BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al.

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Please take notice, Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil- Sakauye Courthouse. The new courthouse is located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA 95814.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR” or “Defendant”) motion for summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows.

Although the notice of motion states that CDCR is moving for summary judgment of all claims alleged or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, CDCR has only noticed a motion for summary adjudication as discussed below.

This is an employment action arising from plaintiff George Beltran’s (“Plaintiff”) former employment as a correctional officer (“CO”) with CDCR at Folsom State Prison. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 14, 2023, alleging causes of action for: (1) retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (3) race discrimination; (4) failure to prevent discrimination; (5) race harassment; and (6) hostile work environment.

Plaintiff identifies as Native American and alleges that beginning in 2021, derogatory statements and slurs were made regarding his appearance, national origin, and ancestry. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that comments were made regarding his long hair and that he was a “fake Indian.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-17.) Plaintiff alleges he was regularly excluded from staff lunches and dinners. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has a daughter with a chronic illness, he has to use FMLA/CRFA leave to care for her, and due to this, his coworkers and supervisors would always complain that he was not working. (Complaint, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that he felt continually harassed, attacked, and humiliated by the comments and that he felt he had no choice but to quit on June 3, 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 23.)

CDCR presents the following issues for summary adjudication in its notice of motion:

Issue No. 1: Summary adjudication should be granted as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for race discrimination because Plaintiff cannot meet his prima facie

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

burden [of] establishing a causal connection between the adverse action and his race or national origin.

Issue No. 2: Summary adjudication should be granted as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for race discrimination because CDCR acted for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, and Plaintiff fails to adduce sufficient evidence of pretext.

Issue No. 3: Summary adjudication should be granted as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for retaliation because Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under the FEHA as the result of having an alleged on-the-job injury.

Issue No. 4: Summary adjudication should be granted as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for retaliation because Plaintiff cannot meet his prima facie burden [of] establishing a causal connection between the adverse action and alleged protected activity.

Issue No. 5: Summary adjudication should be granted as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for retaliation because CDCR acted for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons, and Plaintiff fails to adduce sufficient evidence of pretext.

In a footnote, CDCR asserts that Plaintiff has conceded that his second cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and by his failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. Although never discussed in CDCR’s moving papers, on December 19, 2024, the Court granted CDCR’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend as to the second cause of action. Accordingly, that cause of action is no longer at issue.

In that same footnote, CDCR also asserts that the fifth cause of action for race harassment and the sixth cause of action for harassment based on national origin and FMLA usage are duplicative of one another, and that there is no cause of action for harassment based on FMLA usage. CDCR raised this argument in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action. The Court denied the motion as to the sixth cause of action, and CDCR does not present any evidence that either the fifth or sixth causes of action have been dismissed, nor has CDCR included either cause of action in its notice of motion.

Because CDCR has not moved for summary adjudication of either the fifth or sixth cause of action, this motion cannot be a motion for summary judgment. CDCR also failed to include the fourth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination in its notice of motion. (See Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1546 [summary adjudication must include proper notice of each issue to be adjudicated so that opposing party does not raise only one

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues].) Summary judgment may only be granted where it is shown that the “action has no merit,” and summary judgment lies only where the opponent has no case at all. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215.) As a result, this motion is only a motion for summary adjudication as to the first and third causes of action.

Untimely Opposition and Untimely Reply

Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition on Wednesday, June 3, 2026, just 15 Court days prior to the hearing, instead of the requisite 20. A timely opposition should have been filed on Friday, May 29, 2026.

In connection with the opposition, Plaintiff filed the Declaration of Molly E. Hoot in Support of Plaintiff’s Request that the Court Consider the Late-Filed Opposition. Therein, Ms. Hoot declares that “[d]ue to an inadvertent calendaring error, the deadline was mistakenly calendared approximately fourteen to fifteen days before the actual due date rather than the correct opposition deadline.” (Declaration of Molly E. Hoot (“Hoot Decl.”), ¶ 4.) She continues, “[t]his error occurred during a period of recent staffing changes within counsel’s office.

In May 2026, the attorney previously handling this matter and his paralegal departed the firm. Responsibility for this case was subsequently transferred to Ms. Hoot. (Hoot Decl., ¶ 5.) She declares that “[d]uring this transition, the opposition deadline was inadvertently miscalendared. The late filing was not intentional, nor was it the result of any effort to delay the proceedings or gain a tactical advantage. Rather, it resulted from mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect.” (Hoot Decl., ¶ 6.)

Further, “[u]pon discovering the calendaring error, counsel acted diligently and promptly to finalize and file Plaintiff's Opposition.” (Hoot Decl., ¶ 7.) Ms. Hoot also asks that the Court continue the hearing on this motion to allow CDCR sufficient time to prepare and file a reply. (Hoot Decl., ¶ 8.)

