STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Tentative Ruling

NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED

Defendants Wise Automotive Management, Inc.; Wise Automotive, Inc.; Anthony A. Batarse, Inc. dba Hyundai of Vacaville; and Anthony A. Batarse Motors, Inc. (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) petition to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is ruled upon as follows.

Overview

On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff Rockford Stanley (“Plaintiff”) filed his wage and hour class action Complaint against Moving Defendants alleging the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide or make available meal periods and meal premiums; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods and rest premiums; (5) failure to provide timely and accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to timely pay all wages upon separation; and (7) unlawful business practices.

On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) to add the additional named Defendants Wise Vision, Inc.; Wise North Bay Inc. dba North Bay Nissan; Wise Riders Inc. dba Yuba HD; Wise San Mateo, Inc. dba Golden State Nissan; Wise Vallejo Inc. dba Vallejo Hyundai; and Lloyd A. Wise Motors, Inc. dba Nissan of Vacaville (with Moving Defendants, collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he was a former hourly, non-exempt employee of Defendants, employed as an hourly mechanic from October 15, 2021 to January 17, 2025, in Vacaville, CA. (1AC ¶¶ 1 & 6.)

On December 19, 2025, Moving Defendants filed a Notice of Related Case identifying the case ROCKFORD STANLEY v. ANTHONY A. BATARSE, INC. et al. (Case No. CU25-08416) pending in the Solano County Superior Court as involving the same parties and being based on the same or similar claims.

On December 19, 2025, Moving Defendants filed the instant Petition to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Class Claims, and Stay Proceedings.

On July 9, 2026, Moving Defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in support of their petition to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed objection and moved to strike the Notice of Supplemental Authority. On July 17, 2026, the Court continued the hearing of this matter to permit the Parties supplemental briefing to address the authority identified

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

in the Moving Defendants in the Notice of Supplemental Authority. The Parties have filed their respective supplemental briefing, which the Court considers in its ruling herein. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection to Moving Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority is OVERRULED. The Court proceeds to the merits.

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Cari Desiderio on grounds of hearsay, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, and failure to authenticate the Agreement are OVERRULED.

As is further addressed below, on a petition to compel, the moving party satisfies its initial burden by attaching a copy of the agreement purportedly bearing the opponent’s signature; it need not follow the ordinary procedures of document authentication at that stage. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755.) Furthermore, Ms. Desiderio attests that she is the custodian of records on behalf of the Company. (Desiderio Decl. ¶ 4.) To the extent that Plaintiff’s objections regard lack of personal knowledge and lack of foundation, a records custodian need not have been present or employed when a document was signed in order to authenticate a document maintained in the company’s files, which is precisely the case here. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.)

The Arbitration Agreement

Moving Defendants proffer that Plaintiff entered into “at least two written agreements” to arbitration – the first, in connection with his Application for Employment, which Plaintiff completed through the Company’s online job application portal, and which Plaintiff electronically signed on October 7, 2020. (Desidrio Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 1.) Pertinent here, Moving Defendants contend that on October 20, 2020, Plaintiff physically signed, by hand and in ink, the second arbitration agreement – the Hyundai Vacaville Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement” or “Arbitration Agreement”) – which Moving Defendants contend Plaintiff signed during his onboarding with the Company. (Id. at ¶ 8 [citing Pet. Exh. A].)

The Arbitration Agreement provides the following:

As a condition of my employment with HYUNDAI VACAVILLE its subsidiaries, affiliates, successors or assigns (together, the 'Company'), and in consideration of my employment with the Company and my receipt of the compensation now and hereafter paid to me by Company, I agree to the following provisions of this

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Arbitration Agreement (this “Agreement”):

1. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF

A. Arbitration. IN CONSIDERATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY, ITS PROMISE TO ARBITRATE ALL EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISPUTES, AND MY RECEIPT OF THE COMPENSATION, PAY RAISES, AND OTHER BENEFITS PAID TO ME BY THE COMPANY, AT PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE, I AGREE THAT ANY AND ALL CONTROVERSIES, CLAIMS, OR DISPUTES WITH ANYONE (INCLUDING THE COMPANY AND ANY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, DIRECTOR, SHAREHOLDER, OR BENEFIT PLAN OF THE COMPANY, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH OR OTHERWISE), ARISING OUT OF, RELATING TO, OR RESULTING FROM MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY OR THE TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY, INCLUDING ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT, SHALL BE SUBJECT TO BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER THE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 1280 THROUGH 1294.2 (THE 'ACT'), AND PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA LAW.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT SHALL CONTINUE TO APPLY WITH FULL FORCE AND EFFECT NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES SET FORTH IN THE ACT. DISPUTES THAT I AGREE TO ARBITRATE, AND THEREBY AGREE TO WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, INCLUDE ANY STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER LOCAL, STATE, OR FEDERAL LAW, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT, THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT, THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE, CLAIMS OF HARASSMENT, DISCRIMINATION, AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION, AND ANY STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW CLAIMS.

NOTWITHSTANDING THE FORGOING, I UNDERSTAND THAT NOTHING IN THIS AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF MY RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY DISPUTES THAT THE COMPANY MAY HAVE WITH ME.

B. Class and Collective Action Waiver. THE PARTIES AGREE TO BRING

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

ANY DISPUTE IN ARBITRATION ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS ONLY. THIS AGREEMENT PROHIBITS THE PARTIES FROM FILING, OPTING INTO, BECOMING A CLASS MEMBER IN, OR RECOVERING THROUGH A CLASS ACTION OR COLLECTIVE ACTION. THERE WILL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY DISPUTE TO BE BROUGHT, HEARD, OR ARBITRATED AS A CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION. THIS CLASS/COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVER SHALL NOT BE SEVERABLE FROM THIS AGREEMENT IN ANY LAWSUIT IN WHICH (I) THE COMPLAINT IS FILED AS A CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION AND (II) THE CIVIL COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN WHICH THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED FINDS THE CLASS/COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVER IS UNENFORCEABLE (AND SUCH FINDING IS CONFIRMED BY APPELLATE REVIEW IF REVIEW IS SOUGHT).

IN SUCH INSTANCES, THE CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION MUST BE LITIGATED IN A CIVIL COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND NOT AS A CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THIS AGREEMENT, ANY CLAIM THAT ALL OR PART OF THE CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVER IS INVALID, UNENFORCEABLE, UNCONSCIONABLE, VOID OR VOIDABLE MAY BE DETERMINED ONLY BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND NOT BY AN ARBITRATOR. THE CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVER SHALL BE SEVERABLE WHEN A DISPUTE IS FILED AS AN INDIVIDUAL ACTION AND SEVERANCE IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL ACTION PROCEEDS IN ARBITRATION.

C. Procedure. I AGREE THAT ANY ARBITRATION WILL BE ADMINISTERED BY JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVICES, INC. ('JAMS'), PURSUANT TO ITS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (THE 'JAMS RULES'), WHICH ARE AVAILABLE AT http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/ AND FROM HUMAN RESOURCES. I AGREE THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO DECIDE ANY MOTIONS BROUGHT BY ANY PARTY TO THE ARBITRATION, INCLUDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR ADJUDICATION, AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DEMURRERS, APPLYING THE STANDARDS SET FORTH UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. I AGREE THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL ISSUE A WRITTEN DECISION ON THE MERITS. I ALSO AGREE THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO AWARD ANY REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW, AND THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO THE PREVAILING PARTY, WHERE

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

PROVIDED BY APPLICABLE LAW. I AGREE THAT THE DECREE OR AWARD RENDERED BY THE ARBITRATOR MAY BE ENTERED AS A FINAL AND BINDING JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION THEREOF. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMPANY WILL PAY FOR ANY ADMINISTRATIVE OR HEARING FEES CHARGED BY THE ARBITRATOR OR JAMS EXCEPT THAT I SHALL PAY ANY FILING FEES ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ARBITRATION THAT I INITIATE, BUT ONLY SO MUCH OF THE FILING FEES AS I WOULD HAVE INSTEAD PAID HAD I FILED A COMPLAINT IN A COURT OF LAW. I AGREE THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL ADMINISTER AND CONDUCT ANY ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CALIFORNIA LAW, INCLUDING THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE, AND THAT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL APPLY SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CALIFORNIA LAW TO ANY DISPUTE OR CLAIM, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO RULES OF CONFLICT OF LAW.

TO THE EXTENT THAT THE JAMS RULES CONFLICT WITH CALIFORNIA LAW, CALIFORNIA LAW SHALL TAKE PRECEDENCE. I AGREE THAT ANY ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN SOLANO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA.

D. Remedy. EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY THE ACT AND THIS AGREEMENT, ARBITRATION SHALL BE THE SOLE, EXCLUSIVE, AND FINAL REMEDY FOR ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN ME AND THE COMPANY. ACCORDINGLY, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE ACT AND THIS AGREEMENT, NEITHER I NOR THE COMPANY WILL BE PERMITTED TO PURSUE COURT ACTION REGARDING CLAIMS THAT ARE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.

E. Administrative Relief. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT ME FROM PURSUING AN ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM WITH A LOCAL, STATE, OR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BODY OR GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT IS AUTHORIZED TO ENFORCE OR ADMINISTER LAWS RELATED TO EMPLOYMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OR THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD. THIS AGREEMENT DOES, HOWEVER, PRECLUDE ME FROM PURSUING COURT ACTION REGARDING ANY SUCH CLAIM, EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY LAW.

F. Voluntary Nature of Agreement. I ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

THAT I AM EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT ANY DURESS OR UNDUE INFLUENCE BY THE COMPANY OR ANYONE ELSE. I ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE TEXT OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE SECTION 2870 IN EXHIBIT B. I FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THIS AGREEMENT AND THAT I HAVE ASKED ANY QUESTIONS NEEDED FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND THE TERMS, CONSEQUENCES, AND BINDING EFFECT OF THIS AGREEMENT AND FULLY UNDERSTAND IT, INCLUDING THAT I AM WAIVING MY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. FINALLY, I AGREE THAT I HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY OF MY CHOICE BEFORE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.

2. Governing Law; Consent to Personal Jurisdiction. This Agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of California without regard to California's conflicts of law rules that may result in the application of the laws of any jurisdiction other than California. To the extent that any lawsuit is permitted under this Agreement, I hereby expressly consent to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state and federal courts located in California for any lawsuit filed against me by the Company.

3. Assignability. This Agreement will be binding upon my heirs, executors, assigns, administrators, and other legal representatives, and will be for the benefit of the Company, its successors, its assigns, and third-party beneficiaries, including the Company's owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, partners, attorneys, sister-companies, subsidiaries, and parent companies. These claims also include any claims arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other association with the Company or third-party beneficiaries, whether based on tort, contract, statute, equity or otherwise.

There are no intended third-party beneficiaries to this Agreement, except as have been expressly stated herein. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Company may assign this Agreement and its rights and obligations under this Agreement to any successor to all or substantially all of the Company's relevant assets, whether by merger, consolidation, reorganization, reincorporation, sale of assets or stock, or otherwise.

4. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with any executed written offer letter and any agreement pertaining to confidential or proprietary information and intellectual property assignment between me and the Company, to the extent such materials are not in conflict with this Agreement, sets forth the entire

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

agreement and understanding between the Company and me with respect to the subject matter herein and supersedes all prior written and oral agreements, discussions, or representations between us, including, but not limited to, any representations made during my interview(s) or relocation negotiations. I represent and warrant that I am not relying on any statement or representation not contained in this Agreement. Any subsequent change or changes in my duties, salary, or compensation will not affect the validity or scope of this Agreement.

