Jose De Jesus De Lira Flores and Claudia Maria Magdalena Piedra Fernandez v. Lloyd Saitman

(Santa Monica Courthouse: Dept. N) September 2, 2026 DEPARTMENT N LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Defendants Shawn S. Rabbani and Hertz Investment Company, LLC's Motion to Bifurcate Trial is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs Mir Ali Akbar Helmi and Mahnaz Yazdanmanesh to give notice.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiffs submit evidentiary objections to the declaration of attorney John D. Wilson submitted in support of Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate. Plaintiffs' fourth and seventh objections are sustained as inadmissible hearsay and as lacking foundation. Plaintiffs' second and third objections are sustained as improper opinion. The remaining objections are overruled.

REASONING

Defendants Shawn S. Rabbani and Hertz Investment Company, LLC (together, "Defendants") move the Court for an order bifurcating the liability phase of trial from the damages phase of trial, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 598, which allows for bifurcation "when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted" by bifurcation. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 598.)

Plaintiffs Mir Ali Akbar Helmi and Mahnaz Yazdanmanesh (together, "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion on the ground that bifurcation would duplicate witnesses, prolong trial, risk inconsistent findings, and confuse the jury. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b), "[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States."

Defendants have failed to demonstrate that bifurcation is proper here. Defendants argue that it "makes common sense" to try the issue of liability first before permitting testimony on the issue of damages, considering many of Plaintiffs' experts will address the alleged damages sustained. (Mot., p. 4.) Defendants fail to identify which issues are genuinely separable, do not describe the anticipated liability-phase evidence, and do not demonstrate that a liability phase could proceed without the evidence Plaintiffs characterize as damages proof.

Further, the court, over the objection of a party, cannot order the separate trial of an issue of liability when because of the nature of the case it is necessary to prove the plaintiff's damages in order to establish that liability. (Cohn v. Bugas (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-86.) Here, the issues of liability and damages require presentation of the same witnesses and exhibits. Materiality, reliance, and causation turn on the nature and extent of the concealed conditions, and that same evidence fixes the measure of the loss. (SAC, P.P. 65, 69.)

Separation would require recalling witnesses and reintroducing evidence in a second phase. This duplication undercuts the economy rationale that is the statutory purpose of bifurcation. Accordingly, Defendants Shawn S. Rabbani and Hertz Investment Company, LLC's Motion to Bifurcate Trial is DENIED without prejudice.

Case Number: 24SMCV05613 Hearing Date: September 2, 2026 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Lloyd Saitman's Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first and fifth causes of action. Defendant Lloyd Saitman shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).) Plaintiffs Jose De Jesus De Lira Flores and Claudia Maria Magdalena Piedra Fernandez to give notice.

REASONING

"[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].)

For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967), but the Court does not "assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law." (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125).

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not "sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment"]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 ["A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment."]; Vaccaro v.

Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 ["When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend."].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Mislabeled Cause of Action

As a preliminary matter, Defendant's demurrer is to the first cause of action for negligence and the "sixth" cause of action for premises liability. The TAC contains no sixth cause of action; premises liability is pleaded as the fifth cause of action. Because the substance of the demurrer is clear--Defendant demurs to the negligence claim and the premises liability claim--the Court addresses the demurrer on the merits.

First Cause of Action: General Negligence

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) "the existence of a legal duty of care," (2) "breach of that duty," and (3) "proximate cause resulting in an injury." (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) In the first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege Defendant, as the trustee of the Separate Trust, owned, controlled, maintained, and/or managed the Subject Property. (TAC, P. 22.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant had a duty to act reasonably and use due care while other vehicles accessed the driveway to enter and exit the Subject Property, and to not subject anyone on the Pacific Coast Highway to an unreasonable risk of harm. (TAC, P. 27.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant breached his duty of care despite actual and constructive knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the Subject Property. (TAC, P. 28.)

Defendant demurs to these claims on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Defendant, and (2) the first cause of action is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible against Defendant. A landowner's duty of care encompasses avoiding conditions that expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury offsite.(Barnes v. Black(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1478-1479.) The TAC alleges a dangerous condition on Defendant's property--a narrow, steep driveway with inadequate turnaround space that resulted in vehicles reversing directly onto a high-speed highway. (TAC, P. 60.) That the instrumentality causing injury, here the highway and the limousine, lies beyond the landowner's control does not defeat this duty.

