CATT, TODD MICHAEL vs RENTERIA, MARCOS, Jr

Defendant does not cite a case that supports judicial estoppel of the request for a new trial. Vaghashia v. Vaghashia (2024) 106 Cal.App.5 th 188 is inapposite to this case. Opposing a motion for new trial, then filing a motion for new trial has some of the earmarks of estoppel - it may well be an attempt at two bites at the apple. But this does not precisely address the problem judicial estoppel is here to cure; further, the trial was almost over. It would be an unreasonable extension of the principle as the reliance factor here was simply to continue the trial; there was no factual finding that Plaintiff was attempting to reverse.

THE KENNEMUR ISSUES WITH DR. STRICKLAND Plaintiff argues that the mitigation statements by Dr. Strickland were inadequately stated at deposition and his statements were insufficient to reach the Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907 standard. Dr. Strickland had testified at the deposition, "So let me tell you what I meant by it is that if he does not get the treatment he should have gotten in this intervening period, that the levels of depression that I saw in him and the associate[ed] anxiety are likely to, I think, wax and wane."

Dr. Strickland also appeared to try to avoid the Kennemur question at the deposition. This was a close case then, as now. Defendant argues, essentially, that the Court was correct in its prior ruling and the Court carefully considered that ruling. This does not necessarily mean the ruling was correct and the Court would appreciate further assistance. THE MITIGATION INSTRUCTION MAY HAVE BEEN IN ERROR Defendant does not provide a legal argument for the issue of specificity required for the mitigation instruction.

Such an argument would assist the Court. INSUFFICIENT PAST MEDICAL DAMAGES WERE AWARDED Defendant's billing analyst, after cross-examination and redirect, came to a figure of $269,908. Defendant asserts that some of the medical care was unnecessary, but the evidence provided is weak. Defendant's own billing analyst came to this figure using a Howell analysis. INSUFFICIENT FUTURE NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES WERE AWARDED Defendant cites to Audish v. Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740 for the principal that future damages need not be awarded even when future medical care is.

This case does defeat Plaintiff's claim that such damages should be automatic with future medical care, and the distinctions do not appear to logically alter the statement. Defendant further relies on its witnesses who said no traumatic brain injury occurred, but those witnesses were not credible as against Dr. Strickland, who found that a traumatic brain injury occurred, that Defendant suffered, and continues to suffer. Dr. Strickland had explicitly tested Plaintiff and was the key defense expert.

In this case, where future suffering was asserted by Dr. Strickland and no mitigation defense was made available, some amount had to be awarded. Had some number been chosen, the Court would defer to the jury's findings. Here, the Court must independently review the record and determine an equitable figure if a new trial is not granted on the mitigation issue. The Court will hear argument, and if the Court takes the matter under submission, it will be for a very brief period. The Court apologizes for the delay in ruling.

CV-24-006618 - CATT, TODD MICHAEL vs RENTERIA, MARCOS, Jr - a) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery Pending Determination on Defendants' Motion to Strike Doe Amendments and Motion to Quash Deposition Notice - MOOT. b) Defendant's Motion to Strike Amendments to Complaint Based on Lack of Good Faith, Abuse of Process, and Collusive Misrepresentation - DENIED. As determination of the motion is being made, the matter is moot. Each side cites cases at the demurrer or summary judgment stage, which we are not at.

Plaintiff argues that these were the facts as he understood them at the time he filed his complaint: Stanislaus Animal Services investigated on the day of Plaintiff's accident. According to the officer's report, Ms. Renteria claimed ownership of the two dogs that were killed as a result of the collision. Mr. Renteria then joined the

discussion and contended the dogs were strays. The animal control officer issued two citations to Mr. Renteria, and the third dog, which was injured, was recovered from the Renterias' property. The injured dog appeared to be related to the other two dogs that were killed. On these facts, Plaintiff filed suit against the Renterias. (See Pl.'s Opp., at pp. 3-4.) It was only at Plaintiff's deposition on April 13, 2026, that Plaintiff became aware of a possible dog breeding farm across the street from the Renterias.

Thereafter, Plaintiff acted promptly to amend his complaint. (See Pl.'s Opp., at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff had sent an evidence preservation letter to "Windy Hill Farm" on January 23, 2024, and a follow-up letter to "Gerald Mansager" and "Windy Hill Doodles" on February 15, 2024, and asserted there may be some liability for Windy Hill Doodles if it did not preserve documents. Whether this was a pro forma effort at preservation or based on some actual theory of liability is unclear. Plaintiff makes a sufficient facial showing to permit amendment.

The Court makes no findings at this time as to a potential demurrer or motion for summary judgment. The same logic applies to the Renteria's cross-complaint. The question here is not whether the amendment will survive further scrutiny, but whether it was void ab initio. Based on Plaintiff's claims, it was not. CV-25-001199 - ALMANZA, KRISTOPHER vs MODESTO ON ICE INC - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - Denied. Legal Standards A "party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . ." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question." (Id. at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that "one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that "a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Ibid.) "Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing.

His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed." (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant's burden. (Anderson v.

Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.) Request for Judicial Notice In support of its motion, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Second Amended Complaint and the answer to the Second Amended Complaint. The request for judicial notice is unnecessary as the Court probably need not make such a ruling to consider papers filed in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.)

Discussion

A motion for summary judgment is framed by the pleadings. (See FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381; Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67.) Here, there are two events that give rise to the pleading: (1) the state of the ice; and (2) Defendant's employees' alleged failure to timely offer aid (see SAC P.P. 18, 22, 44). The only fact that Moving Defendant lists for the latter issue is SUF No. 18: "Plaintiff claims in discovery and the operative complaint after he fell employees of Modesto On Ice, Inc. refused to call him an ambulance but at his deposition he testified and clarified they did not refuse to call him an ambulance." Plaintiff disputes this characterization. (See Resp. Sep. Stmt., SUF No. 18; AMF Nos. 6-8.) His issue was with the timing of the offer to render aid. Specifically, in his deposition, Plaintiff