5. Severability. If a court or other body of competent jurisdiction finds, or the Parties mutually believe, any provision of this Agreement, or portion thereof, to be invalid or unenforceable, such provision will be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to effect the intent of the Parties, and the remainder of this Agreement will continue in full force and effect.

6. Modification, Waiver. No modification of or amendment to this Agreement, nor any waiver of any rights under this Agreement, will be effective unless in a writing signed by the President or CEO of the Company and me. Waiver by the Company of a breach of any provision of this Agreement will not operate as a waiver of any other or subsequent breach.

7. Survivorship. The rights and obligations of the parties to this Agreement will survive termination of my employment with the Company. (Petition Exh. A (“Agreement”) pp. 1-4 [emphasis in original].)

Legal Standard

Both federal and state law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97; accord, Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 889.) Under California law, a written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable consistent with standard contract principles. There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Code Civ. Proc., §1281; Madden v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706.) On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third

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25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Federal law is fully consistent with these principles. As the United States Supreme Court explained more than twenty years ago, “Because the Federal Arbitration Act is ‘at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,’ we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute—not to broader policy considerations—in determining the scope of the agreement.” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19 [citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 294].) “For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (Id. [citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582].)

As such, “under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p.1518.) “A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [citation omitted].)

Discussion

Through their petition, Moving Defendants request the Court to compel Plaintiff’s individual claims against them to arbitration, dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims, and stay the action pending arbitration. (Petition pp. 9:11-10:4.)

In opposition, Plaintiff contends (1) that the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) applies instead of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”); (2) because the CAA applies, under Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, the Class Action Waiver in the Agreement is unlawful; (3) the petition should be denied because Moving Defendants fail to present competent evidence of any Arbitration Agreement; (4) there is no enforceable Agreement because it lacked mutual assent or is void due to fraud; and (5) the Agreement is unconscionable. The Court addresses each of these issues in turn below.

Formation – Existence of an Arbitration Agreement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

California courts apply a three-step burden-shifting framework to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-166.) First, the moving party bears the burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.) By attaching a copy of a signed arbitration agreement to its petition to compel arbitration, a defendant satisfies its initial burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Espejo v.

Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058-1059; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Here, Moving Defendants proffer a copy of the Agreement bearing Plaintiff’s handwritten signature. (Agreement p. 4.) The Court finds this sufficient to satisfy Moving Defendants’ initial burden of establishing the existence of an Agreement.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.) In opposition, Plaintiff raises contentions pertaining to the formation of the Agreement – that he does not remember signing an arbitration agreement when he applied online, that he was rushed, no one invited him to ask questions about the documents, etc. (Stanley Decl. ¶¶ 4-15.) The Court does not find that Plaintiff has created a dispute as to the authenticity or formation of the Agreement.

Notably, Plaintiff does not deny that the handwritten signature on the Agreement is his. (See id. at ¶ 17.) An individual is capable of recognizing his own handwritten signature; where a party confronted with that signature cannot allege it is inauthentic or forged, the fact that he does not recall signing “neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 758; see also Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 825-826 [agreeing with Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th, that inability to recall signing the document does not create dispute as to authenticity of handwritten signature].)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s alternative theory, that the Agreement was void for fraud in the execution (Opp’n pp. 9:27-10:9 [citing Stanley Decl. ¶¶ 4-16), also fails. A contract is void for fraud in the execution only where the signer was deceived as to the nature of his act and neither knew nor had a reasonable opportunity to know the character or essential terms of the writing. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415.) Even considering Plaintiff’s proffered evidence, Plaintiff does not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

identify any affirmative misrepresentation about the nature of the Agreement, and which was itself titled “Hyundai Vacaville Arbitration Agreement.” In sum, the Court finds that an enforceable agreement was formed.

Application of the Federal Arbitration Act/California Arbitration Act

Next, the Parties dispute whether the substantive provisions of the CAA or the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) apply. A voluntary election of the FAA turns on the specificity of the governing-law language. Where an agreement contains an “express proviso that ‘Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the [FAA],’” that specific directive controls. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 350.) But, general or permissive references to arbitration law do not affect such an election, and the FAA’s provisions “do not apply unless the contract contains a choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them.” (Id. at p. 345.)

The Agreement here expressly provides that “THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT SHALL CONTINUE TO APPLY WITH FULL FORCE AND EFFECT NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES SET FORTH IN THE ACT.” (Agreement ¶1(A).) The Court finds that provision controls and that the FAA governs. As such, the Court need not address the issue of interstate-commerce as the FAA governs by the parties’ express contractual election.

Additionally, having found that the FAA governs, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments based upon Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th 443 as the FAA preempts Gentry’s rule against employment class waivers and forecloses state rules that condition enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class wide procedures. (Garrido v. Air Liquide Industrial U.S. LP (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 833, 837–838; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 344, 352.)

Unconscionability

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is unenforceable because it was unconscionable. The Court may refuse to enforce any contract or provision of a contract deemed to be unconscionable. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5.) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) “But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards to the regularity of the procedural process of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ In other words, the more

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) Plaintiff has the burden to prove unconscionability. (Jenks, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.)

Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion. Plaintiff contends that the Arbitration Agreement was a condition for employment and presented to Plaintiff on a “take-it or leave-it basis.”

In the employment context, the inequality of bargaining power between an employee and an employer is sufficient on its own to demonstrate procedural unconscionability in an employment contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533-34.) “[I]n the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by the employer on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration agreement.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 115.)

Here, it appears that the Arbitration Agreement is adhesive. (See Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.) In any event, “cases uniformly agree that a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2015) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127; see Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 179.) Moreover, “where the arbitration provisions presented in a contract of adhesion are highlighted for the employee, any procedural unconscionability is ‘limited.’” (Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.) The Court finds a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability. As such, the Court must next turn to whether Plaintiff has established a high degree of substantive unconscionability.

Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability “focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” (Kinney, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [internal quotations omitted].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) the Agreement is overbroad as to the one-sided nature of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

the scope of covered claims; (2) the Agreement requires Plaintiff to arbitrate a “neverending” list of claims against non-signatory, unnamed beneficiaries; and (3) the Agreement applies for an indefinite duration.

i. Overbroad – Scope; Lack of Mutuality

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable as it extends its protections to broad swaths of third-party beneficiaries. (Opp’n, p. 12:21-22.) Referencing the language from the Agreement which states, “ANYONE (INCLUDING THE COMPANY AND ANY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, DIRECTOR, SHAREHOLDER, OR BENEFIT PLAN OF THE COMPANY, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH OR OTHERWISE),” including “any claims arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other association with the Company or third-party beneficiaries . . .” Plaintiff contends that, analogous to the case Cook v.

University of Southern California, he must arbitrate any and all claims against the defendant and its “related entities,” without requiring the “related entities” to arbitrate their claims against him. (Id. at pp. 12:21-13:10 [citing Agreement ¶ 1(A); Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 326-328].) Plaintiff contends that the “blatantly unjustified and non mutual terms render the Purported Agreement substantively unconscionable.” (Opp’n, p. 14:3-4.)

The Court finds the language referenced in the Agreement to be distinguishable from Cook. In Cook, the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in holding that the agreement’s broad scope was substantively unconscionable – the Cook court considered the express terms of the agreement, which required Cook to arbitrate “all claims, whether or not arising out of Employee’s University employment . . .” and found that Cook was required to arbitrate claims unrelated to her employment with USC. (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 317, 321, 325 [emphasis added].)

