Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporterservices-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving defendant is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving defendant is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving defendant is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Defendant Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC’s (“MCPA”) motion for summary judgment or alternatively, summary adjudication of issues is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendant’s 23 Undisputed Material Facts, which of opposing plaintiff’s 13 Additional Material Facts, and/or which of the parties’ respective written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b), expressly prohibiting objections to evidence from being “restated or reargued in the separate statement.”

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), expressly requiring the written objections to evidence quote or set forth the objectionable statements claimed to be inadmissible, so the Court need not expend its finite resources searching for the specific statements/evidence to which these objections are directed to in order to rule on such objections.

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1113(f), requiring a table of contents and a table of authorities when the memorandum exceeds 10 pages.

Factual Background

This action was commenced on 10/21/2021 and arises out of Peace Umana’s stay at the Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center dating back to 2014. The operative First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) filed on 2/24/2022 now asserts causes of action for Elder

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

Abuse, Violations of Resident’s Bill of Rights, Negligence and Wrongful Death, with the latter alleging that Ms. Umana passed away in November 2021. The 1AC specifically alleges in Paragraph 3 that on 11/21/2019, Ms. Umana was diagnosed with a “right proximal comminuted, varus angular fracture” which “[t]he doctors opined could not have happened without significant trauma to the bone” but “no such trauma had been noted” to have occurred during her several years’ long residency at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center, even in the days shortly before 11/21/2019. According to the 1AC, this facility was understaffed and “this resulted in definite issues with neglect of Ms. Umana’s condition, which directly caused her injuries, as described herein below.” (1AC, ¶3.)

Trial is currently set for 10/6/2026. The Court notes that a motion to continue trial is now set for 9/18/2026 and that at the Mandatory Settlement Conference on 8/27/2026, plaintiff’s claims against both defendant SSC Carmichael Operating Company LLC (“SSC Carmichael”) and defendant Sun Mar Management Services were deemed settled.

Moving Papers. Defendant MCPA now moves for summary adjudication on each of the four causes of action on the grounds each “lacks merit.” (Not. of Mot., p.ii:2-8.) Curiously, in the introductory paragraph of the moving points & authorities, defendant MCPA indicates this motion is actually brought on the grounds “Plaintiffs cannot proffer any clear and convincing evidence to support their claims against [MCPA]” (Mov. MPA, p.1:8-13) but to the extent this is the actual grounds for this motion, defendant MCPA’s Notice of Motion is defective on its face.

In any event, this motion asserts in significant part that MCPA cannot be liable for any alleged elder abuse or other wrongdoing in connection with the fracture diagnosed on 11/21/2019 because MCPA “neither owned nor operated Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center at the time of the incident.” (Id., at p.7:15-19.) More specifically, defendant MCPA maintains that the care facility where Ms. Umana resided was prior to 8/1/2021 owned and operated by co-defendant SSC Carmichael and it was not until 8/1/2021 that defendant MCPA first acquired ownership and control over the care facility, with the upshot being that prior to 8/1/2021 defendant MCPA “was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or dayto-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center.” (Id., at p.1:15-23.)

According to the moving papers, “The undisputed evidence demonstrates that [MCPA] had no ownership interest in, management authority over, or responsibility for the care rendered at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center on November 21, 2019” and thus, MCPA “did not employ, supervise, control, or direct the personnel responsible for Decedent’s care at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center and cannot be held liable for any alleged acts or omissions occurring there. (Id., at p.7:19-24.) The moving points and authorities proceed to argue with respect to the first cause action that defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

MCPA “did not deny or withhold required services from decedent” or otherwise “cause [her] to suffer injury,” nor is there any “evidence of oppression, fraud, malice and/or corporate ratification,” while claiming that each of the remaining three causes action “lacks merit.” (Id., at pp.6-13.)

In support of this motion, defendant MCPA filed a separate statement which sets forth a total of 23 Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), with UMF Nos. 1-16 cited as support for summary adjudication of the First Cause of Action (although there are two separate UMF Nos. 14 and 15); UMF Nos. 1-18 cited as support for summary adjudication of the Second Cause of Action; UMF Nos. 1-20 cited as support for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action; and UMF Nos. 1-23 cited as support for summary adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action. Consequently, in the event either defendant MCPA has failed to carry its initial burden of production with respect to any one of UMF Nos. 1-16 or plaintiff established the existence of a triable issue of material fact with any one of these 16 UMFs, summary adjudication of each cause of action must be denied since all of these 16 UMFs were cited as support for summary adjudication on all four causes of action.