CDCR filed its reply on Friday, June 12, 2026. The deadline to file a timely reply was Monday, June 8, 2026 (11 days prior to the hearing was Sunday, June 7, 2026). In the reply, CDCR addresses Plaintiff’s untimely opposition in a single sentence and accompanying footnote, which states the opposition is untimely and should not be considered. (Reply at 5:3-4.)

The Court has reluctantly considered the untimely opposition and untimely reply, but the parties are advised that any further failure to comply with applicable rules may result in adverse rulings and untimely filings being disregarded.

Legal Standard

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

In evaluating a motion for summary adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant's motion for summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781).

Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

Third Cause of Action for Race Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Government Code section 12940, subsection (a), Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he qualified for the position sought; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) some other circumstance that suggests a discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355; Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands (1996) 51

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Cal.App.4th 345, 367 [applying this standard to FEHA religious discrimination claim].)

If the plaintiff meets this burden, a presumption of discrimination arises, and “the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and to justify a judgment for the employer that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355-56, quotations, citations omitted.)

If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff is afforded the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 356.) “To defeat the motion, the employee must then adduce or point to evidence raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance that intentional discrimination occurred.” (Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097-1098.)

CDCR moves for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for race discrimination on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish a causal nexus between the Notice of Adverse Action (“NOAA”) and his race; (2) CDCR had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the NOAA; and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish pretext.

The Court need not evaluate whether Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case because it concludes that CDCR has presented undisputed evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the NOAA. To that end, CDCR relies upon the foregoing material facts as well as the following additional evidence, which CDCR asserts demonstrates that the NOAA was issued to Plaintiff not because of his race, but because it was determined that he was dishonest regarding his request for bereavement leave and in subsequent discussions and interviews regarding the same.

Plaintiff had access to CDCR’s bereavement leave policy, which provides that an employee may take up to three workdays of leave for the death of their grandparent, mother-in-law, father-in-law, grandchild, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew, and an additional two days if the employee travels more than 400 miles. (UMFs 14, 15.)

Plaintiff claimed bereavement leave for the passing of his great aunt (an ineligible relative under CDCR’s policy) on July 3, 6, 7, 8, returned to work on July 9 and 10, and then took another bereavement leave day on Tuesday, July 13, 2021. (UMF 12.) On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff turned in his time sheet for approval, along with his great aunt’s funeral card. The funeral card reflected that Plaintiff’s great aunt’s services were held on July 7 and 8, 2021. Sergeant Garrity informed Plaintiff that he could not take bereavement leave for his great aunt and that Plaintiff would need to change his July 3,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

6, and 7 bereavement leave days to another form of paid time or dock. (UMFs 21, 22.) Sergeant Garrity did not approve Plaintiff’s timesheet, and the matter was referred to the Office of Internal Affairs (“IA”). (UMF 27.)

Sergeant Garrity also questioned Plaintiff after noting that Plaintiff’s bereavement leave travel days? July 8 and 13, 2021’ were not taken in conjunction with his other bereavement leave days. (UMF 24.) After being asked for travel receipts, Plaintiff told Sergeant Garrity that he traveled back to Texas for an extension of his great aunt’s service. He explained “the Waka” to Sergeant Garrity as: “The Waka involved the carrying of the deceased to the top of the hill and leaving the body there for the animals to consume for 30 days,” and “returning after 30 days to burn the remains of the body.” (UMF 25.) This led Sergeant Garrity to believe that Plaintiff returned to Texas twice. (UMF 26.)

On October 11, 2021, Lieutenant Emily Castro served Plaintiff with an IA interview notice. (UMF 28.) Plaintiff explained “the Waka” to Lieutenant Castro as: “I performed ‘the Waka’ because my great aunt’s sons were too elderly to climb the ladder.” Plaintiff further explained “during, ‘the Waka,’ my great aunt’s body was placed on posts,” and “they cut me,” as he was describing his blood being placed on his great aunt’s body. Plaintiff then explained how the body would be placed in position so animals could feed on it for six months before the remains were burned and the ashes were scattered. (UMF 29.)

Special Agent Azell Middlebrooks of the Office of IA interviewed Plaintiff on October 20, 2021. (UMF 30.) During this interview, Plaintiff stated that a supervisor, Sergeant Jenee Gelein, approved his bereavement leave. (UMF 31.) On July 3, 2021, Sergeant Gelein explained to Plaintiff that he could take three days of bereavement leave for his “aunt,” an additional two travel days, and the required substantiation. Sergeant Gelein was not authorized to approve bereavement leave. (UMF 32.) Plaintiff told Agent Middlebrooks that he did not understand bereavement leave eligibility until the date of his October 20, 2021 IA interview. (UMF 33.)