Of import, the referenced language here is expressly tethered to the employment relationship: “IN CONSIDERATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY, ITS PROMISE TO ARBITRATE ALL EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISPUTES . . . I AGREE THAT ANY AND ALL CONTROVERSIES, CLAIMS, OR DISPUTES WITH ANYONE (INCLUDING THE COMPANY AND ANY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER, DIRECTOR, SHAREHOLDER, OR BENEFIT PLAN OF THE COMPANY, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH OR OTHERWISE), ARISING OUT OF, RELATING TO, OR RESULTING FROM MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY OR THE TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY . . .” (Agreement ¶ 1(A) [emphasis added].)

In Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 241, the appellate court,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

reviewing language requiring arbitration “of all claims, disputes, and/or controversies (collectively ‘claims’), whether or not arising out of [Ayala-Ventura]'s employment or the termination of employment,” concluded that the agreement was still limited to employment-related disputes. In contrast,the Cook agreement “was unconscionable in part because of the multifarious ways in which a claim against USC ‘completely unrelated to [Cook's] employment’ could arise.” (Ayala-Ventura, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 255-257.) Accordingly, the concern identified in Cook, that an employee could be compelled to arbitrate future non-employment-related claims against USC-affiliated entities, such as medical malpractice claims, is not present here because the Agreement is expressly limited to employment-related disputes.

In Cocom, the Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement requiring the employee to arbitrate claims against the employer's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees, clients, and vendors was not substantively unconscionable for lack of mutuality, because the agreement was limited to employment-related disputes. (Cocom v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (9th Cir. 2026) 179 F.4th 1168, 1178 [“but the fact that the MAA is limited to employment-related claims achieves a similar result.

Just as in Ayala- Ventura, claims Cocom may have against third parties ‘unrelated to their role’ in ABM would not be covered by the MAA. [Citation.] Because of the MAA's more limited scope, the lack-of-mutuality analysis here is much more similar to Ayala-Ventura than to Cook, and any lack of mutuality does not rise to the level of substantive unconscionability.”] [citing Ayala-Ventura, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th].)

In sum, the Court does not find the scope overly broad as applied to the pleaded wageand-hour and related claims. Further, the Court finds that the Agreement retains the modicum of bilaterality the law requires. (Ayala-Ventura, supra,119 Cal.App.5th at p. 258 [citing Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 120].) Plaintiff has not established any degree of substantive unconscionability on this basis.

ii. Overbroad – Duration

Plaintiff also contends that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable as it purports to last indefinitely. Pointing to the language in the Agreement, identifying claims covered as “past, present, or future” claims, Plaintiff contends that there is no temporal limitation, and such terms of indefinite duration are substantively unconscionable. (Opp’n, p. 14:6- 9 [citing Agreement ¶ 1(A)].)

The Ayala-Ventura the court reviewed similar language and arguments:

This more limited potential claims bears on Ayala-Ventura’s claim the Agreement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

is unconscionable because it is infinite in duration. The Agreement states it “shall survive the termination of [Ayala-Ventura’s] employment. It can only be revoked or modified by a writing signed by [Ayala-Ventura] and the Human Resources Representative of the Company that specifically states an intent to revoke or modify this Arbitration Agreement.” Ayala-Ventura argues this language is substantially the same as the language the Cook court found unconscionable because the agreement survived indefinitely following the plaintiff employee’s termination.

Specifically, the agreement in Cook provided it “‘shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment, and may only be revoked or modified in a written document that expressly refers to the “Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” and is signed by the President of the University.’” (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Though the Agreement’s language is substantially like that in Cook, we reiterate the importance of context in determining unconscionability. The various potential claims that could arise against USC together with the agreement’s infinite duration made it unconscionable.

