Bacelar v. Kimberly Anne Wright and Jill Lee Ryther

shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought." (Civ. Proc. Code, Sec. 2023.040.)

Defendants violated Penal Code Sec. 502 by stealing Plaintiff Bacelar's personal information and publishing it online. Plaintiffs also allege malicious prosecution regarding the death of a dog which Defendants allegedly adopted from Plaintiffs based on false representations. The Court granted Defendant Kimberly Anne Wright and Defendant Jill Lee Ryther's separate anti-SLAPP special motions to strike. Defendants now move for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1).

Defendant Kimberly Anne Wright's motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $73,500. Defendant Jill Lee Ryther's motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $57,000.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Kimberly Anne Wright's Motion For Attorney's Fees

Discussion

The Court granted Defendant Kimberly Anne Wright's anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. Defendant moves for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) in the amount of $106,532. A defendant prevailing on a special motion to strike is entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs. (Sec. 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 17 P.3d 735].) The defendant can recover only its fees and costs in connection with the motion, not the entire action. (Citations omitted.) (City of Industry v.

City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 218 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) [O]nly those attorney fees and costs related to the special motion to strike, not the entire action, may be recovered under section 425.16, subdivision (c) . (See, e.g., S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 381 [46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 138 P.3d 713] ["the fee 'provision [under Sec. 425.16] applies only to the motion to strike, and not to the entire action' "]; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383 [46 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 542] [legislative history of Sec. 425.16 "clearly show[s] the Legislature intended that a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike be allowed to recover attorney fees and costs only on the motion to strike, not the entire suit"].)

In awarding fees the trial court is not constrained by the amount sought by the successful moving parties (citation omitted), but is obligated to award "reasonable attorney fees under section 425.16 [that] adequately compensate[] them for the expense of responding to a baseless lawsuit." (Citations omitted.) The fees awarded should include services for all proceedings, including discovery initiated by the opposing party pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (g), directly related to the special motion to strike. ([*93] Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v.

San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1248 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57] [affirming award of attorney fees including fees incurred in opposing discovery request and motion for reconsideration]; American Humane Assn. v. Los Angeles Times Communications (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104 [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488] [documentation for attorney fee motion should include “the total cost of the special motion to strike and any related discovery permitted by the court "]; see Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 446 [121 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 275] ["statute is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extricating herself from a baseless lawsuit "].)

In determining the fee award pursuant to section 425.16, the court may utilize the lodestar method addressed in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303] and in appropriate cases may include a fee enhancement for the purpose of compensating the attorney for contingent risk, exceptional skill or other factors. (Citation omitted.) .(Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92-93 [bold emphasis added].) The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v.

Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4 th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) "The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally 'begins with the ' lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate....'" "[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award...." (Graciano v.

Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4 th 140, 154.)

In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of "'fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.'" (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v.

County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.) The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a "manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence." (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-94.) The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney's fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v.

ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

The Court has considered its rulings on Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, and reviewed the case history. The Court has also examined the billing summary attached as Exhibits 3 and 4 to Defendant's Appendix of Exhibits, and the Declarations of Carl I. S. Mueller and David D. Samani setting forth the lodestar calculations and costs. The Court approves the hourly rates of $400 and $650 set forth in the Muller and Samani Declarations. However, the Court reads into these hourly rate experience in SLAPP motions which would account for knowledge that would be expected of counsel billing at these rates, which in turn should reduce the amount of legal research for most issues. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledges that the issues raised by the anti-SLAPP motion were more complex than an average anti-SLAPP motion.

However, attorney's fees are not recoverable for unsuccessful portions of anti-SLAPP motion: Defendants consequently are entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the claims on which they prevailed, but not fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the remaining claims. The trial court may determine the appropriate amount of fees and costs, upon a proper application by defendants. (See Coltrain, supra, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 108.) (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.) In this regard, time spent on the unsuccessful motion to seal is not recoverable. "A trial court is not required to state each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable. A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case." (Karton v. Ari Design & Constr., Inc (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744-45.)

The Court finds that the reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred is $73,500 which includes the time spent on and costs incurred in bringing this fee motion. As such, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $73,500.

Defendant Jill Lee Ryther's Motion For Attorney's Fees

Discussion

The Court granted Defendant Jill Lee Ryther's anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. Defendant moves for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1) in the amount of $82,531.20. The Court incorporates by reference its discussion above re: Defendant Wright's motion for attorney's fees.

The Court has considered its rulings on Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, and reviewed the case history. The Court has also examined the billing summary attached as Exhibit D to the Declaration of Carl I. S. Mueller setting forth the lodestar calculations and costs. The Court approves the hourly rates of $450 and $650 set forth in the Muller Declaration. However, the Court reads into these hourly rate experience in SLAPP motions which would account for knowledge that would be expected of counsel billing at these rates, which in turn should reduce the amount of legal research for most issues. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledges that the issues raised by the anti-SLAPP motion were more complex than an average anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court finds that the reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred is $57,000 which includes the time spent on and costs incurred in bringing this fee motion. As such, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $57,000.

Case Number: 26STCV11961

Hearing Date: September 2, 2026

Dept: 734

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants entered into an agreement to purchase Plaintiff's property and had an unlicensed contractor perform work on the property, but Defendants failed to perform under the agreement. Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff is attempting to force a cancellation of the transaction that would strip Defendant of her contractual rights, cause forfeiture of her earnest money deposit, release the brokers and agents from liability, and deprive her of the substantial money she already spent improving and repairing the Property in reliance on representations by her agent and the transaction participants. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Mahin Norwood moves to expunge the lis pendens recorded in connection with the Cross-Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

The hearing on Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Mahin Norwood's motion to expunge the lis pendens recorded in connection with the Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED to October 16, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. Moving party indicates that the opposing party's counsel was served by e-mail. However, it appears to the Court that opposing party's counsel did not provide an e-mail address on the caption page of the Cross-Complaint or other pleadings filed with the Court. The proof of service indicates that notice of this motion was served upon [email protected] .

Moving party did not demonstrate compliance with Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1010.6(b)(3), which provides: "Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served." This is significant because no opposition was filed, so there is no assurance that the motion was properly served. Moving party is to immediately serve a copy of the motion and notice of the continuance by mail to the address