Markus Petty v. FEDEX Corporation

TENTATIVE RULING FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 2026 Department R12 - Judge Kory Mathewson Markus Petty v. FEDEX Corporation – CIVRS2601686 Motion(s): (1) Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction; and (2) Demurrer Movant(s): (1) Defendant FedEx Corporation; (2) Defendants FedEx Corporation and Federal Express Corporation Respondent(s): (1),(2) Plaintiff Markus Petty Ruling: (1) Motion to Quash is CONTINUED to ___________ to permit the limited jurisdictional discovery consistent with the Court’s limitations described. (2) Demurrer is CONTINUED to _____________. The Court GRANTS Leave to Amend the Complaint. (1), (2) PLAINTIFF to provide Order and give notice. ______________________________________________________________________________

The Court’s Register of Actions reflects that Plaintiff attempted to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on April 17, 2026, that was rejected because an Answer had already been filed. There being no FAC on file affects the demurrer, however, it does not preclude consideration of the motion to quash, which challenges the Court’s personal jurisdiction over FedEx Corp. following service of the original summons and complaint.

(1) MOTION TO QUASH

FedEx Corp. moves to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing it is a Delaware holding company headquartered in Tennessee, did not employ Plaintiff, and did not control FedEx’s day to day operations or employment decisions.

Plaintiff relies on agency and alter ego theories and alternatively requests limited jurisdictional discovery concerning FedEx Corp.’s role in California employment and safety policies.

General Jurisdiction The present record does not support general jurisdiction over FedEx Corporation. FedEx Corp. is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Tennessee. (Waits Decl. ¶ 4.) Its only California employees are three government affairs employees in Sacramento. (Waits Decl. ¶ 6.) Nothing presently before the Court suggests this is the exceptional case in which a corporation is otherwise “at home” in California. (Daimler AG, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 137-139.)

Plaintiff relies on an agency or “representative services” theory based on FedEx’s California operations. Under that theory, a subsidiary’s forum contacts historically could be attributed to a foreign parent where the subsidiary performed services sufficiently important to the parent that, absent the subsidiary, the parent would undertake those activities itself. (F. Hoffman- La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 797-798.) That theory does not establish general jurisdiction merely because a subsidiary conducts substantial business in

California. The governing inquiry is whether FedEx Corp.’s own affiliations with California render it essentially at home here. They do not.

Specific Jurisdiction Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing specific jurisdiction over FedEx Corp. Brandon Waits, employed by FedEx as a Vice President, Human Resources, and who also serves as Treasurer for FedEx Corp., declares that FedEx maintains its own operations and management personnel, while FedEx Corp. does not participate in the supervision or direction of FedEx employees, application of employment policies, discipline, investigations, disability accommodations, or day to day working conditions. He further declares that FedEx Corp. did not employ Plaintiff or participate in employment decisions concerning him. (Waits Decl. ¶¶ 8-12.)

Plaintiff submitted no declaration or authenticated documentary evidence contradicting that showing. Instead, Plaintiff relies on allegations contained in the purported FAC that FedEx Corp. formulated enterprise-wide employment and safety policies governing the Facility and used FedEx as its California operational instrumentality. Because the FAC was never filed, those allegations are not part of the operative pleading. In any event, allegations in an unverified pleading are insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s evidentiary burden on a motion to quash. (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.)

The evidence likewise does not establish a basis to attribute FedEx’s California contacts to FedEx Corp. A parent corporation is not subject to jurisdiction merely because its subsidiary conducts business in California; the ownership and oversight ordinarily associated with a parent subsidiary relationship are insufficient. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 541-542.) Plaintiff must instead show either forum related conduct by FedEx Corp. itself or a sufficient basis for treating FedEx’s relevant California conduct as that of FedEx Corp.