Ayala-Ventura claims if she were injured in an automobile accident caused by one of CCS’s company vehicles 10 years after her employment, she would be compelled to arbitrate a claim. But without facts about the number of company vehicles generally in use by CCS, we are unable to assess the probability of this occurrence, which appears speculative at best. Nothing in the record indicates CCS’s operations have anything like the well-known, broad capacity of USC’s reach. Cook could be subject to the arbitration agreement forever in any manner of ways including not just a botched surgery but an injury while attending a USC football game in 15 years. (Ayala-Ventura, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 257-258 [emphasis added].)

The Court finds Ayala-Ventura persuasive. Namely, nothing properly before the Court indicates Defendant’s business operations are as multifaceted as USC’s (see Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 312). The Court is not persuaded that the Moving Defendants’ operations approach the breadth that made the indefinite duration unconscionable in Cook, where claims wholly unrelated to employment could arise for the remainder of Plaintiff’s life in any manner of ways. The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to establish a degree of substantive unconscionability on this ground.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability. Because the Court finds no substantive unconscionability, severance is not required, and the Court need not address the Parties’ arguments relating to severability.

Dismissal of Class Claims

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

As stated above, under the FAA, class action waivers are enforceable. (Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 525.) Moving Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims based on the Arbitration Agreement’s class action waiver. (Agreement ¶ 1(B).) For reasons further discussed above, Plaintiff’s class claims are DISMISSED pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement’s class action waiver.

Joinder

Defendants Wise Vision, Inc.; Wise North Bay Inc. dba North Bay Nissan; Wise Riders Inc. dba Yuba HD; Wise San Mateo, Inc. dba Golden State Nissan; Wise Vallejo Inc. dba Vallejo Hyundai; and Lloyd A. Wise Motors, Inc. dba Nissan of Vacaville (collectively “Joining Defendants”) have filed a notice of joinder to the Moving Defendants’ petition to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposes.

Pertinent here, only the Company (“Moving Defendants”) signed the Agreement (see Agreement p. 4), and thus, Joining Defendants seek to compel arbitration as nonsignatories under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Ntc. Joinder p. 2:11-12.) The Court finds the doctrine applies and that joinder is appropriate. Plaintiff’s claims against Joining Defendants (as non-signatories) are founded in, and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying obligations of the Agreement. (Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 111, 124; Soltero v. Precise Distribution, Inc. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 887, 893.) Plaintiff’s theory of liability against the Joining Defendants are based upon his allegations that they are his joint employers. (1AC ¶¶ 17-22.)

A joint employer’s liability derives solely from its share of the direct employer’s obligations, and those obligations derive from the employment relationship; a plaintiff’s joint-employer theory therefore inextricably intertwines his Labor Code claims with the employment agreement. (Gonzalez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 123.) A plaintiff may not group affiliated entities together as joint employers for purposes of liability while simultaneously disclaiming that relationship to avoid arbitration; the doctrine focuses on the nature of the claims rather than the plaintiff’s artful pleading of them as independent statutory violations. (Id. at p. 118.) The Court finds that joinder is appropriate, and thus, Joining Defendants notice of joinder is GRANTED. The Joining Defendants may enforce the Agreement.

Disposition

Moving Defendant’s petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED as set forth herein. Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate his individual claims against Moving Defendants.

Joining Defendant’s notice of Joinder is GRATNED. Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate his individual claims against Joining Defendants.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021180: STANLEY vs WISE AUTO MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. 09/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Plaintiff’s class allegations are DISMISSED. This action is STAYED pending the completion of the arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. All other scheduled hearings in this department are VACATED.

The Parties are to contact the Court and request a Case Management Conference within 15 days of receiving notice of a final decision in the arbitration proceeding.

To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 8A at (916) 874- 5754 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.)

If oral argument is requested, the parties may appear by Zoom with the links below:

To join by Zoom link – https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16108301121 To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864 / ID: 16108301121

Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to notice all parties of this order.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order or further notice is necessary.

The Court hereby lifts the stay imposed on Stay - Entire Action/Case imposed on 07/17/2026.

The case is ordered stayed pending binding arbitration as to the entire action.

All other scheduled hearings set in this department are ordered vacated.