Opposition. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that this motion should be denied for several reasons. First, the opposition insists this motion is premised on “duplicated and misnumbered ‘facts’ that are legal conclusions rather than facts” and “its central corporate declaration literally states that [MCPA] ‘did provide healthcare services or treatment to any patient(s), including Plaintiff PEACE UMANA, at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before August 1, 2021.” (Opp., p.2:19-24.) Second, defendant MCPA’s reliance on the declaration of Dr.

Klein for the proposition that the healthcare facility “maintained the standard of care at all times” fails because the medical records on which this opinion is based “are not before the Court” as the “care plans, wound care evaluations, and the records of at least six hospitalizations in 2020 and 2021 that appear nowhere in Defendant’s Compendium of Exhibits,” meaning this expert’s opinion “ha[s] no evidentiary value” for purposes of this motion, citing Garibay v. Hemmat (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 735 and Kelley v.

Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519. (Id., at p.2:10-18.) Third, while defendant MCPA contends it “‘did not own, operate, manage, or control’ the facility before August 1, 2021,” the evidence shows that the decedent “developed the aspiration pneumonia, sepsis, and acute hypoxic respiratory failure that killed her” during the exact period of MCPA’s admitted ownership and control over the Healthcare Center. (Id., at p.2:1-9.)

In his opposing separate statement, plaintiff concedes that several of the 23 UMFs offered by defendant MCPA are “undisputed” but contends that a majority are “disputed” at least in part. Plaintiff also offers 13 Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) of his own in an

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

attempt to establish the existence of triable issues of fact which mandate denial of this motion.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v.

Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.) In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v.

Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. CRC Rule 3.1350(b) explicitly mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis; brackets added.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant MCPA’s Request for Judicial Notice of (1) the “License issued to SSC Carmichael to operate and maintain the ‘Skilled Nursing Facility’ known as Mission Carmichael Healthcare [C]enter effective from November 1, 2020 to October 31, 2021” and (2) the “License issued to [MCPA] to operate and maintain the ‘Skilled Nursing Facility’ known as Mission Carmichael Healthcare [C]enter effective from February 3, 2022 to October 31, 2022” is GRANTED but is limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a), §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff’s Objections. Plaintiff filed on 8/19/2026 13 written objections to certain evidence proffered with the moving papers. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(q), the Court does not rule on those written objections which are not material to the disposition of this motion but as to the remainder, the Court rules as follows.

No. 2: Overruled because defendant MCPA filed on 6/26/2026 a Notice of Errata which included the inadvertently omitted executed signature page for the Johnson Declaration.

No. 3: Overruled because plaintiff has failed to set forth any valid grounds which renders the subject statement inadmissible and notably, the opposition contends that this statement, as written, actually mandates denial of the entirety of this motion insofar as it states “[MCPA] did provide healthcare services or treatment to any patient(s), including Plaintiff PEACE UMANA, at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

August 1, 2021.” (Johnson Decl., ¶8 (underline added for emphasis).)

No. 4: Sustained because the Balecha Declaration fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation necessary to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary (1) to properly authenticate the cited “‘Admission Record’ dated April 3, 2014” which predates not only the declarant’s becoming the Healthcare Center’s Administrator on 12/11/2023 but also defendant MCPA’s own claimed acquisition of the Healthcare Center 8/1/2021 and/or (2) to establish the prerequisite for the business records exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in Evidence Code §1271.

No. 5: Sustained because the Balecha Declaration fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation necessary to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary (1) to properly authenticate the cited records consisting of the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated December 31, 2019” and the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated March 31, 2019,” both of which predate not only the declarant’s becoming the Healthcare Center’s Administrator on 12/11/2023 but also defendant MCPA’s own claimed acquisition of the Healthcare Center 8/1/2021 and/or (2) to establish the prerequisite for the business records exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in Evidence Code §1271.

No. 6: Overruled because the Balecha Declaration on file with the Court includes an executed signature page which indicates the declaration was executed on 6/11/2026 and the inclusion of the phrase “to the best of my knowledge” in the final paragraph does not render the entirety of this declaration inadmissible, although as noted elsewhere, the Balecha Declaration remains deficient in other specific respects.

