SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET’S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al.

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520

Tentative Ruling - 09/02/2026 Jamilah A. Jefferson

The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; on 05/15/2026 is Granted in Part.

The Motion of Defendants Peet’s Coffee, Inc. (“Defendant”) for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED IN PART.

It is GRANTED as to the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth/Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Twelfth causes of action.

It is DENIED as to the First, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh causes of action. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LEGAL STANDARD

In moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Id.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either: “that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established”; or “that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) “In examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in connection with the motion, the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Such summary procedure is drastic and should be used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for the open trial method of determining facts.” (Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Fernando Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) was hired on February 4, 2018 with Peet’s Coffee. (UMF 1.) On March 16, 2020, he injured his left hand during an incident. (UMF 11.) He returned to work on September 7, 2020. (UMF 18.) On October 12, 2020, he partially severed his right finger. (UMF 19.) He returned to work on January 8, 2021 and was terminated the same day. (UMFs 25, 33.) 23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520 First Cause of Action: Waiting Time Penalties

Labor Code sections 201 and 202 address when wages are due to employees who quit or are terminated or discharged. Labor Code section 203 imposes a waiting time penalty if the final wages are paid late.

Defendant offers as evidence that according to Plaintiff’s own deposition, Plaintiff testified that he received his final paycheck on January 9, 2021, a day after he was terminated, but that it included an additional day of wages. (UMF 34, citing to Isvoranu Decl., Ex. A, Sanchez Depo. 77:17-78:7.) Plaintiff also cites to the same evidence but disputes what Defendant’s discovery response asserting that the final paycheck was “issued” on January 8, 2021 means. Neither side appears to introduce evidence of the check itself.

In light of the fact that summary judgment is considering liberally in favor of the opposing party with any doubts regarding the propriety of summary judgment are to be resolved in favor of the opposing party, summary adjudication is DENIED as to the First Cause of Action. (Kulesa v. Castleberry (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 103, 112.)

Second Cause of Action: Disability Discrimination

The elements of a claim for disability discrimination in violation of FEHA are (1) the employee plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) he or she otherwise is qualified to do his or her job; and (3) he or she was subjected to adverse employment action because of the disability. (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344-345.)

The elements of a prima facie case of discrimination vary depending on particular facts, but generally, a plaintiff must provide evidence that he (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position sought or was performing competently in the position already held; (3) suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1105.)

“Summary judgment on a FEHA discrimination claim is appropriate where, regardless of any dispute concerning the plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer presents evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its action, and the plaintiff fails to provide evidence rebutting the state reason as pretextual. [Citation.] Reasons are legitimate if they are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would preclude a finding of discrimination. [Citation.] Issues that are nondiscriminatory on their face and honestly believed by the employer, will suffice even if foolish or trivial or baseless; the ultimate issue is whether the employer honestly believed in the reasons it offers. [Citation.]” (Hodges, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 910 [internal quotations omitted].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520

Here, it is undisputed that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made as part of his failure to check that the machine was turned off prior to initiating any repair work for both incidents. (UMFs 12, 21 [citing to Sanchez Depo., 56:17-23], 22 [citing to Sanchez Depo., 53:22-24].)

Defendant contends – and the Court agrees – that Plaintiff cannot establish that there was a discriminatory animus based on disability and causal link between his membership in said protected class and any adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff offers no circumstantial or direct evidence to reflect that because of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendant terminated his employment. Rather, Plaintiff speculates that the decision was predetermined based on his supervisor’s, Ian Boyle's, statement that anyone who got hurt would be fired automatically, and because he had to take medical leave twice for his hand injuries. (AMFs 6, 8.) This is insufficient.

Pursuant to the foregoing, summary adjudication of the second cause of action is GRANTED.

