (Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 117.) The decision of Townsend v. Superior Court is also instructive in that it clarifies that the meet-and-confer process is not intended to be some perfunctory formality but rather it “requires a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.” (Townsend v.

Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1438.) In light of these authorities, this Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the threshold requirement of making, prior to filing their motion to compel, a “reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve” their primary dispute regarding defendant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, as plainly mandated by §2016.040(a). This deficiency alone warrants denial of this motion.

Still, even assuming arguendo that the on-the-record exchange between counsel found on Pages 179-180 of the transcript could be characterized as being some part of a “reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve” their dispute over the propriety of defendant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege (which it is clearly not), this exchange fails to demonstrate that plaintiffs’ complied with the requirement to make a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve “each issue presented by the motion,” as specified in Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040(a).

In fact, in this Court’s view, the exchanges between counsel are little more, if not nothing more, than a mere series of statements made in various ways that repeatedly convey plaintiff’s view that defendant’s “Fifth Amendment objections are not well taken” and that “you and I can’t decide that here today,” as well as defendant’s counsel’s own repeated statements of what she will or will not allow her client to answer, coupled with assertions of unanalyzed reasons for withholding answers. Indeed, none of the exchanges between counsel, even after apparent breaks were taken, involve any engagement of the applicable legal analysis and authorities in relation to the specific questions and areas of inquiry on which plaintiffs sought questioning, much less all of the issues which eventually have been raised by this motion.

Thus, in the Court’s view, nothing said on the deposition record appears to constitute a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve “each issue presented by the motion.” Relatedly, to the extent that counsel’s exchanges on the deposition record were intended to defer to a later date, a more robust discussion of the applicable legal analysis pertaining to “each issue presented by the motion,” as the Court has already noted, no such evidence of subsequent meet-and-confer sessions was provided in Joseph Lara’s declaration which purports (in paragraph 1) to satisfy the meet-and-confer requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

Finally, it is worth adding that the opposition to this motion to compel indicates defendant’s counsel sent an email on 7/16/2026 in an attempt to meet-and-confer about some of the issues which arose during the deposition, and which are encompassed by the present motion to compel. This does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ motion shall be denied. First, it was plaintiffs’ burden as moving party to establish in their moving papers that they satisfied the meet-and-confer requirements before filing this motion.

Plaintiffs clearly failed to do so. Defendant’s opposition papers cannot be relied upon by plaintiffs to satisfy their own omission of evidence and failure to meet their burden in the moving papers. Second, even if the evidence which defendant supplies had been included in Joseph Lara’s declaration, it still would not satisfy plaintiffs’ meet-and-confer prerequisite. Indeed, the sending of a mere email fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040(a)’s requirement for meet-and-confer efforts not only to be conducted either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference but also to address each issue presented by the motion.

Further, plaintiffs’ failure to respond at all to defendant’s 7/16/2026 meet-and-confer attempt is only further indicative of plaintiffs’ failure to engage in any meaningful meet-and-confer process as delineated by case law including but not limited to the Young and Townsend opinions cited above.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’ motion is denied in its entirety. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it does so in order to address additional and independent reasons why this motion to compel shall be denied.

B. One of the issues specifically raised by the moving papers is defendant Lewis’ assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination not “as to discrete questions supported by an identified, real risk of criminal liability” but “[i]nstead, she asserted a running privilege objection across dozens of questions ” (Mov. MPA, p.1:9- 14) and this point is reiterated times throughout the moving separate statement in connection with each of the 49 questions to which plaintiffs seek answers (see, e.g., Mov.

Sep. Stm., p.2:3-7; p.3:7-13; p.4:10-17; p.5:13-19; p.6:16-22; p.7:19-25; etc.). As support for this proposition reiterated in the moving separate statement, plaintiffs cite Page 164:21-Page 165:21 of the Lewis Deposition Transcript but the cited passage from the deposition does not establish the existence of any “running privilege” relating to the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the cited portions of Pages 164-165 actually pertain to defense counsel’s “running objections” to the line of questioning on the grounds it “is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and a clear violation of her right to privacy,” as well as “badgering and harassing,” to which plaintiff’s counsel expressly agreed. (Depo., p.164:21-p.165:21.)

In light of the actual record appearing on Pages 164-165, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ suggestion that defendant improperly asserted a “running privilege” or a “running objection” based on the Fifth Amendment. Curiously, according to plaintiffs’ own moving separate statement, it appears to the Court that defendant Lewis actually specifically invoked her Fifth

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Answers at Deposition Questions of Defendant Alexis Paige Lewis in Department 16D

Amendment rights on 49 separate occasions in response to each of the 49 deposition questions at issue. Thus, plaintiffs have not carried their burden as to this asserted issue in any event such that the motion is denied on this further ground.

