D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al.

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

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Hon. Christopher E. Krueger Department 16C 916-874-7848

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant 4150FlorinPerkins LLC’s (“4150”) demurrer to plaintiff D7Roofing Services, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Plaintiff filed the operative 1AC on May 22, 2025, alleging ten causes of action as follows: (1) foreclosure of mechanics lien; (2) quantum meruit; (3) account stated; (4) monies due; (5) open book account; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of implied-in-fact contract; (8) breach of oral contract; (9) unjust enrichment; and (10) restitution from transferee based on quasi-contract and unjust enrichment.

Only the first, second, ninth, and tenth causes of action are alleged against 4150.

Generally, this action arises from a roofing project performed by Plaintiff at the real property located at 4150 Florin Perkins, Sacramento, California 95826 (the “Subject Property”). Plaintiff alleges it submitted a proposal to defendants Jacob Small and Tidal

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

Wave Properties LLC to complete roofing on 26 mechanical units, along with installation of curbs and flashing, for $70,000. (1AC, ¶¶ 8-9, Ex. A.) Mr. Small presented himself as the owner of the Subject Property. (1AC, ¶ 11.) The project was completed on September 12, 2024. Mr. Small and Tidal Wave Properties, LLC were billed, but the invoice was never paid. (1AC, ¶¶ 12-14, Ex. B.)

On November 13, 2024, a Claim of Mechanics Lien was recorded against the Subject Property in the County of Sacramento. (1AC, ¶ 15, Ex. C.) “On information and belief, at the time Defendant 4150FLORINPERKINS LLC purchased the Subject Property, it had actual or constructive knowledge of the work being performed by or completed by Plaintiff at the Subject Property.” (1AC, ¶ 16.) The 1AC does not allege the date upon which 4150 purchased the Subject Property.

4150 demurs to the first, second, ninth, and tenth causes of action on the ground that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Plaintiff has opposed. 4150 filed an untimely reply on April 29, 2026, which was one day late.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of court documents is granted insofar as the Court accepts the fact of their existence, not the truth of their contents. (See Professional Engineers v. Dep’t of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590 [judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true]; Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121 [“[W]hile the existence of any document in a court file may be judicially noticed, the truth of the matters asserted in those documents, including the factual findings of the judge who was sitting as the trier of fact, is not entitled to notice.”].)

Demurrer Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially dnoticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

First Cause of Action for Foreclosure of Mechanics Lien

4150 asserts the mechanics lien is invalid because there are no allegations that Plaintiff served any preliminary notice, or that Plaintiff served a preliminary notice to 4150, as required by Civil Code section 8410, which states, “[a] claimant may enforce a lien only if the claimant has given preliminary notice to the extent required by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 8200) and made proof of notice.” (Civ. Code § 8410.)

Civil Code section 8200 provides, “(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, before recording a lien claim, giving a stop payment notice, or asserting a claim against a payment bond, a claimant shall give preliminary notice to the following persons: (1) The owner or reputed owner.” Subsection (e) provides, “(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions: (2) A claimant with a direct contractual relationship with an owner or reputed owner is required to give preliminary notice only to the construction lender or reputed construction lender, if any.”

“A preliminary written notice to the property owner is a necessary prerequisite to the validity of a mechanic’s lien.” (Hub Construction Specialties, Inc. v. Esperanza Charities, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 855, 856; see Civ. Code, § 8200, subd. (c).) The purpose of the notice requirement is to “alert[] owners and lenders to the fact that the property or funds involved might be subject to claims arising from contracts to which they were not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

parties and would otherwise have no knowledge.” (Romak Iron Works v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 767, 778.) Thus, “the rule requiring [the] liberal construction [of mechanic’s lien laws] may not be applied to frustrate the Legislature’s manifested intent to exact strict compliance with the preliminary notice requirement.” (Id. at pp. 777- 778.)

The 1AC does not contain any allegations regarding service of a preliminary notice on any party, and Plaintiff’s argument that a preliminary notice was not required is unsupported, as discussed below.

Plaintiff contends that under Civil Code section 8200(e)(2), a preliminary notice is not required where the claimant has a direct contractual relationship with the owner or reputed owner of the property. A direct contractual relationship may also be established where an owner, though not formally a contracting party, has actual knowledge of the work being performed and fails to object. (Kim v. JF Enterprises (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 849, 855.)

Citing to paragraphs 43, 49, and 59 of the 1AC, Plaintiff asserts it has sufficiently alleged that it directly contracted with Mr. Small and Tidal Wave for the work performed on the Subject Property and that at the time 4150 acquired the Subject Property (which date is not specifically alleged), 4150 had actual or constructive knowledge of the improvements performed by Plaintiff. (1AC ¶¶ 43, 49, 59.) Thus, Plaintiff argues a preliminary notice was not required. The allegations Plaintiff relies upon, however, do not allege a direct contract was ever entered into.