With respect to the Waka, Plaintiff explained it to Agent Middlebrook as: “The Waka is when you take the body of the deceased, go to the top of a mountain, place the body on a podium and you are supposed to allow the body to remain there for around six months while animals feed off the body.” Thereafter Plaintiff explained, “you’re supposed to light the body on fire and let the ashes scatter.” (UMF 35.) When asked when and where “the Waka” was conducted, Plaintiff stated it took place on July 12, 2021 in Las Cruces, New Mexico, approximately 45 minutes from El Paso, Texas. When asked if he participated, Plaintiff responded that since his great aunt decided to be buried, his family did an “all nations prayer” that included crown dancers in place of a body and the burning of her

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

belongings. Plaintiff also said he could not tell Sergeant Garrity about the prayer ceremony to allow his great aunt’s spirit to make it to heaven. (UMF 36.) Plaintiff further stated that he did not attend his great aunt’s services on July 8, 2021, because his child was sick. (UMF 37.)

The Office of IA interviewed Plaintiff for a second time on March 3, 2022. (UMF 38.) When asked if his statements to Sergeant Garrity and Lieutenant Castro were truthful, Plaintiff responded, “I gave them an explanation of what we do.” (UMF 39.) Plaintiff testified that he explained “the Waka” as if his great aunt were part of the ritual so they could see and understand it. (UMF 40.) Plaintiff admits that “the Waka” did not occur, and that he did not participate in it. (UMF 41.) Plaintiff also stated that he did not attend his great aunt’s services on July 8, 2021 because he did not have the funds. (UMF 42.) In addition, Plaintiff admitted he was aware of the bereavement leave policy after Sergeant Gelein explained it to him on July 3, 2021. (UMF 43.)

On April 6, 2022, the Office of IA issued Plaintiff a case closure notice, signed by former Folsom State Prison Warden Rick Hill. The Office of IA sustained findings that Plaintiff falsified his timesheet, made false statements to Sergeant Garrity, requested bereavement leave for an ineligible relative, and was not truthful during his IA interview. (UMF 44.)

The Court concludes that the foregoing evidence establishes that the NOAA was issued based on the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that CDCR concluded Plaintiff made false and misleading statements to his supervisor and IA investigators and falsified his time records after knowing that bereavement leave is not available for the death of a great aunt. The evidence includes that Plaintiff admitted he was aware of the existence of the bereavement leave policy, was informed he had to change his leave days to another form of paid time or dock, still submitted his time sheet without changing it from bereavement leave to another form of paid time or dock, did not travel on July 8 despite claiming it as a bereavement leave travel day, made misleading statements to supervisors and investigators regarding the Waka and whether it occurred with respect to his great aunt, and made misleading statements regarding when he became aware that he was not entitled to take bereavement leave. (UMFs 12-44.)

Having established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, this shifts the burden to the Plaintiff to show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. [citations omitted].' (Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 140.) In this regard, Plaintiff was required to produce “substantial responsive evidence that the employer's showing was untrue or pretextual thereby raising at least an inference of discrimination.” (Hersant v. California

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Dept. of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004-1005.) Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons ... that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” (Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) Evidence of pretext must be “‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to create a triable issue ... .” (Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.)

It bears observing here that Plaintiff responds to all but two of the material facts proffered by CDCR as being “disputed to the extent ” and then Plaintiff sets forth various explanations that he is disputing the fact in the event it implies something beyond what is actually stated in the material fact. For example, even the straightforward fact that Plaintiff resigned on June 2, 2022, is disputed by Plaintiff “to the extent Defendant implies Plaintiff voluntarily resigned independent of the dismissal process.” (UMF 8.)

By way of another example, Plaintiff “disputes” material fact number 7, which states that Plaintiff was supervised by Sergeant Daniel Reid from 2017 until his resignation, “to the extent that Defendant omits Reid’s repeated race-based comments and harassment.” (UMF 7.) Plaintiff provides similar discussions regarding his partial disputes for all but two of the UMFs. Plaintiff’s inferences, explanations, and argument do not create a material dispute, nor are they helpful to the Court. Plaintiff’s purported disputes are not true disputes, but rather argument regarding what may or may not be implied by the material fact.

The separate statement is not the place for explanation or legal argument. The only proper response is whether the fact is undisputed or disputed and, if disputed, a citation to the evidence that creates the purported dispute.

Further, where Plaintiff has stated a material fact is “disputed” (e.g., UMFs 11 and 26), his evidence does not create a dispute. In UMF 11, CDCR contends that “Plaintiff has no evidence that Sergeant Solem forced him to unbraid his hair and asked if anyone in Plaintiff’s family died.” Plaintiff contends, “Plaintiff testified Solem forced him to unbraid his hair publicly and referenced whether someone in Plaintiff’s family was going to die.” However, Plaintiff’s cited deposition testimony does not reference Plaintiff being asked to unbraid his hair and includes testimony that simply does not dispute the fact as stated.