Plaintiff’s alter ego theory also fails for the same evidentiary reason. The asserted common officers and directors, consolidated financial reporting, unified branding, and inequitable result are allegations contained in the purported FAC, not competent jurisdictional evidence. Plaintiff therefore has not established the unity of interest and inequitable result necessary to disregard the entities’ separate corporate identities. (Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 538-540.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established specific jurisdiction over FedEx Corp.

Because Plaintiff has not established the threshold contacts necessary for specific jurisdiction, the parties’ competing arguments concerning whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable need not be resolved at this stage. That issue may be addressed, if necessary, following jurisdictional discovery.

Jurisdictional Discovery Plaintiff alternatively requests a 60-day continuance to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. A plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction generally is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery concerning jurisdictional facts. (Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911.) Whether to continue a motion to quash for that purpose lies

within the Court’s discretion. (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) A continuance is warranted where the plaintiff demonstrates that the proposed discovery is likely to lead to evidence establishing jurisdiction. (Automobile Antitrust Case, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.)

Plaintiff identifies specific discovery concerning FedEx Corp.’s internal organizational structure, employment and workplace safety policies applicable to FedEx’s California facilities, and communications between the entities concerning the Chino facility or California operations. Plaintiff also seeks financial consolidation records. These subjects are directed to Plaintiff’s theory that FedEx Corp. itself exercised control over employment and safety policies relevant to the claims asserted here.

FedEx Corp. responds that Plaintiff has identified no evidence suggesting discovery would contradict Waits’s declaration, did not pursue jurisdictional discovery while the motion was pending, and is merely seeking to uncover a basis for jurisdiction that he has not otherwise established. However, the question is whether Plaintiff has identified a non-speculative avenue of inquiry likely to produce evidence bearing on jurisdiction. He has.

The proposed inquiry into which entity formulated, approved, or directed the employment and workplace safety policies applicable to the Chino facility bears directly on whether FedEx Corp. engaged in forum related conduct connected to Plaintiff’s claims. The same is true of discovery concerning the relevant reporting and decision-making relationships between FedEx Corp. and FedEx. Those matters are principally within Defendants’ possession and are not facts Plaintiff reasonably could be expected to establish without discovery.

The request is therefore distinguishable from one based only on the hope that some jurisdictional facts may emerge. Plaintiff has identified discrete categories of information tied to the specific jurisdictional issues raised by FedEx Corp.’s evidence.

The discovery, however, should be confined to matters bearing directly on personal jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff may conduct discovery concerning: (1) FedEx Corp.’s role, if any, in formulating, approving, directing, or implementing employment, human resources, workplace safety, or operational policies applicable to FedEx’s California operations or the Chino facility during the relevant period; (2) the corporate reporting and decision-making relationships relevant to those subjects; and (3) communications between FedEx Corp. and FedEx concerning those policies or operations. However, broad financial discovery concerning consolidated accounting or liabilities is not sufficiently connected to the specific jurisdiction inquiry.

Consequently, the motion to quash is continued to permit the limited jurisdictional discovery described above.

(2) DEMURRER Defendants FedEx Corp. and FedEx demur to Plaintiff’s purported FAC. Both the demurrer and Plaintiff’s opposition proceed on the premise that a FAC was filed and is the operative pleading. However, the Register of Actions reflects otherwise. Plaintiff attempted to

file a FAC, but the filing was rejected on April 17, 2026 because Scannell had already answered the original complaint and leave of court was required.

Accordingly, the February 23, 2026 complaint remains the operative pleading. Defendants’ demurrer, however, is expressly directed to the FAC, and the parties’ briefing addresses allegations contained in that proposed pleading rather than the operative complaint. Plaintiff’s opposition likewise repeatedly relies on allegations in the purported FAC.

Under these circumstances, the merits of the demurrer are not properly before the Court. As a remedy, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file the FAC given the parties have proceeded as if the FAC is on file, no prejudice is demonstrated, and judicial economy warrants it. The hearing on the Demurrer will be continued so the Court may properly review the FAC once filed.

Dated: September 4, 2026

____________________________ Judge Kory Mathewson

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