Jai Mundi Incorporated v. Vape Craft, LLC

inspection all appear appropriately allocated to both parties. And Plaintiff does not dispute any of these charges. These expenses alone are thousands of dollars, indicating that more than $500 should be charged to Plaintiff.

With respect to the payment to Rodrigo Lopez to clean up the Subject Property, neither Plaintiff nor the Referee has explained what portion of the Subject Property Mr. Lopez cleaned up. Plaintiff argues she should not be charged any portion of the $2,750 listed as yard cleanup because she kept her gardener on payroll throughout the cleanup process to make the property more presentable for sale. She also states she and her daughter spent hours cleaning up Defendant’s yard after the workers hired by the realtor, and paid for from the proceeds of the sale, left the property.

Plaintiff should be reimbursed for expenses paid to her gardener which lessened the need for Mr. Lopez’s services. In addition, any amount of extra time required to clean up Defendant’s portion of the Subject Property over and above what it took him to clean up Plaintiff’s portion should be allocated to Defendant. However, Plaintiff’s and her daughter’s time spent cleaning the Subject Property must be viewed as voluntary.

d. Taxes

Plaintiff argues that after Defendant’s parents died, Defendant continued to pay one-half of the tax bill until November 2023, when she stopped contributing to the account. Plaintiff states Defendant owes her $340.00 for the balance of the 2023 taxes; and, that Plaintiff paid all the property taxes for 2024 ($4,293.42) and for 2025 ($4,474.44), such that Defendant owes Plaintiff $4,723.93 for her share of the taxes. Plaintiff states that she paid for all of the repairs of the well tank and well such that Defendant owes her half of those amounts, totaling $1,526. Plaintiff argues she should be repaid $3,023.00 for the cost of the required title search as a recoverable cost of litigation. It is not clear if the Referee took these requests for repayment into consideration.

V.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s arguments are valid. However, based upon the information provided by her and the Referee, this court cannot determine if the amounts she seeks to have allocated to the Defendant are reasonable. Nor is there any evidence before this court regarding tax payments or whether the Referee had this information. Accordingly, this court directs the Plaintiff to meet and confer with the Referee to allow the Referee to recalculate the proposed distribution to take into account Plaintiff’s objections. If the Referee determines Plaintiff should not be entitled to the requested amounts, she is directed to file an explanation with this court. This matter will be CONTINUED to September 16, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16. Any brief filed by the Referee must be filed and served by Wednesday, September 9, 2026, and any opposition thereto must be filed by September 11, 2026.

2. 25CV00572, Jai Mundi Incorporated v. Vape Craft, LLC

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, Defendant Benjamin Osmanson (“Defendant”) moves to set aside the default and default judgment entered against him on the grounds that the default judgment is void due to lack of service or, alternatively, Defendant’s default and default judgment resulted from his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect.

I. Legal Standards

This motion is brought pursuant to CCP section 473, but the memorandum also cites CCP section 473.5. 3

CCP section 473(b) allows the court to relieve a party from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. CCP section 473(d) allows the court to set aside any void judgment or order. CCP section 473.5 allows a party to move to set aside a default or default judgment when service of a summons has “not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against the party in the action.”

II. Timeliness

In opposition, Plaintiff Jai Mundi Incorporated, dba Kai’s Virgin Vapor (“Plaintiff”) argues that the motion is untimely. A motion under CCP section 473(b) to set aside a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect must be brought within six months. There is no time limit to set aside a void judgment. (CCP section 473(d).) A motion pursuant to CCP section 473.5 allows a motion for relief to be brought 180 days after service of the default or default judgment. (CCP section 473.5(a).)

Defendant’s default was entered on May 13, 2025. The default judgment was entered against Defendant and VapeCraft, LLC on October 23, 2025. This motion was filed on April 9, 2026. Thus, the motion is timely under sections 473.5 and subsection (d) of section 473. However, it is untimely under subsection (b) of section 473. More than six months has passed since the entry of Defendant’s default and setting aside the default judgment without setting aside the default would be an “idle act.” (Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267, 273.) The cases cited by Defendant are distinguishable because they were not decided based upon the six-month time limit to bring a motion under CCP section 473.