In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC, which is instructive. In Annocki, a motorcyclist was killed on the Pacific Coast Highway by a vehicle exiting a restaurant's driveway. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 34.) The Court of Appeal, reversing an order sustaining a demurrer, held that although the restaurant did not and could not control conditions of the highway, the configuration of the premises allowed restaurant patrons to leave the premises in a manner that was unsafe to themselves, giving rise to a duty. (Id., pp. 38-39.)

The court grounded its conclusion in the general rule that a landowner may owe a duty where its property "unleash[es] forces onto public streets," such that "injury to third persons was foreseeable." (Id., at p. 38.) Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendant's property contained a dangerously configured driveway, including lack of turnaround space and a design that required backing directly into high-speed traffic. Under Annocki, this is sufficient to establish a duty owed.

Furthermore, Defendant argues the TAC's allegations that the valet attendants warned Defendant Makhshikyan not to back onto the Pacific Coast Highway, and that he ignored them, is a judicial admission that negates duty and proximate cause. (Dem., p. 4; TAC P. 26.) While the determination of whether an act is intervening or superseding presents a question of fact, there still must be sufficient allegations of an act to survive a demurrer. (Bigbee v. Superior Court (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 451, 456.) Here, there are sufficient facts pled that a driver backing unsafely into traffic on the Pacific Coast Highway is the very risk the alleged driveway configuration created. (TAC, P. 31.) Additionally, Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficiently clear to show Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for negligence. Accordingly, the Defendant's demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action: Negligence (Premises Liability)

"The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages." (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) "Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises." (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.) The Court incorporates the reasoning laid out above. Furthermore, ownership and control are adequately alleged.

Plaintiffs allege the Separate Trust owned and controlled the Subject Property and its points of ingress and egress. (TAC, P.P. 10, 56.) The allegations are sufficient for purposes of demurrer. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the fifth cause of action is sufficiently pled. Further, Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficiently clear to show Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for premises liability. Accordingly, the Defendant's demurrer is overruled as to the fifth cause of action.

Conclusion

Defendant Lloyd Saitman's Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first and fifth causes of action. Defendant Lloyd Saitman shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)

Case Number: 26SMCV01925 Hearing Date: September 2, 2026 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING

The hearing on Plaintiff Alessandro A. Dazzan's Motion to Enforce Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(h) and Request for Monetary Sanctions of $2,500 is CONTINUED TO ______________________ in order to provide Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC with an opportunity to file a motion for protective order. An Order to Show Cause re: Filing of Motion for Protective Order is scheduled for ________, 2026, at _________in Department N of the Santa Monica Courthouse. Plaintiff to give notice.

REASONING

Plaintiff moves for an order enforcing Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26, subdivision (h), and compelling Defendant to produce within fifteen (15) days (1) Warranty Policies and Procedure Manuals under subdivision (h)(12) and (2) the manufacturer's written statement of policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests for restitution or replacement pursuant to "Lemon Law" claims under subdivision (h)(15). Plaintiff also requests that the Court impose monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,500, payable within fifteen (15) business days.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant filed its answer on May 22, 2026 and, thus, had to produce the seventeen categories of documents enumerated in subdivision (h) on or before July 10, 2026, 60 days after filing the answer. According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to produce documents under subdivisions (h)(12) and (h)(15). Plaintiff also argues that the manufacturer may not condition its mandatory, self-executing production obligation on the entry of a protective order. Plaintiff argues that the Court has authority to order compliance pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision(a) and Government Code section 68608, subdivision 9(b), and to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to section 871.26, subdivision (j).

In opposition, Defendant argues that it served its initial disclosures on July 9, 2026, within 60 days of the Answer and produced about 889 pages of documents. However, Defendant conditioned its production of warranty policies and procedure manuals under subdivision (h)(12), and the manufacturer's written statement of policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests under subdivision (h)(15) on Plaintiff's agreement to a protective order, which was provided to Plaintiff on May 11, 2026. On July 22, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel informed