Third Cause of Action: FMLA/CFRA Discrimination

As an initial matter, this appears to be a FMLA/CFRA retaliation or interference claim. A cause of action for failure to reinstate after CFRA leave, like one for failure to grant CFRA leave, is based on Government Code section 12945.2, subdivision (a):

“Family care and medical leave requested pursuant to this subdivision shall not be deemed to have been granted unless the employer provides the employee, upon granting the leave request, a guarantee of employment in the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the leave.”

Defendant also meets its initial burden to establish the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether it guaranteed the same or comparable position to Plaintiff and whether it retaliated against him for taking CFRA leave. The evidence presented by Defendant establishes that Plaintiff’s CFRA leave requests were granted by Defendant, and Plaintiff was permitted to return to his position after the first instance, although he was terminated the same day as his return after the second.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to submit competent evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. If an employer meets this initial burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate a triable issue of fact by producing evidence that the employer's reasons were untrue or pretextual or that the employer acted with discriminatory animus. (Ibid.)

As described above, Defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520 employment action of termination. With regard to his disability and his requests to take leave, Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext.

As such, summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Fourth Cause of Action: Hostile Work Environment Harassment

Under FEHA, “[t]o be actionable, the harassment must be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” (Etter v. Veriflo Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 457, 463.) In the context of a motion for summary judgment, “ ‘[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.’” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 880, citing Cal. Gov. Code § 12923, subds. (a), (b), (e).)

The specific instances of Boyle’s allegedly harassing conduct include:

1. Boyle’s January/ February 2020 statement – prior to any incident – that anyone who got hurt would be terminated “on the spot” (AMFs 6, 8);

2. Upon returning in September 2020 from his first medical leave, Boyle assigned Plaintiff to the graveyard shift without any justification (AMFs 17-19); and

3. Boyle surveilled Plaintiff three times approximately two weeks after his return, which he did not do for most co-workers. (AMF 46.)

(Oppo., p. 18:4-14.)

Based on these incidents, there is no triable of issue of fact as to whether any harassment of Plaintiff was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support his claim of a hostile work environment. The Court notes that as Defendant points out, conduct which is related to job duties, including personnel management activities, cannot support a FEHA harassment claim. (Reply, pp. 8:26:25- 9:1.) Plaintiff also does not offer evidence sufficient to show that assigning him to the graveyard shift constituted an adverse action - indeed, it is undisputed that the graveyard shift did not differ in duties from the other two shifts except that it was worked during the night. (AMF 20.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the Fourth cause of action.

Fifth/ Sixth/ Eighth Causes of Action: FEHA Retaliation under Gov. Code sections 12940(h)/12945.2(k)/ Retaliation under Lab. Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520

There are no triable issues of material fact as to whether (1) there was a causal connection between “protected activity” by Plaintiff and any adverse employment actions taken against him, in terminating his employment; and (2) whether the proffered reasons for the adverse actions were pretexts for retaliation or whether there is other direct or circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042; Gov. Code § 12940(h).)

The only instance provided of Plaintiff’s protected activity is his asking Mr. Boyle on January 8, 2021 why he was being terminated when there were other mechanics present who bore equal LOTO responsibility to him at the second incident. (Oppo., pp. 15:14-16:18.) Plaintiff does not allege that his requests for reasonable accommodations were protected activities.

However, the alleged adverse actions all took place prior to Plaintiff's alleged protected activity (the statement questioning his termination) – including the denial of a pay raise, the graveyard shift reassignment, the targeted surveillance, and his termination. (Id. at p. 17:1-5.) The timing of the direct question Plaintiff raised at his termination meeting is, thus, insufficient to support a reasonable inference of retaliation - Plaintiff questioned the termination after he was terminated. (See Shaner v. Synthes (3rd Cir. 2000) 204 F.3d 494, 504-505.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth causes of action.

Seventh Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation

Courts require a finding of actual discrimination under FEHA before a plaintiff may prevail on a claim for failure to prevent discrimination. (Kelley v. The Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 208.) Retaliation is included within the meaning of discrimination for purposes of the FEHA statute governing the failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. (Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2017) 228 F.Supp3d 1086, 1098.)

