Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Alexis Lewis’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows.

In this action, Plaintiffs Joseph (“Joseph”) and Vincent Lara (“Vincent”) allege causes of action against Defendant for intentional interference with expected inheritance and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant befriended their father, Alan Lara (“Alan”), in 2019 and since then “engaged in a scheme to defraud Alan of money,” including through “fraud, manipulation, undue influence and duress.” (Comp. ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs allege that after Alan died in 2022, they learned that in August of 2021, Alan had changed the beneficiary designation on an annuity account from 50% to Vincent and 50% to Joseph to 80% to Defendant, 10% to Vincent, and 10% to Joseph. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant stole Alan’s computer login credentials and changed the beneficiary designation herself by forging Alan’s electronic signature.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) The papers filed in response to a defendant's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC Rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1) [brackets added].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

Defendant’s separate statement includes the following facts which she asserts are undisputed. Alan’s annuity is a Nationwide Destination B (2.0) IRA annuity. As of October 21, 2020, Vincent and Joseph were designated beneficiaries of the annuity at 50% each. (UMF 1, 2) On August 9, 2021, a DocuSign “Edit Bene Process” beneficiary change was processed designating Defendant an 80% beneficiary of the annuity and Plaintiffs each 10% beneficiaries. (UMF 3) The August 2021 Beneficiary Change Request shows Alan’s ownership information and email address. (UMF 4) Alan told Defendant on August 29, 2021 that he named her as a beneficiary and that “there’s no approval needed because it’s my money already.” (UMF 5) On October 4, 2021, Defendant discovered from Alan that a third party attempted to access his account. Defendant was not involved in the attempt. (UMF 7)

On July 27, 2021, Alan executed a notarized grant deed conveying a 10% interest in his Citrus Heights home to Defendant. (UMF 8) Joseph never told Defendant of his expected inheritance prior to Alan’s death. (UMF 9) Joseph’s discovery responses do not identify any specific facts or identify any documents regarding forgery, stolen credentials or that Defendant effected the beneficiary change. (UMF 11) Joseph relied on text messages between Alan and Defendant as support for his allegations. (UMF 13) Prior to Alan’s death, Defendant did not know whether or in what amount Plaintiffs expected to inherit from Alan. (UMF 14) Defendant first learned of the annuity on August 29, 2021. (UMF 17) Alan died on April 27, 2021.

The Court will address Defendant’s arguments in the order presented in the moving papers.

First Cause of Action (Intentional Interference with Expected Inheritance)

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is denied.

The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with expected inheritance are (1) plaintiff had an expectancy of an inheritance; (2) proof to a reasonable degree of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

certainty that a bequest or devise would have been in effect at the time of the testator’s death if there had been no interference; (3) the defendant had knowledge of plaintiff’s expectancy of inheritance and took deliberate action to interfere with it; (4) the interference was conducted by independently actionable tortious means directed at the testator; and (5) damage. (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1057.)

Plaintiffs allege that Alan told Defendant about the annuity before the August 2021 beneficiary change. (Comp. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “engaged in wrongful conduct, stealing various account information including credit card numbers, bank account numbers, and account login and password information while she was in his home, and lying about various medical conditions and her purportedly dire financial situation, among other methods of fraud, manipulation, undue influence, and duress.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs allege that prior to Defendant’s interference, it was reasonably certain they would have each received 50% of the annuity’s value. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Defendant argues that the evidence shows that she never knew about Plaintiffs’ inheritance prior to the August 2021 beneficiary change, that she did not steal credentials or forge a change to the annuity, that the beneficiary designation was revocable, and in any event, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy.

The Court first concludes that Defendant failed to meet her initial burden. Importantly, this cause of action is asserted by both Vincent and Joseph. As framed, Defendant seeks summary adjudication of the entire cause of action, not simply the cause of action to the extent asserted by Joseph. (Not. 2:7-13.) Defendant’s motion directed to the first cause of action focuses on the claimed failure of Joseph’s discovery responses to identify any specific facts, documents, or witnesses to support the claim that Defendant knew about Plaintiffs’ inheritance and that she engaged in wrongful conduct and that Joseph admitted he never told Defendant of the inheritance. (UMF 9-12, 15, 16, 18) However, Defendant does not cite to any discovery responses from Vincent.