Similarly, UMF 26 states that “Plaintiff's statement led Sergeant Garrity to believe that he returned to Texas twice.” Plaintiff contends that “Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s characterization of Garrity’s interpretation as dispositive or undisputed. Plaintiff contends CDCR improperly conflated oral cultural explanations with deception.” This does not dispute the fact as stated. Moreover, Plaintiff’s deposition citation does not support his statement, as it only refers to the lack of receipts, and the other cited passage has no substantive testimony about Plaintiff leading Sgt.

Garrity to believe that he traveled to Texas twice.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Turning to pretext, Plaintiff argues that CDCR’s reason is pretextual because CDCR knew that his leave was for his great aunt. To that end, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Jason Dotson testified during the IA investigation that Plaintiff specifically disclosed the leave was for his great aunt. Officer Dotson allegedly testified he escalated the issue to Lieutenant Randy Rogers because the leave request system lacked a “great aunt” category. In turn, Lieutenant Rogers allegedly instructed Officer Dotson to enter the leave as “aunt” and include a notation reflecting “great aunt,” approve the leave, and investigate it further.

Plaintiff also argues he testified that he informed CDCR that the leave involved his great aunt and that he had previously received bereavement leave for his great uncle without issue. Thus, he asserts that a reasonable jury could conclude he believed his leave request complied with existing practice and had been properly authorized. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that a jury could conclude CDCR interpreted Plaintiff’s cultural explanations of the Waka through the lens of preexisting hostility toward Plaintiff’s Native identity and appearance, especially because CDCR tolerated years of comments accusing Plaintiff of being “fake Indian” and mocking his appearance.

He also contends, without supporting evidence, that the way he explained the Waka is a “fundamental cultural communication difference, not fraud.” Lastly, he insists the severity of the discipline supports pretext because he worked for CDCR for 14 years and had no comparable dishonesty history.

Plaintiff has not presented a separate statement of additional facts for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff's additional evidence is only presented in Ms. Hoot's declaration. In addition, Plaintiff’s evidence that is cited in opposition to CDCR's separate statement of UMFs is not sufficient to establish pretext and is primarily based on Plaintiff’s own speculation.

First, Plaintiff erroneously cites to “Exhibit 2” instead of “Exhibit 1” as evidence of Officer Dotson and Lieutenant Rogers’ testimony. As to Exhibit 1, CDCR has objected to it on the grounds that it lacks foundation, lacks authentication, and is hearsay. The objections are well taken. Molly Hoot attests that, “Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of transcripts of investigatory interviews conducted by [CDCR] during its internal investigation concerning Plaintiff. These materials were produced by Defendant during discovery in this action.” (Hoot Supporting Decl., ¶ 2.)

CDCR objects that Exhibit 1 is a 13-page document that lacks page or bates stamp numbers and purports to be a written transcript made by Plaintiff’s counsel of an audio file that CDCR produced. CDCR asserts it did not produce a written transcript, and Plaintiff does not include any reference to the audio file being transcribed by a certified court reporter. The document also fails to even identify who is purporting to conduct the interview. CDCR’s objections are sustained as Ms. Hoot has failed to properly authenticate the exhibit and it is hearsay.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Nonetheless, even if the Court were to consider Exhibit 1, nothing therein supports or evidences any purported testimony from Officer Jason Dotson or Lieutenant Randy Rogers. Plaintiff cites to the evidence as “Dotson IA Interview” and “Rogers IA interview,” but neither the names Dotson nor Rogers can be found anywhere in Exhibit 1, or in any of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff.

Exhibit 1 is also Plaintiff’s purported evidence that he received bereavement leave for his great uncle, but CDCR’s objections to Exhibit 1 have been sustained. What remains is Plaintiff’s contention that he did not have a history of dishonesty. However, this was not presented as an additional material fact for the Court to consider and, even if it had been, the Court disagrees that it constitutes substantial evidence that CDCR’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for issuing the NOAA to Plaintiff is implausible or untrue such that it is pretext. The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish pretext.

Based on the foregoing, the motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED.

First Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the employer's action. (Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453.)

CDCR moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA on the ground that Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the NOAA and any protected activity, and/or CDCR had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the NOAA. As to the last issue, CDCR relies upon the same evidence and material facts discussed above.

Even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, CDCR has also met its burden with respect to the first cause of action by establishing it had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the NOAA. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to establish pretext. In opposition, Plaintiff raises the same arguments discussed above with respect to pretext and asserts the analysis “applies with equal force to the retaliation claim.” (Opposition at 18:2-3.) For the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext.

Accordingly, CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action is GRANTED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Conclusion

CDCR’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first and third causes of action is GRANTED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID 16030877014. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003281: BELTRAN vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 06/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 16C

Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.