As no triable issues of material fact are found with Plaintiff’s harassment, discrimination or retaliation claims, as such, summary adjudication of the Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED.

Ninth/ Tenth Causes of Action: Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation/ Failure to Engage in Interactive Process

“The FEHA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities. It provides that ‘[i]t is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520 fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: [¶] ... [¶] (m)(1) For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.’ [Citation.] An employer, however, is not required to make an accommodation ‘that is demonstrated by the employer or other covered entity to produce undue hardship ... to its operation.’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 30.)

In addition to the obligation to make reasonable accommodation for a known physical or mental disability, the FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee ... to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee ... with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).) Section 12940 (n) “imposes separate, independent duties on an employer to engage in the ‘ “interactive process” ’ and to make ‘ “reasonable accommodations. (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 citing to Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).)

Underlying claims involving the failure of an employer to provide reasonable accommodation or engage in the interactive process, is the requirement that the employee at issue be “disabled” under the statutory definition under FEHA, and also that the employee requested the accommodation in the first place. (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54-55.)

Here, summary adjudication is denied as to the ninth and tenth causes of action because the evidence shows a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant fully engaged in the interactive process and accommodated Plaintiff’s request relating to his hand injuries either time following his two accidents.

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions required of his job, as he concedes that, as a maintenance technician, he required use of both hands. (UMF 15.) Plaintiff alleges that, based on the length of time that passed between when his work status restrictions were communicated to management – four and thirteen minutes respectively – "without HR consultation and without any individualized analysis” and then denied, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was, in fact, accommodated or whether Defendant engaged in the interactive process in good faith. (Oppo., p. 4:12-13) It is unclear what accommodation Plaintiff was seeking beyond leave but an employer’s obligation is triggered even without an actual request; “the employer must initiate the interactive process if it becomes aware of the need for accommodation through a third party[.]" (Zamora v.

Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 41.)

While there may be no timeframe, the duty is ongoing and “the [] EECOC interpretive guidance on the ADA makes clear that the duty to identify and provide a “reasonable accommodation”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520 under the ADA is a duty to identify and provide accommodations that enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired. (29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.) . . .” (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 973.)

Thus, the undisputed evidence indicates that Defendant granted Plaintiff's request for medical leave for both injuries, but a jury could find that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process by virtue of failing to, for example, provide further consideration of alternative jobs for Plaintiff or inquire from him what tasks might be appropriate. Defendant is, therefore, not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on either cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The Motion is DENIED as to the Ninth and Tenth causes of action.

Eleventh Cause of Action: Unfair Competition

This cause of action is derivative of Plaintiff’s other causes of action and therefore survives based upon whether the other causes of action establish a violation of law or an unfair business practice by Defendant. (Noel v. Home Servicing (2009) 653 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1056; Ingles v. Westwood One Broadcasting Serves. Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060.)

Summary adjudication is thus DENIED for the Eleventh cause of action (in light of the First, Ninth, and Tenth causes of action surviving).

Twelfth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination

Summary adjudication is granted as to the twelfth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because Plaintiff has failed to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether his engagement in protected activity was a contributing factor to his termination. (Dinslage, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 383.)

The parties agree that this cause of action is similarly derivative of retaliation and discrimination claims. Accordingly, summary adjudication is GRANTED.

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s objections to portions of the Boyle, Usinger and McCahon supporting declarations are OVERRULED.

Defendant’s objections to several exhibits attached to Declaration of Gabriel and portions of Plaintiff’s deposition OVERRULED

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV057069: SANCHEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs PEET'S COFFEE, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION;, et al. 09/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peet's Coffee, Inc., a Virginia Corporation; (Defendant) CRS# 835238783007 in Department 520

NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the court’s final order on September 3, 2026 unless, by no later than 4:00 P.M. on September 2, 2026, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or self- represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling.

The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: “Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case name], [number].” When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument.

The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. Their email must be provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed.

ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may give email notice they will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.