Hooper vs. Coastal Animal Services Authority

12. Hooper vs. Coastal Animal Services Authority

26-01545384

Demurrer to Amended Complaint

Defendants, Coastal Animal Services Authority, City of Dana Point and City of San Clemente’s demurrer to each of the two causes of action in Daniel Hooper and Karlee Hooper’s First Amended Complaint is sustained in its entirety.

1st cause of action for Violation of California Constitutional Due Process

The Court agrees with CASA’s position that there is no constitutional tort cause of action for damages to remedy an asserted violation of the due process liberty interest under article I, section 7(a). Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300. The Katzberg court examined the drafting history of the state due process clause and concluded that it did not indicate an intent to permit an implied right of action for damages, and that a damages action was not contemplated by tort law.

The Court of Appeal in City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1077 applied Katzberg directly, confirming that a plaintiff may not sue for damages based on a violation of article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. Accordingly, a dog owner whose pet is wrongfully detained by a government actor cannot recover damages by invoking the state due process clause alone.

The Court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action.

2nd cause of action for negligence

Decisions to seize and impound dogs are discretionary acts that do not create mandatory duties enforceable through negligence claims.

In Danielson v. County of Humboldt (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1, the Court of Appeal examined a county ordinance provision authorizing animal control officers to seize and impound potentially dangerous dogs, finding it clearly discretionary because it stated the officer “may” seize and impound the dog and did not mandate seizing or impounding any dog. Similarly, in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.45h 543, the court held that even if an investigating officer had reviewed prior complaints in the animal control database, the county would not have had an obligation to petition the court to declare a dog potentially dangerous or to seize and impound a dog. The court emphasized that the duty in question involved permissive and discretionary decisions and conduct, distinguishing it from mandatory ministerial duties that could support

liability under Government Code section 815.6. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 543.

The discretionary nature of impoundment decisions means that a plaintiff generally cannot establish the mandatory duty element required for public entity liability under the Government Claims Act. Without a mandatory duty imposed by statute, a negligence claim against a city for wrongful detention fails as a matter of law.

But Hoopers have alleged a “mandatory” duty on the part of CASA that was allegedly breached. These allegations are at paragraphs 78- 80.

The Dana Point Municipal Code sections 10.05.020 and 10.05.030 require officials to investigate reports and review facts but still leave the ultimate determination of whether to seize the dog to the officer’s judgment about dangerousness or public safety. That duty remains discretionary and does not support a negligence claim. However, if the ordinance eliminates discretion by mandating seizure whenever specific factual criteria are met (for example, "shall seize any dog that has bitten a person on two occasions"), and the plaintiff can show the city failed to follow those mandatory procedures, a negligence claim under section 815.6 might survive.

The Court finds none of the “mandatory” language quoted in the complaint requires CASA to detain or release the subject dog. The statutory language requires CASA to investigate reports that an animal has attacked a person, review the applicable facts relating to such a report and to make determinations based upon that review and imposes mandatory limitations on pre-hearing impoundment.

The Court finds the allegations do not suffice to state a claim under Government Code section 815.6 because they describe duties that require the exercise of discretion rather than ministerial acts with clear implementing guidelines. Even when a statute uses mandatory language like “shall,” the duty remains discretionary if officials must exercise significant judgment in performing it.

Based on the above, the Court sustains the demurrer to the 2nd cause of action.

Lastly, the Court is mindful of the strenuous defense position that leave to amend should be denied because it is unlikely Plaintiff will be able to plead a viable cause of action against Defendants.

Nevertheless, the Court in its discretion shall grant leave for Plaintiff to file such an amendment.

Plaintiffs shall have 21 days leave to amend the complaint.

The Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to March 18, 2027, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C12.

CASA to give notice.

13. Raymond James Finacial Services, Inc vs. Robinson

26-01563657

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. [“Raymond James”] and Yvan Huu Cao’s motion for a preliminary injunction against defendant Paul Stewart Robinson from prosecuting FINRA Arbitration Case No. 26-00105, and for related declaratory relief that no agreement or enforceable obligation to arbitrate exists as to Robinson’s claims under FINRA Rule 12200, is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a) [authorizing injunctive relief]; Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assoc. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306 [“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits ... [i]f the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then we must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether the trial court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction should be upheld: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction;’” internal citations omitted]; O’Connell v.

Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 moving party has burden “to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction”].)

Moving parties’ request for judicial notice [RJN] is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d), (h).) As to Exs. A, A-1 through A-5, and C judicial notice is limited to the fact that the documents were filed, but not of the truth of their contents. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1) [court records]; Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400 [“Courts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents;” emphasis in original, internal citation omitted]; In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314 [“while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice