R.V. vs. The Regents of the University of California

Here, LC § 558.1 provides that certain persons “may be held liable as the employer for” specified wage-and-hour violations. Maresch and Lim-Valle may be treated as employers for purposes of some of Plaintiff’s claims. Under Boucher, CCL’s bankruptcy has no effect on claims against Maresch and Lim-Valle in their capacity as employers under LC § 558.1. The motion is therefore granted.

However, the Court has serious reservations about future proceedings. Plaintiff can likely prove Maresch and Lim-Valle’s managerial and ownership roles without implicating any bankruptcy issues. But how does Plaintiff intend to prove the class wage-and-hour claims? Under LC § 558.1, Maresch and Lim-Valle are only liable to the class if the class suffered wage-and-hour violations. For example, because of the automatic stay, Plaintiff can’t propound a request for production seeking all time and pay records for the class, because those are the property of the bankruptcy trustee.

Moreover, there are concerns about conflicting judgments. Again, Maresch and Lim-Valle are only liable to the class to the extent wage-and-hour violations occurred. Because CCL is in bankruptcy, any judgment in favor of the class or even the individual plaintiff can’t bind CCL. As a result, to the extent the class’s claims against CCL survive bankruptcy, it’s possible the trier of fact could find Maresch and Lim-Valle are liable for wage-and-hour violations, but a subsequent trier of fact could find CCL not liable because no such violations occurred. Such a result would be absurd and should be avoided.

9 R.V. vs. The Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint Regents of the The Regents of the University of California (“University”) demur to the University of negligence claims in the operative complaints of plaintiffs Jane Doe R.V. and California Jane Doe M.M., which are consolidated for pretrial purposes. As to R.V., the demurrer is OVERRULED AS MOOT because R.V. has dismissed her claims 2025-01493422 against the University with prejudice. (ROA 145.) As to M.M., the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (FAC) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

GROUNDS FOR RULING

Initially, the Court notes that M.M. contests only one of the several arguments raised by the University in its demurrer: she contends she has adequately alleged the University’s notice of Hoefs’ misconduct. The Court accordingly treats the University’s other arguments as conceded.

As to notice, M.M. alleges that she treated with Hoefs at UCI Medical Center from 1998 to 2001. She stopped treatment at that time “following a significant improvement in her medical condition.” (M.M. FAC, ¶ 31.) M.M. also alleges that complaints about Hoefs’ behavior were lodged “as early as 2016.” (M.M. FAC, ¶ 41.) Complaints made in 2016 cannot possibly have put the University on notice of Hoefs’ conduct when M.M. treated at the University from 1998 to 2001. In opposition, M.M. contends the reference to 2016 was merely illustrative, not the earliest possible date of notice. This argument ignores the language of the pleading, which says complaints were lodged “as early as 2016.”

The balance of M.M.’s opposition is directed at the University’s conduct surrounding a potential Second Amended Complaint. This argument is irrelevant to whether the FAC is subject to demurrer. Either M.M. has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or she has not.

For these reasons, the demurrer is sustained. Given Plaintiff’s admissions as to the dates of treatment at the University and when the University arguably was on notice of Hoefs’ misconduct, the Court does not see how the claims against the University can survive. Indeed, Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint does not include any amended allegations that will cure