Thus, even assuming that Defendant were to have demonstrated that Joseph does not and cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support the first cause of action, Defendant has failed to demonstrate the same as to Vincent. That is, Defendant has not demonstrated that Vincent “does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain” evidence to support the first cause of action. (Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 168, 186.) Defendant’s contention that Joseph’s discovery responses are admissions of Vincent pursuant to Evidence Code § 1222 is incorrect.

Evidence Code § 1222 provides that a statement offered against a party is not inadmissible by the hearsay rule if it “was made by a person authorized by the party to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of the statement ” (Evid. Code § 1222(1). While Joseph is an attorney and is representing Vincent, the subject discovery responses are Joseph’s own. When Joseph verified those responses, he did so in his own capacity as a Plaintiff, not as Vincent’s attorney. (E.g.

Def.’s Exh. B. at COE 089.) Thus,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Defendant’s showing would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or an issue of legal duty as required by CCP § 437c(f)(1). Nor has Defendant obtained a stipulation from Plaintiffs which has been approved by the Court allowing a motion for adjudication of certain legal issues or damages not covered by subdivision (f)(1). (CCP § 437c(t).) Further, Defendant did not request summary adjudication of any separate act based on Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. The notice does not mention Lilienthal at all. On this basis alone, the motion is denied.

While the Court need not proceed any further, even assuming Defendant met her initial burden, Plaintiffs met their burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. To that end, UMF 17 states that Defendant first learned of the annuity on August 29, 2021. Plaintiffs present evidence that Alan sent a message to Defendant on February 20, 2020 expressly using the term “annuity.” (Plaintiffs’ Additional Material Facts [“AMF”] 14.) Plaintiffs also present evidence that on March 1, 2021, Alan told Defendant that he was waiting for a letter from Nationwide Insurance which held one of his annuity accounts to confirm he received $15,000 per month. (AMF 10) In addition, Defendant testified at her deposition that she assumed that Alan’s retirement funds would pass to his children. (AMF 11) Defendant also testified that Alan discussed withdrawing retirement funds after talking to a Nationwide adviser. (AMF 9) Defendant further testified that before the August 29, 2021 beneficiary change, she knew Alan had retirement assets, received money from retirement, and understood that Alan’s stocks, bonds, and annuity to be the same type of asset. (AMF 7) Alan also wrote to Defendant in October 2020 and discussed making Defendant a beneficiary. (AMF 6) Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant learned of the annuity prior to August 29, 2021 and thus disputes Defendant’s UMF 17.

On this additional basis, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

Second Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief)

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is denied.

Plaintiffs allege that the August 2021 beneficiary change is fraudulent and void and seek a judicial declaration with respect to the rights, obligations, and duties of the parties. (Comp. ¶¶ 31, 32.)

Defendant failed to meet her initial burden. Defendant’s motion is premised on similar UMFs as the motion directed to the first cause of action. Specifically, UMFs 28 and 29 are similar to UMFs 11 and 18. That is, like UMFs 11 and 18, UMFs 28 and 29 assert that Joseph’s discovery responses fail to identify facts to show that Defendant forged or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

stole credentials or that Defendant effected the beneficiary change, or that anyone informed her of Plaintiffs’ inheritance. As explained above in connection with the first cause of action, Joseph’s discovery responses are not Vincent’s responses and do not show that Vincent “does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain” evidence to support the second cause of action. (Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 168, 186.) As with the first cause of action, Defendant’s showing would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or an issue of legal duty as required by CCP § 437c(f)(1).

Nor has Defendant obtained a stipulation from Plaintiffs which has been approved by the Court allowing a motion for adjudication of certain legal issues or damages not covered by subdivision (f)(1). (CCP § 437c(t).) Further, Defendant did not request summary adjudication of any separate act based on Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. The notice does not mention Lilienthal at all. On this basis alone, the motion is denied.

In addition, even if Defendant’s evidence were sufficient to demonstrate that she did not forge or otherwise access the annuity account, Defendant would still not have met her burden because the second cause of action is premised on allegations that the August 2021 beneficiary change was the result of not only forgery or unauthorized access to Alan’s account, but also undue influence, fraud, and duress. (Comp. ¶¶ 24, 30.) Defendant has not addressed these allegations and therefore has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ cause of action fails. For this additional reason the motion is denied.

Once again, though the Court need not proceed any further, even assuming Defendant met her initial burden, Plaintiffs met their burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. To that end, UMF 29 states that Joseph identified no evidence that anyone ever informed her of Plaintiffs’ expected inheritance. However, as set forth above, Plaintiffs present evidence that Alan sent a message to Defendant on February 20, 2020 expressly using the term “annuity”, that on March 1, 2021, Alan told Defendant he was waiting for a letter from Nationwide Insurance which held one of his annuity accounts to confirm he received $15,000 per month.

