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PLAINTIFF CHIH HU'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL SITE INSPECTION AND FOR SANCTIONS
Matter on the Law & Motion / Discovery calendar for Thursday, September 18, 2025, Line 1. [Part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling.]
PLAINTIFF CHIH HU'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO COMPEL SITE INSPECTION AND FOR SANCTIONS. Plaintiff Chih Hu's motion to compel compliance with her site inspection demand is denied. The court denies sanctions to both parties.
Hu noticed a site inspection on the mutually agreed date of August 20, 2025. (Oksenendler Dec. Ex. 6.) The notice stated that Hu demanded defendant BXP Research Park LP permit her inspection of "the door which is the subject of this litigation, and the surrounding areas." (Id.) Hu also notified defendants that she would "photograph, measure, and/or videotape the property. No destructive testing will be performed." (Id.)
On August 20, Hu's attorney and her expert Zachary M. Moore attended the inspection, along with defendants' attorneys and others. BXP expert Mike Panish observed via Zoom through a cell phone camera. Moore inspected and pushed the door, but BXP refused to permit Moore to disassemble the cover of a door latch and push bar mechanism. (Moore Dec. paras. 10, 11; Holl Dec. paras. 6-7.)
Hu now seeks an order requiring BXP to permit that further inspection. Code of Civil Procedure, section 2031.030, governs inspection demands. It states in relevant part in subdivision (c)(4) that an inspection demand must "[s]pecify any inspection, copying, testing, sampling, or related activity that is being demanded, as well as the manner in which that activity will be performed, and whether that activity will permanently alter or destroy the item involved."
The court denies relief because Hu's inspection demand did not specify "the manner in which that activity will be performed." It is one thing to visually inspect a door; it is another to take it apart and put it back together again. BXP's expert rightly notes that disassembly of the door latch mechanism raised the prospect that it would have to be put back together again correctly, for fire safety among other reasons. (Panish Dec. paras. 15-16.)
Had Hu notified BXP that she intended to take apart the door, the parties could have met and conferred about the circumstances under which an internal inspection of the latch mechanism would take place, such as only after a qualified contractor removed the panel, or only after Moore or Hu agreed to indemnify BXP for any damage to the door resulting from Moore's inspection. Hu did not provide notice, and therefore BXP was within its rights to object to those portions of Hu's inspection that went beyond the scope of her inspection demand.
Hu focuses on her argument that her proposed testing was not destructive, in that Moore intended to restore the door to the condition he found it in. But Hu ignores the portion of the statute requiring her demand to specify how the inspection would occur.
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The court nonetheless denies sanctions to all parties, concluding that Hu was substantially justified in bringing this motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., section 2031.320, subd. (b).) [End of part 1 of 2 of the tentative ruling.] =(301/CVA) | |