Parker vs. Le

identified. The Court therefore addresses the merits notwithstanding the procedural defect.

The two actions concern disputes over the same two adjacent residential properties, and the parties are identical in both cases, except that in the 3080 Action, Plaintiff litigates in her capacity as “Successor Trustee and Sole Beneficiary of the Claudia Anne Parker Revocable Trust.” In the 7835 Action, Plaintiff appears in her individual capacity, although she alleges that the property is in a trust, and has filed a motion for leave to amend which, in part, seeks to change Plaintiff’s capacity to trustee. Both cases involve claims for negligence, private nuisance and property damage. However, the 3080 Action also includes allegations related to easement rights.

Plaintiff contends that the cases do not overlap, and therefore consolidation would not serve economy and convenience. She contends that the 3080 Action concerns issues with the front portion of the properties, while the 7835 Action concerns issues with the rear portion of the properties.

The Court finds that consolidation would conserve judicial resources, and reduce the risk of inconsistent rulings. Although the issues raised in the two cases are not identical, because they involve the same parties, same property, and similar causes of action, complete consolidation will streamline the litigation.

Defendants raise concern that Plaintiff is not able to prosecute these actions in pro per, as she apparently intends to pursue both actions in her capacity as trustee. Defendants urge the Court to set an OSC re: Dismissal regarding the matter. However, this issue is beyond the scope of a motion for consolidation. Further, citing Aulisio v. Bancroft, Defendants contend that a person who is "only the trustee and sole beneficiary of a revocable trust settled by someone else," and not the settlor, "could not purport to litigate trust matters in propria persona because the interests at stake in protecting the trust corpus would belong to the settlor." (Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1525.) Defendants have not provided any evidence that Plaintiff is not the settlor of the trust.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. The actions are consolidated for all purposes, with Parker v. Le, et al., Case No. 2024-01447835, designated as the lead case.

Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff Ana Christina Parker (“Plaintiff”) seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. However, on the deadline for Plaintiff’s reply brief, Plaintiff instead filed a Notice of Lodging and Supplemental Declaration which purports to submit a revised proposed Second Amended Complaint. The revised proposed Second Amended Complaint was not attached to the supplemental declaration or notice of lodging. Further, the notice of lodging indicates that the revised proposed SAC “add[s] limited factual allegations and related requested abatement relief based on newly discovered information concerning wall-height limitations, wall-reconstruction requirements, and the feasibility of abating ongoing noise, privacy, wall, an access-related interference.” (ROA 70 ¶ 3.)

The Court cannot assess the merits of the motion without a copy of the proposed pleading. Further, CRC 3.1324 requires Plaintiff to provide a declaration regarding the proposed changes, and to include a redline of the proposed pleading, none of which has been done in connection with the revised proposed SAC.

Finally, submitting the revised proposed SAC after Defendants have already filed their opposition unfairly deprives Defendants of a fair opportunity to respond to the proposed pleading.

For all of these reasons, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Defendants to give notice of both orders. 108 The Standard Fire Insurance Company vs. Milton Roy Company, Hartell Division, 25-01473457 Plaintiff The Standard Fire Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) moves to compel Defendant Viking Range, LLC’s representative Michael Lacombe to appear for a deposition. Plaintiff also asks for monetary sanctions in the amount of $561.65 against Viking Range, LLC’s attorney, Sierra J. Chinn-Liu, Esq., for the reasonable costs and fees associated with having to bring this motion. The Motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, et seq. and 2023.030(a).

Defendant Viking Range, LLC (“Defendant”) opposes the motion.

On 08/13/2026, the Court held a hearing on this motion. The Court ordered the following after the hearing:

“The Court finds that whether Mr. Lacombe signed the verification to Defendant’s discovery responses is of great significance to the issues presented in this motion. However, Plaintiff has not provided any admissible evidence that Mr. Lacombe signed a discovery verification in defense of this case. Plaintiff also did not provide admissible evidence that Mr. Lacombe appeared at destructive testing on Defendant’s behalf.

Plaintiff is ordered to file evidence establishing that Mr. Lacombe signed the verification on behalf of Defendant and any other evidence supporting Mr. Lacombe’s role and/or responsibilities in relation to Defendant no later than 9 court days before the continued hearing. Defendant is permitted to file a 3 page reply in addition to evidence opposing Plaintiff’s contentions no later than 5 court days before the continued hearing.

If Plaintiff’s statement is true, that Mr. Lacombe signed the discovery verification on behalf of Defendant in defense of this case, the Court strongly encourages the parties to work together to establish a mutually agreeable date to conduct Mr. Lacombe’s deposition.” (ROA 111.)

On August 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration in support of the motion to compel the deposition of Michael Lacombe. In the declaration, Plaintiff’s counsel attached the discovery responses provided by Defendant, which were verified by Michael Lacombe. The Court finds that such evidence supports Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant shall be required to produce Michael Lacombe for deposition.

As such, the motion to compel Defendant Viking Range, LLC’s representative Michael Lacombe to appear for a deposition is GRANTED. Defendant shall produce Michael Lacombe for his deposition on a mutually agreeable date, no later than 45 days following notice of this order.