III. Service of Summons and Complaint

Defendant argues he was not properly served with summons and complaint. Proof of service of summons filed on April 10, 2025, states that Defendant was served by substituted service on April 2, 2025, at 3:50 p.m., by leaving the documents with Julia Franetusahova, Defendant’s mother-in-law, at 15400 Mokete Trail in Smithfield, Virginia, and thereafter mailing a copy of the documents to Defendant at that address. The process server’s declaration of diligence indicates the process server attempted to serve Defendant at the Virginia address three times prior to leaving the documents with Ms. Franetusahova.

In his declaration, Defendant states that from August 2016 to June 2025, his primary residence was located in Carlsbad, California. (Osmanson decl., ¶16.) He states he purchased the residence in Virginia in December 2022 and began the process of moving his family to the Virginia property in 2023, but he retained use and ownership of his California office space and his Carlsbad residence so that he could continue to operate his California businesses. (Ibid.) He states he traveled back and forth between the Virginia and California residences from December 2022 to June 2025, but his personal primary residence remained in California until June 2025. (Ibid.)

Defendant does not dispute that he lives at the Virginia property some of the time. In fact, he describes the Virginia property as a “home.” (Osmanson decl., ¶16.) He attempts to distinguish the California home as his “personal” primary residence. No authority supports this distinction. Nor does he provide supporting facts that he only lived at the Carlsbad property. Rather, he only states that he retained the use and ownership of the Carlsbad residence “so that [he] could continue to operate [his] California businesses.” (Ibid.)

Nor does Defendant actually state he was not aware of this lawsuit. He states: “After being served with the default judgment and learning of this lawsuit, I retained legal counsel to represent me, oppose the Order to Show Cause re contempt, and move to set aside the default and default judgment.” (Id., ¶18.) His statement does not require finding he was not aware of the lawsuit prior 4

to being served with the default judgment. It only requires finding that he hired counsel sometime after both learning of this lawsuit and being served with the default judgment.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant was properly served because a defendant can have more than one dwelling place or abode. Process server, David Vincent Larsen, states that he attempted service on Defendant’s home in Carlsbad three times and did not find anyone at home. (Larsen decl.) Plaintiff’s evidence supports finding Defendant purchased the Virginia property and that he made representations on various occasions that he moved to Virginia. The deed to 15400 Mokete Trail, Smithfield, Virginia, shows it was transferred to Defendant on October 27, 2022. (Jablon decl., Exhibit B.)

Defendant’s CEO received a text from Defendant on January 30, 2023, wherein Defendant stated he had moved to Virginia. (Jones decl., ¶2, Exhibit A.) An article dated August 19, 2024, from the Smithfield Times discusses a Virginia business owned by Defendant. The article states Defendant represented that he “is a transplant from California.” (Id., Exhibit C.) Another article dated January 22, 2025, states that Defendant, the owner of another Smithfield, Virginia, business is an “isle of Wight County” resident. (Id., Exhibit D.)

Another article dated November 3, 2025, quotes Defendant discussing one of his Smithfield, Virginia, businesses stating: “We do a little bit of work each day and open for the evening,” discussing how he and his wife intend to be positive members of the community in Smithfield, and that they represented to the paper that they relocated to Smithfield from California in 2022. (Id., Exhibit E.)

Even if this court did not consider Plaintiff’s evidence, Defendant himself does not dispute that the Virginia residence was one of his homes. Moreover, Ms. Franetusahova informed the process server that Defendant was not present—not that he did not live at the property. Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, cited by Defendant, is distinguishable because the defendant in that case was served at her mother’s address, where she did not live.

IV. Objections in Reply

Defendant’s objection, number 1 to the declaration of Shawnee Jones, is overruled. Defendant’s objections, numbers 1 and 2 to the declaration of David Vincent Larsen, are overruled. Mr. Larsen’s phraseology cited in objection number 1, stating “after due and diligent effort” is not taken by this court as a legal determination but rather the process server’s understanding of his own attempts to serve Defendant. Defendant’s objections, numbers 1 and 2 to the declaration of Andrew Jablon, are sustained. Defendant’s objections, numbers 3 and 4 to the declaration of Andrew Jablon, are overruled.

V.

Conclusion

Defendant was properly served by substituted service at his home in Virginia. He provides no evidence that he was not actually aware of this lawsuit in time to defend against the action before his default or the default judgment was entered against him. Defendant’s motion to set aside his default under CCP section 473(b) is untimely. The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order consistent with this ruling in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court 3.1312.

3. 25CV01525, Gutierrez v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

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