No. 7: Sustained because attorney Dangerfield’s Declaration fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation necessary to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary (1) to properly authenticate the various records (consisting primarily of medical records from Mercy San Juan Medical Center) identified in Paragraphs 2-8 (i.e., Ex. Nos. 5-7, 9, 11-12, 14) and/or (2) to establish the prerequisite for the business records exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in Evidence Code §1271. It appears that the only attestation provided in the Dangerfield Declaration to establish foundation for the aforementioned documents are the following statements:

1. I am one of the attorneys in our office assigned to this case and base the following upon my personal knowledge such that, if called upon as a witness, I could and would so testify competently thereto.

2. Through the course of discovery, [MCPA] obtained the medical records of Plaintiff PEACE UMANA (hereinafter referred to as “Decedent”) from Mercy San

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

Juan Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as “Mercy San Juan”). Contained within those medical records is a document entitled “History and Physical” dated November 21, 2019 A true and correct copy of [this document] is attached to [MCPA’s] Compendium of Exhibits as Exhibit 5 and is herein incorporated by this reference.” (Dangerfield Decl., ¶¶1-2.)

The sum and substance of Paragraph 2 is then repeated in Paragraphs 3-8 in connection with the other identified exhibits. However, the mere fact that the declarant is “one of the attorneys assigned to this case” does not establish personal knowledge regarding any specific activities of the law firm but more critically, this does not establish personal knowledge of facts needed to set forth an adequate foundation under Evidence Code §1271 to except such records from exclusion as hearsay. Nor can the mere attestation by counsel that MCPA obtained medical records from a particular source provide the foundation required under Evidence Code §1271.

No. 8: Overruled because plaintiff has failed to set forth any valid grounds which renders the subject statements or the referenced discovery responses inadmissible. Declarant’s alleged failure to demonstrate that the subject discovery responses are “factually devoid” does not impact the admissibility of the declarant’s statements or the discovery responses themselves.

No. 9: Overruled because as noted above, defendant MCPA’s Request for Judicial Notice of (1) the licenses issued to SSC Carmichael and defendant MCPA to operate and maintain the subject Skilled Nursing Facility known as Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center is granted but only for those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a), §452(b)-(d).) The grant of judicial notice does not extend to the truth of the statements contained in documents judicially noticed. (See, Kilroy v. State of California, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at 1569-70.) However, the Court adds that the license issued to SSC Carmichael is authenticated in Paragraph 3 of the Johnson Declaration and the Court finds no objection to this paragraph of the Johnson Declaration.

No. 11: Sustained because the Klein Declaration fails to set forth a sufficient factual foundation necessary to affirmatively establish the personal knowledge necessary to show that “the only mention of a wound [in the decedent’s medical records] is from [sic] the Wound Care Specialist Evaluation form dated August 14, 2017 wherein she had a stage 4 wound on her right toe, which resolved by June 11, 2018” and notably, this “Wound Care Specialist Evaluation form dated August 14, 2017” does not appear to have been included among the evidence submitted with the moving

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

papers.

To the extent plaintiff’s opposing separate statement purports to assert objections to certain of defendant MCPA’s own 23 UMFs themselves, such objections are overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

Defendant MCPA’s Objections. Defendant MCPA filed on 8/28/2026 two separate sets of written objections which are directed at the Neidich and Lichtenhan Declarations submitted with the opposition papers. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(q), the Court does not rule on these written objections because they relate to evidence which is not material to the disposition of this motion inasmuch as neither the Neidich nor the Lichtenhan Declaration was cited by plaintiff in his opposing separate statement. As noted above, according to existing case law, “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 1477 (italics in original).)

To the extent defendant MCPA’s separate statement in response to plaintiff’s AMFs purports to assert objections to certain of the latter’s own 13 AMFs themselves, such objections are overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

Discussion

The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to satisfy defendant MCPA’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and as will now be shown, the Court finds that the moving papers are not sufficient to carry defendant MCPA’s initial burden of production, thereby mandating denial of this motion for summary adjudication in its entirety.

UMF No.

4. As noted above, this motion is primarily premised on the contention that MCPA can have no liability in this case because MCPA “neither owned nor operated Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center at the time of the incident” occurring in or about November 2019 (Mov. MPA, p.7:15-19) and thus, MCPA “was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center” at any time prior to 8/1/2021 (Id., at p.1:15-23). However, the moving papers fail to satisfy defendant MCPA’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to this primary contention because both UMF No. 4 and the cited declaration by Mr. Johnson expressly indicate that MCPA “did provide healthcare services or treatment to any patient(s),

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

including [decedent], at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before August 1, 2021.” (Underline added for emphasis.) This evidence, as presented, supports the opposite of the statement asserted in UMF No.