C. Additionally, while the moving separate statement does appear to set forth each of the 49 different deposition questions and responses in dispute, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ stated reasons for compelling an answer to each of these 49 questions are essentially the same, to wit:

Defendant refused on a blanket, running claim of privilege (see Lara Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A at 164:21–165:21) rather than claiming the privilege with specific reference to this question. A blanket refusal to testify is unacceptable. Defendant must invoke the privilege with respect to the particular question, and the Court must then determine whether the claim is well founded in light of the question and circumstances presented. (Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1044–1045; Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 306–308.)

The person invoking the privilege must demonstrate that the fear of incrimination is reasonable and not advanced fancifully or merely imagined (id. at 1044), and the privilege does not extend to matters that would subject the witness only to liability in a civil proceeding (id. at 1039, fn. 1). This question is innocuous on its face, and it is difficult to conceive how a response could be incriminating. (Cf. id. at 1046, fn. 9.) The overbreadth of the claim is confirmed by defendant’s selective invocation: she denied any affiliation with PrivateDelights (Lara Decl. ¶ 2, Exh.

A at 158:11–16) yet refused to authenticate postings bearing her photograph, tattoo, and aliases. The Court should compel an answer if it determines that a responsive answer cannot reasonably tend to incriminate defendant. If the Court cannot make that determination on the present record, it should require defendant to provide a sufficient, non-incriminating explanation and issue a question-specific ruling. If the Court sustains a privilege claim, it should prevent unfair surprise by precluding defendant from offering her own testimony or declaration on the same subject unless she timely notifies plaintiffs of a waiver and plaintiffs receive a fair opportunity for further deposition and reasonable ancillary discovery. (A & M Records, Inc. v.

Heilman (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 554, 566–567; Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 309–314.) (Mov. Sep. Stm., p.3:2-p.4:1.)

In short, plaintiffs’ moving papers are essentially limited to challenging defendant’s assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege and as such, plaintiffs have completely ignored the various other objections which were asserted in response to most, if not all, of the 49 deposition questions at issue including but not necessarily limited to those

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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mentioned in the preceding paragraph (i.e., not reasonably calculated, right to privacy, badgering, harassing, etc.). Although the moving separate statement does specifically contend that the first of the 49 deposition questions at issue is “plainly relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” (Id., at p.3:2-6), this proposition does not appear to have been included in connection with any of the other 48 questions. Because the moving papers fail to address all of the various objections asserted in response to the 49 deposition questions at issue, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to carry their initial burden of showing entitlement to answers (or “further” answers) to such deposition questions. Again, this constitutes a separate and distinct ground upon which this Court shall deny the present motion to compel.

D. Finally, the Court notes that it is true the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege “must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a specific answer to a specific question” (Blackburn v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 427.) and the danger of incrimination may not be either imaginary or insubstantial (Ohio v. Reiner (2001) 532 U.S. 17, 21). Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment privilege “extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction and likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness” but “[t]he witness cannot be expected to state the precise hazard that he fears because he might then be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. [Citations.]” (Blackburn v.

Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 428-429.) When it is not evident from the circumstances that the question calls for incriminating information, the court must require an explanation as to why and how the answer might be incriminating. (Id.) Indeed, as to the component of plaintiffs’ motion which is based upon defendant’s assertion of this privilege, it was incumbent upon the parties to engage in a meet-andconfer process that specifically applies the governing law to the discovery sought and questions asked.

In any event, the Court makes clear that due to the substantial failures discussed above, the Court makes no ruling here as to whether any of the questions at issue may be asked at trial. Indeed, the parties’ apparent failure to adequately meet-and-confer in advance of this motion has now caused these issues to remain unresolved pre-trial, leaving them to the discretion of the trial judge (once assigned).[1]

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not separately address plaintiffs’ remaining arguments that defendant Lewis’ counsel unjustifiably instructed the deponent not to answer some of the 49 deposition questions, “passed notes, communicated a potential answer while a question was pending, and made suggestive speaking objections.” (Mov. MPA, p.1:18-21.)

Disposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs’ present motion to compel is DENIED in its entirety.

The Court declines to award any monetary sanctions under the circumstances here because this motion to compel is denied and because the opposition was not filed without substantial justification.

Moving parties to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.) [1] While the Court does not rule upon questions presented by this motion where the Fifth Amendment

was asserted, it will merely note that Question No. 1 presented by plaintiffs’ motion is moot. Deposition Question No. 1 was as follows: “So again, Ms. Lewis, could you tell us yes or no, did you have an intimate relationship with Alan ever?” (Mov. Sep. Stm., p.2:22-23.) While defendant responded “[o]n advice of counsel, I decline to answer on grounds that I might incriminate myself” (Id., at p.2:25-26), this response is moot as defendant answered the same question merely moments earlier. In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel had already specifically asked: “Did you and Alan have an intimate relationship?” With no interposed objection, conditions or refusal, defendant unequivocally answered: “No.” (J. Lara Decl., Ex. A, p.50:2-4.)