Raymond James Finacial Services, Inc vs. Robinson

Nevertheless, the Court in its discretion shall grant leave for Plaintiff to file such an amendment.

Plaintiffs shall have 21 days leave to amend the complaint.

The Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to March 18, 2027, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C12.

CASA to give notice.

13. Raymond James Motion for Preliminary Injunction Finacial Services, Inc vs. Robinson Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. [“Raymond James”] and Yvan Huu Cao’s motion for a preliminary injunction against 26-01563657 defendant Paul Stewart Robinson from prosecuting FINRA Arbitration Case No. 26-00105, and for related declaratory relief that no agreement or enforceable obligation to arbitrate exists as to Robinson’s claims under FINRA Rule 12200, is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a) [authorizing injunctive relief]; Costa Mesa City Employees' Assoc. v.

City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306 [“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits ... [i]f the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then we must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether the trial court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction should be upheld: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction;’” internal citations omitted]; O'Connell v.

Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 moving party has burden “to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction”].)

Moving parties’ request for judicial notice [RJN] is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d), (h).) As to Exs. A, A-1 through A-5, and C judicial notice is limited to the fact that the documents were filed, but not of the truth of their contents. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1) [court records]; Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400 [“Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents;” emphasis in original, internal citation omitted]; In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314 [“while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice

of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files”]; Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, FN 7 [judicial notice of truth of matters in court records ordinarily limited to “orders, statements of decision, and judgments”].)

As to injunctive relief, moving parties have not shown a probability of prevailing on the merits of their cause of action for declaratory relief. (Costa Mesa City Employees' Assoc. v. City of Costa Mesa, supra at 305-306.) Moving parties contend that defendant does not have standing under their client agreement with decedent Patricia Robinson to pursue arbitration before FINRA, having been divested of trust beneficiary status, and further does not qualify as a customer under FINRA Rule 12200. (Moving papers at 7:4-10:7; see also Ex. D to Cao Decl. [client agreement].)

The client agreement includes an arbitration provision stating:

Any dispute or controversy, either arising in the future or in existence now, between me and you (including your officers, directors, employees or agents and the introducing broker, if applicable) will be resolved by arbitration conducted before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the FINRA Arbitration Code, and in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code). (Ex. D to Cao Decl., p. 9, ¶ (a).)

The client agreement defines “me” as “the undersigned and any other actual or beneficial owner of property in this account.” (Id., p. 6, first paragraph; emphasis added.) However, moving parties have not shown that defendant was not, or is not, a “beneficial owner” of any property in any account, as they contend.

First, there is no evidence that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the 2011 Client Agreement, Plaintiffs would provide investment, securities, and financial planning services and invest the Trusts’ assets for the beneficiaries of the Trusts.” (Moving papers at 3:14-16, 8:4-19.) The client agreement (Cao Decl., Ex. D) only lists Patricia Robinson as an individual, not as a trustee of either the Family Bypass Trust or the Surviving Spouse’s Trust (RJN, Ex. A-2). The client agreement is also heavily redacted, and there is no way to determine the source of any assets in the accounts, or that their purpose was to manage assets of either Trust. Nor is there any other evidence supporting moving parties’ contention that the client agreement pertained to financial planning and investment of the assets of either Trust, as represented in

the moving papers. (Gilman v. Dalby (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 923, 940 [“statements in motions are not evidence”].)

Second, even if moving parties had provided evidence that the client agreement pertained to Trust assets, their standing argument relies on a “First Amendment and Restatement of The Wholly Amended Robinson Family Surviving Spouse’s Trust Agreement Dated January 9, 2006” which removed defendant as a beneficiary of that Trust. (RJN, Ex. A-4.) However, judicial notice of this document is limited to the fact that it was filed, as stated above, and plaintiffs have not provided any other evidence authenticating it, or showing its validity and truthfulness.

Further, defendant’s Petition in Case No. 2023- 01341473 disputes that this document was valid, based on Patricia Robinson’s alleged history of dementia and head trauma, as well as Madeleine Robinson’s alleged undue influence. (RJN Ex. A, ¶¶ 17- 20, 35-37; see also Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114–115 [“For a court to take judicial notice of the meaning of a document ... based on the document alone, without allowing the parties an opportunity to present extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the document, would be improper”].)

Third, moving parties have not provided any evidence that defendant was ever removed as a beneficiary of the “Family Bypass Trust.” (RJN, Ex. A-1, Article 3 [division of trust upon death of first settlor], Article 6 [“At the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall distribute the remaining trust estate to the settlors' then-living descendants, by right of representation”]; see also RJN Ex. A-2 [declaration of trust split acknowledging both trusts].)

Plaintiffs also contend that defendant is not entitled to seek arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 because he is not and was not a client or customer. However, this argument relies on the same purported lack of beneficiary status (moving papers at 7:12-8:21), which arguments fail as discussed above.

Moving parties have also not shown that the settlement agreement in Case No. 2023-01341473 estops defendant from seeking arbitration, inasmuch as moving parties were not parties to that action, nor did defendant assert any claims against them. (CytoDyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 288, 299, fn. 9, citing Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986- 987 [judicial estoppel elements]; In re Marriage of Brinkman (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1289 [traditional estoppel elements].)

Moving parties also fail to show any purported irreparable harm, other than costs to be incurred in defending the FINRA arbitration, which is

generally insufficient absent exceptions not present here [such as insolvency or to prevent dissipation of specified funds]. (Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565 [“an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff”].)

Finally, as to the request for “related declaratory relief that no agreement or enforceable obligation to arbitrate exists,” moving parties cite no authority allowing this court to issue declaratory relief on an ordinary noticed motion. (Nisei Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1019– 1020 [trial court properly denied motion for “partial declaratory relief ... on the procedural ground that there is no stand-alone dispositive motion for declaratory relief authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure or elsewhere, and the trial court pointed out that if plaintiffs wanted to pursue such relief by a motion procedure it should have done so under the recognized process of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or a motion for summary judgment or adjudication”].)

The Case Management Conference is VACATED, and this case is set for a Court Trial on November 5, 2027, at 11:00 a.m. in Department C12.

Defendant shall give notice.