4. As explained above, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication must construe the evidence of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor (see, e.g., Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926) and equally important, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied (see, Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252).

In this instance, while the moving papers broadly assert that defendant MCPA can have no liability to plaintiff because it was not responsible for any care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center prior to acquiring ownership and control over this facility effective 8/1/2021, such assertion necessary fails in light of UMF No. 4’s express and plainly contradictory statement that MCPA “did provide healthcare services or treatment to patients, including [the decedent], at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before August 1, 2021” (underline added for emphasis), which language is repeated verbatim in Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration.

Indeed, the Johnson Declaration’s verbatim repetition of the factual statement set forth in UMF No. 4 demonstrates to this Court that UMF No. 4 did not inadvertently omit the word “not.” For these reasons, the Court finds that defendant MCPA failed to carry its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to the First Cause of Action for Elder Abuse and this alone mandates denial of summary adjudication on this cause of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact.

Still, it is worth adding here that the assertion in UMF No. 4 which is repeated in Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration conflicts on its face with UMF No. 2, which states in pertinent part that “[b]efore August 1, 2021, [MCPA] was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center.”

Moreover, because defendant MCPA also relies on this same UMF No. 4 along with Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reasons.

In light of the preceding, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to address additional separate and distinct reasons why this summary

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

judgment/adjudication motion must be denied without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence offered in opposition.

UMF No.

8. This UMF states in its entirety, “On November 22, 2019, Decedent underwent an intramedullary fixation of the right subtrochanteric femur fracture without any complications; on November 24, 2019, Decedent discharged back to Mission Carmichael Post Acute in stable condition.” (Underline added for emphasis.) In short, by its own terms, UMF No. 8 (like UMF No. 4) directly contradicts defendant MCPA’s primary contention that it did not become responsible for providing any care, services or treatment to the decedent prior to the transfer of ownership and control which was effective 8/1/2021.

Therefore, defendant MCPA has failed to meet its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to the First Cause of Action for Elder Abuse and this alone mandates denial of summary adjudication on this cause of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact. Additionally, because defendant MCPA also relies on this same UMF No. 8 as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov.

Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3- 7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to all of these causes of action as well.

To the extent defendant MCPA may now attempt to assert that UMF No. 8 reflects a scrivener’s error, the Court refers again to the Nazir decision for the proposition that a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252).

UMF No.

6. According to UMF No. 6, “On April 3, 2014, Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center initially admitted Decedent” and “[h]er diagnoses in 2014 included aphasia, chronic embolism, dementia, hypertension, hemiplegia, hemiparesis, hyperlipidemia, type 2 diabetes mellitus and insomnia.” The sole evidence cited as support for this UMF is defendant MCPA’s Exhibit 4, described as “‘Admission Record’ dated April 3, 2014,” along with Dr. Klein’s summarization of same. However, plaintiff’s objection No. 4 has been sustained for the reasons set forth above and as a result, the Court finds that MCPA’s UMF No. 6 is without any evidentiary support at all or at a minimum, without sufficient evidentiary support for the entirety of the factual assertions therein.

Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 6 and this, in turn, precludes summary adjudication of the first cause of action for elder abuse regardless of any opposition. Moreover, because defendant MCPA relies on this same UMF No. 6 as support for summary adjudication

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reasons.

Additionally, the extent that the “‘Admission Record’ dated April 3, 2014” and/or Dr. Klein’s summarization of same is offered by defendant MPCA as support for UMF Nos. 15 (both Nos. 15), 20 and 23, such UMFs are likewise without sufficient evidentiary support for the entirety of the factual assertions therein. Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to these UMFs as well, thereby mandating denial of summary adjudication on each of the causes of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact relative to these UMFs.

UMF No.

9. This UMF states, “On December 31, 2019, radiology results confirmed that the hardware is in place, and Decedent’s right femur is aligned close to normal” and cited as support is defendant MCPA’s Exhibit 8, described as the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated December 31, 2019,” along with Dr. Klein’s summarization of same. However, plaintiff’s objection No. 5 (directed at defendant MCPS’ Ex. Nos. 8 and 10) has been sustained for the reasons set forth above and as a result, the Court finds that MCPA’s UMF No. 9 is without any evidentiary support at all.

Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 9 and this, in turn, precludes summary adjudication of the first cause of action for elder abuse regardless of any opposition. Moreover, because defendant MCPA relies on this same UMF No. 9 as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reasons.

Additionally, the extent that the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated December 31, 2019” and/or Dr. Klein’s summarization of same is offered by defendant MPCA as support for UMF Nos. 15 (both Nos. 15), 20 and 23, such UMFs are similarly without sufficient evidentiary support for the entirety of the factual assertions therein. Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to these UMFs as well, thereby mandating denial of summary adjudication on each of the causes of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact relative to these UMFs.

Finally, to the extent defendant MCPA may now attempt to assert that UMF No. 9 is not truly “material” to the disposition of this motion, such assertion conflicts with the Nazir decision which, as set forth above, stands for the proposition that a moving party’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252).

UMF No.

11. According to UMF No. 11, “By March 31, 2020, Decedent’s right femur and hip joint remained in alignment and the intertrochanteric hip fracture was healing” and offered as support for this UMF is defendant MCPA’s Exhibit 10, described as the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated March 31, 2020,” along with Dr. Klein’s summarization of same. However, plaintiff’s objection No. 5 (directed at defendant MCPS’ Ex. Nos. 8 and 10) has been sustained for the reasons set forth above and as a result, the Court finds that MCPA’s UMF No. 11 is without any evidentiary support at all.

Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 11 and this, in turn, precludes summary adjudication of the first cause of action for elder abuse regardless of any opposition. Moreover, because defendant MCPA relies on this same UMF No. 11 as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reasons.

Additionally, the extent that the “‘Radiology Results Report’ dated March 31, 2020” and/or Dr. Klein’s summarization of same is offered by defendant MPCA as support for UMF Nos. 15 (both Nos. 15), 20 and 23, such UMFs are without sufficient evidentiary support for the entirety of the factual assertions therein. Accordingly, MCBA failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to these UMFs as well, thereby mandating denial of summary adjudication on each of the causes of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact relative to these UMFs.

UMF No.

13. This UMF states, “Decedent does not possess clear and convincing evidence that [MCPA] provided her with insufficient wound care that resulted in the development of new pressure injuries during her admission” and the sole evidence cited in support of UMF No. 13 is Paragraph 15 of Dr. Klein’s declaration. However, while Paragraph 15 may provide evidentiary support for Dr. Klein’s own professional opinion that “[MCPA] did not cause Decedent to develop any pressure ulcers,” the cited passage from this declaration fails to affirmatively establish that decedent or plaintiff “does not possess clear and convincing evidence that [MCPA] provided [decedent] with insufficient wound care that resulted in the development of new pressure injuries during her admission.” For this reason alone, defendant MCBA has failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 13, thereby mandating

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

denial of summary adjudication on the first cause of action for elder abuse regardless of the evidence offered in opposition. Moreover, because defendant MCPA relies on this same UMF No. 13 as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reason.

Furthermore, even if defendant MCPA had proffered evidence sufficient to establish that “Decedent does not possess clear and convincing evidence that [MCPA] provided her with insufficient wound care that resulted in the development of new pressure injuries during her admission” (which it did not), defendant MCPA still failed to establish its entitlement to summary adjudication here. Under current California law, a defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication on the ground a plaintiff cannot produce evidence to prove a particular cause of action may not merely rely on factually-devoid discovery responses or testimony but must go farther by affirmatively demonstrating the plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of obtaining the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case. In Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, the Sixth District Court of Appeal explained:

We cannot agree with those who may be understood to suggest that a moving defendant may shift the burden simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case. It is clear to us, from the requirement of the 1992 amendment that a defendant have “shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established” (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, former subd. (n)(2); Stats. 1992, ch. 1348, § 1), that a defendant must make an affirmative showing in support of his or her motion.

Such a showing connotes something significantly more than simply “pointing out to the court” that “there is an absence of evidence”: before the burden of producing even a prima facie case should be shifted to the plaintiff in advance of trial, a defendant who cannot negate an element of the plaintiff’s case should be required to produce direct or circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff not only does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie case. (Id., at 186 (underline added for emphasis).)