The 1AC only alleges the existence of an implied-in-fact or oral contract between Plaintiff and Mr. Small and Tidal Wave for “additional work” or “supplemental scopes of work,” but Plaintiff has not set forth any legal authority that an implied-in-fact or oral contract constitutes a “direct contractual relationship” for purposes of the exemption found in section 8200(e)(2). The allegations also do not pertain to the original scope of work. Further, while Plaintiff alleges that a proposal was submitted to Mr.

Small and Tidal Wave, there are no allegations that the proposal was ever accepted or that a contract was ever formally signed to complete the work. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegation regarding 4150’s knowledge of the work performed states, “On information and belief, prior to purchasing the Subject Property, Defendant 4150FLORINPERKINS LLC had actual or constructive knowledge of the work being performed by or completed by Plaintiff at the Subject Property.” Even if the Court accepts this allegation as true, there are no allegations that 4150 failed to object to the work being performed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the allegations are sufficient pursuant to the exemption found in section 8200(e)(2) is rejected.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED based on the foregoing.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

The Court notes that Plaintiff also argues that 4150 previously sought to release the mechanics lien through a verified Petition for Release of Property From Lien Sacramento Superior Court Case, Case No. 25CV001402, which the Court denied on multiple grounds, and 4150 is now improperly challenging the validity of the mechanics lien at the demurrer stage. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) ¶ 1, Ex. A, Petition.) The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that 4150 is challenging the validity of lien via this argument rather than the sufficiency of the allegations. Further, the principles the Court applied in ruling on the petition for release are distinct from the principles that are applied on demurrer.

Due to the foregoing, the Court need not evaluate 4150’s additional arguments in support of the demurrer.

Second Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit

To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for services from the defendant, that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant, and that defendant has not paid for the services. (Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794; see also California Civil Jury Instruction (“CACI”) No. 371.)

4150 argues that the 1AC does not allege that 4150 ever requested that Plaintiff perform any roofing work on the Property, either explicitly or implicitly. The 1AC alleges only that Plaintiff submitted a proposal to Mr. Small and Tidal Wave Properties and that those defendants were billed for the work. Exhibits A and B of the Complaint also indicate that the proposals and invoices were only directed to Mr. Small and Tidal Wave Properties.

Plaintiff asserts that it has sufficiently alleged it provided the work in reliance on an implied request by 4150 because the 1AC alleges that, prior to purchasing the Subject Property, 4150 had actual or constructive knowledge that the work was being performed. (1AC, ¶¶ 51, 59.)

The Court disagrees that 4150’s alleged knowledge, prior to the purchase, that work was being performed sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff was acting pursuant to 4150’s implied request for services. Plaintiff does not allege any specific conduct undertaken by 4150 pursuant to which it could be implied that 4150 requested that the work be performed. Knowledge that work was being performed is not synonymous with a request to perform the work. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that 4150 was the owner at the time the work was performed, rendering Plaintiff’s additional legal authority

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

irrelevant.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Ninth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment

4150 demurs on the ground that “unjust enrichment” is not a cause of action.

Technically, there is no cause of action for “unjust enrichment.” (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793). In general, “one who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution.” (Professional Tax Appeal v. Kennedy- Wilson Holdings, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 230, 238.) Unjust enrichment is synonymous with restitution and is often treated as a “quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.” (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.) “Under the law of restitution, ‘[a]n individual is required to make restitution if he or she is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [Citations.] A person is enriched if the person receives a benefit at another’s expense. [Citations.]’” (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 389.)

Plaintiff asserts it has alleged it performed roofing work on the Subject Property, thereby increasing the Subject Property’s value, and Plaintiff has not been paid. (1AC, ¶¶ 9-14, 54.) Thus, Plaintiff asserts 4150 was unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of a new roof without compensating Plaintiff.

The 1AC only alleges that 4150 had “actual or constructive knowledge of the work being performed by or completed by Plaintiff” before buying the property (1AC, ¶ 59), and that it “accepted and retained the benefit conferred by Plaintiff” (1AC, ¶ 58). 4150 argues the mere allegation that a party, before buying a property, may have known that a contractor had completed some work or was performing some work does not constitute a factual allegation that a party was “unjustly” enriched.

The Court agrees with 4150 that alleging only that a party had knowledge that work was being completed on the property before it was purchased is insufficient to state a claim of unjust enrichment. Thus, the Court concludes that the 1AC fails to sufficiently state a claim for quantum meruit. The demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Tenth Cause of Action for Restitution Based on Quasi-Contract and Unjust Enrichment

4150 argues restitution is synonymous with unjust enrichment and, therefore, also fails for the same reason the ninth cause of action. 4150 also argues the 1AC does not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

allege any facts that would support a claim of unjust enrichment.

The parties raise the same arguments as those raised with respect to the ninth cause of action. Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED for the same reasons.

Conclusion

4150’s demurrer is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is granted because this is the first challenge to the pleading.

Plaintiff may file and serve a Second Amended Complaint on or before May 15, 2026.

Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint, or 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

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To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003152: D7 ROOFING SERVICES, INC. vs TIDAL WAVE PROPERTIES, LLC, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16C

available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

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