Defendant further testified that before the August 29, 2021 beneficiary change, she knew Alan had retirement assets, received money from retirement, and understood that Alan’s stocks, bonds, and annuity to be the same type of asset. In addition, Defendant testified at her deposition that she assumed Alan’s retirement funds would pass to his children and that Alan discussed withdrawing retirement funds after talking to a Nationwide adviser. Alan also wrote to Defendant in October 2020 and discussed making Defendant a beneficiary. (AMFs 6, 7, 9-11, 14) A reasonable trier of fact could infer that Defendant’s understanding that Alan’s retirement funds, which included the annuity which Alan discussed with her, would pass to Plaintiffs, reveals that she was aware of Plaintiffs’ expected inheritance from the annuity.

Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s UMF 29. On this additional basis, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

Punitive Damages

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is denied.

Defendant failed to meet her initial burden. Defendant’s motion is premised on similar UMFs as the motion directed to the first and second causes of action. Specifically, UMFs 37 and 38 are similar to UMFs 11, 18, 28 and 29. That is, like those UMFs, UMFs 37 and 38 assert that Joseph’s discovery responses fail to identify facts to show that Defendant forged or stole credentials or that Defendant effected the beneficiary change, or that anyone informed her of Plaintiffs’ inheritance. As explained above in connection with the first cause of action, Joseph’s discovery responses are not Vincent’s responses and do not show that Vincent “does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain” evidence to support a claim for punitive damages. (Hagen v.

Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 168, 186.) As with the first cause of action, Defendant’s showing would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or an issue of legal duty as required by CCP § 437c(f)(1). Nor has Defendant obtained a stipulation from Plaintiffs which has been approved by the Court allowing a motion for adjudication of certain legal issues or damages not covered by subdivision (f)(1). (CCP § 437c(t).) Further, Defendant did not request summary adjudication of any separate act based on Lilienthal & Fowler v.

Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848. The notice does not mention Lilienthal at all. On this basis alone, the motion is denied.

In addition, even if Defendant’s evidence were sufficient to demonstrate that she did not forge or otherwise access the annuity account, Defendant would still not have met her burden because, again, Defendant is alleged to have also engaged in undue influence, fraud, and duress. (Comp. ¶¶ 24, 30.) Defendant has not addressed these allegations and therefore has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages fails. For this additional reason the motion is denied.

While the Court need not proceed any further, even assuming Defendant met her initial burden, Plaintiffs met their burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. To that end, UMF 38 states that Joseph identified no evidence that anyone ever informed her of Plaintiffs’ expected inheritance. However, as set forth above, Plaintiffs present evidence that Alan sent a message to Defendant on February 20, 2020 expressly using the term “annuity”, that on March 1, 2021, Alan told Defendant he was waiting for a letter from Nationwide Insurance which held one of his annuity accounts to confirm he received $15,000 per month.

Defendant further testified that before the August 29, 2021 beneficiary change, she knew Alan had retirement assets, received money from retirement, and understood that Alan’s stocks, bonds, and annuity to be the same type of asset. In addition, Defendant testified at her deposition that she

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00336808-CU-FR-GDS: Vincent Lara vs. Alexis Paige Lewis 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

assumed Alan’s retirement funds would pass to his children and that Alan discussed withdrawing retirement funds after talking to a Nationwide adviser. Alan also wrote to Defendant in October 2020 and discussed making Defendant a beneficiary. (AMFs 6, 7, 9-11, 14) A reasonable trier of fact could infer that Defendant’s understanding that Alan’s retirement funds, which included the annuity which Alan discussed with her, would pass to Plaintiffs, reveals that she was aware of Plaintiffs’ expected inheritance from the annuity. Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s UMF 38. On this additional basis, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is denied.

Given that Defendant failed to meet its burden with respect to the all causes of action, Defendant has necessarily failed to meet its burden with respect to the motion for summary judgment. The failure to dispose of all causes of action necessarily precludes summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted where it is shown that the “action has no merit” and summary judgment lies only where the opponent has no case at all. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1215.)

Defendant’s motion is denied in its entirety.

The Court need not address Plaintiffs’ additional arguments not specifically discussed above, or Plaintiffs’ alternate request for a continuance pursuant to CCP § 437c(h).

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections are overruled.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.