Thus, to the extent defendant MCPA suggests it is entitled to summary adjudication of the elder abuse cause of action because plaintiff does not currently possess clear and convincing evidence showing that MCPA “provided insufficient wound care that resulted in the development of new pressure injuries during [decedent’s] admission,” defendant MCPA has failed to make the requisite additional showing that plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of obtaining such evidence. For this reason as well, the Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

finds that defendant MCPA failed to carry its initial burden of production in connection with UMF No. 13, which UMF was cited as support for summary adjudication on all four causes of action. (See, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.8:16-22; p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7.) Consequently, summary adjudication must be denied all four causes of action.

UMF No.

14. According to the first of the two UMF Nos. 14 set forth at Page 8:24 of the moving separate statement (as distinguished from the “second” UMF No. 14 set forth at Page 10:23), “[MCPA] did not cause Decedent’s subtrochanteric femur fracture sustained on or around November 21, 2019” and the sole evidence cited as support are Paragraphs 2-4 of the Johnson Declaration along with the three exhibits referenced therein, Exhibits 1-3. However, to the extent that this motion is primarily premised on the contention that MCPA can have no liability in this case because MCPA “neither owned nor operated Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center at the time of the incident” occurring in or about November 2019 (Mov.

MPA, p.7:15-19) and thus “was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center” at any time prior to 8/1/2021 (Id., at p.1:15-23), such an argument is contradicted by defendant MCPA’s own UMF Nos. 4 and 8 as well as Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration. As discussed already, both UMF No. 4 and Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration expressly indicate that MCPA “did provide healthcare services or treatment to any patient(s), including [decedent], at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before August 1, 2021” (underline added for emphasis), while UMF No. 8 itself states in pertinent part that “on November 24, 2019, Decedent discharged back to Mission Carmichael Post Acute in stable condition” (underline added for emphasis).

In light of these directly conflicting assertions found in these two UMFs and in Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration, the Court finds that defendant MCPA has failed to carry its initial burden of production in connection with the “first” UMF No. 14 and since this UMF was cited as support for summary adjudication on all four causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.8:24-27; p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must be denied all four causes of action.

UMF No.

15. According to the first of the two UMF Nos. 15 set forth at Page 9:13 of the moving separate statement (as distinguished from the “second” UMF No. 15 set forth at Page 12:12), “[MCPA] did not cause Decedent did not cause to suffer any injury during her admission.” However, to the extent that this motion is primarily premised on the contention that MCPA can have no liability in this case because MCPA “neither owned nor operated Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center at the time of the incident” occurring in or about November 2019 (Mov. MPA, p.7:15-19) and thus “was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center” at any time prior to 8/1/2021 (Id., at p.1:15-23), such an argument is contradicted by defendant MCPA’s own UMF Nos. 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

and 8 as well as Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration, all of which were discussed in the preceding paragraph relating to UMF No.

14. In light of the assertions found in UMF Nos. 4 and 8 as well as Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration which contradict the suggestion that MCPA played no role in decedent’s care and treatment prior to 8/1/2021, defendant MCPA has not met its initial burden of production in connection with the “first” UMF No. 15 and insofar as this UMF was cited as support for summary adjudication on all four causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p. 9:13-15; p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must be denied all four causes of action.

UMF No.

14. According to the “second” UMF No. 14 set forth at Page 10:23 of the moving separate statement, “Decedent has no clear and convincing evidence of reckless, oppressive, malicious or fraudulent conduct on part of [MCPA]” and among the evidence cited as support for this assertion is plaintiff’s responses to defendant MCPA’s form and special interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions attached to the moving papers as Exhibit Nos. 19-22. However, MCPA’s reliance on such responses is unavailing insofar as these responses consist solely of objections to the respective discovery requests and as such, MCPA’s citation to these “responses” fails to provide any legitimate evidentiary basis for UMF No. 14’s statement that “Decedent has no clear and convincing evidence of reckless, oppressive, malicious or fraudulent conduct on part of [MCPA].” Consequently, the Court finds that defendant MCPA failed to meet its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 14 and thus, summary adjudication must be denied as to the first cause of action for elder abuse regardless of whether the opposition proffers evidence sufficient to show any triable issue of material fact.

Additionally, because defendant MCPA relies on this same “second” UMF No. 14 along with plaintiff’s objections to defendant MCPA’s form and special interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reasons.

Furthermore, to the extent defendant MCPA cites plaintiff’s objection-only discovery responses to form and special interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions for the purpose of showing that the responses are devoid of facts tending to show recklessness, oppression, malice or fraudulent conduct on part of MCPA and that the latter is therefore entitled to summary adjudication on the elder abuse cause of action, MCPA has misconstrued its burden in this regard as discussed above in connection with UMF No.

13. Here, the evidence MCPA offers as support for the “second” UMF No. 14 (the “responses” consisting solely of objections) fails to affirmatively demonstrate either that plaintiff currently has no evidence showing

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

recklessness, oppression, malice or fraudulent conduct on part of MCPA or that plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of obtaining evidence showing such conduct, thereby mandating denial of summary adjudication of the elder abuse cause of action regardless of whether the opposition has produced evidence showing the existence of any triable issue of material fact. Additionally, because defendant MCPA relies on this same “second” UMF No. 14 as support for summary adjudication on each of the remaining three causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must also be denied as to each of these three causes of action for the same reason.

UMF No.

16. Similar to the “second” UMF No. 14 discussed above, UMF No. 16 states that “Decedent has no clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director, or managing agent of [MCPA] authorized or ratified any wrongful conduct, or committed any oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent act or omission constituting neglect or abuse of Decedent,” with defendant MCPA again relying in large part upon plaintiff’s objectiononly responses to the former’s form and special interrogatories, requests for production and requests for admissions which are attached to the moving papers as Exhibit Nos. 19-22.

For the same reasons explained immediately above in connection with MCPA’s “second” UMF No. 14, MCPA’s reliance on such discovery responses falls short because these responses consist solely of objections and do not have any genuine evidentiary value. As such, they fail to demonstrate that statement that “Decedent has no clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director, or managing agent of [MCPA] authorized or ratified any wrongful conduct, or committed any oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent act or omission constituting neglect or abuse of Decedent” and defendant MCPA has failed to meet its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF No. 16 as well.

Additionally, to the extent these discovery responses are offered to show that plaintiff does not possess evidence sufficient to establish “an officer, director, or managing agent of [MCPA] authorized or ratified any wrongful conduct, or committed any oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent act or omission constituting neglect or abuse of Decedent” and that defendant MCPA is entitled to summary adjudication on the elder abuse cause of action, the moving papers are deficient because as explained above, a defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication must show more than the mere absence of essential evidence and specifically, the plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of obtaining the essential evidence. Here, the objection-only discovery responses do not adequately show that plaintiff has no evidence and/or no reasonable possibility of obtaining evidence to establish “an officer, director, or managing agent of [MCPA] authorized or ratified any wrongful conduct, or committed any oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent act or omission constituting neglect or abuse of Decedent.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00310038-CU-PO-GDS: Marshall Umanah, Conservator for Peace Umana vs. Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Mission Carmichael Post Acute, LLC dba Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center in Department 16D

Finally, because defendant MCPA relies on this same UMF No. 16 as support for summary adjudication on all four causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.13:22-28; p.15:14-19; p.18:24-28; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must for these reasons be denied as to all four causes of action regardless of whether the opposition has presented evidence sufficient to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact.

UMF No.

19. In this UMF, defendant MCPA asserts that it “owed no duty to Decedent at any time before August 1, 2021” and this stems from defendant MCPA’s primary assertion that it “neither owned nor operated Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center at the time of the incident” occurring in or about November 2019 (Mov. MPA, p.7:15-19) and thus “was not responsible for the care, services, staffing, policies, procedures, or day-to-day operations of Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center” at any time prior to 8/1/2021 (Id., at p.1:15-23).

However, as already explained, this argument is directly contradicted by defendant MCPA’s own UMF Nos. 4 and 8 as well as Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration which expressly indicate that MCPA “did provide healthcare services or treatment to any patient(s), including [decedent], at Mission Carmichael Healthcare Center before August 1, 2021” (underline added for emphasis) and that “on November 24, 2019, Decedent discharged back to Mission Carmichael Post Acute in stable condition” (underline added for emphasis).

In light of these directly conflicting assertions found in these two UMFs and in Paragraph 7 of the Johnson Declaration, the Court finds that defendant MCPA has failed to carry its initial burden of production in connection with UMF No. 19 and since this UMF was cited as support for summary adjudication on both of the last two causes of action (see, Mov. Sep. Stm., p.19:4-6; p.21:3-7), summary adjudication must be denied as to both the third and fourth causes of action.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, the present motion for summary adjudication must be denied as to all four causes of action alleged in the operative 1AC due to defendant MCPA’s failure to carry its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) with respect to each cause of action so as to mandate denial of both summary adjudication and summary judgment on the entirety of the 1AC. Accordingly, defendant MCPA’s motion is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)