CARLOTTA CT., LLC VS. BRITTANY L. PICKETT ROSE

September 2, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 2:00 PM LINE 12 26-UDL-00556 CARLOTTA CT., LLC VS. BRITTANY L. PICKETT ROSE

CARLOTTA CT., LLC STEVEN T. NAUMCHIK BRITTANY L. PICKETT ROSE

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Brittany Pickett-Rose’s Demurrer to Complaint is CONTINUED to 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2026 in Department 28, Courtroom I, 800 North Humboldt Street, San Mateo, California.

As a preliminary matter, notice of demurer was purportedly served by mail. “Service by mail must be made in strict compliance with the mandates of [Code of Civil Procedure] sections 1013 and 1013a.” (Aquino v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 104, 111.) The proof of service of the demurrer does not set forth the exact title of the documents served and merely states that the papers were “served ... by mailing a copy” (see Demurrer, filed Aug. 21, 2026 at p. 11, ll. 11–12) without “also showing that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with the postage thereon fully prepaid.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a, subds. (b), (c); see id., § 1013, subd. (a) [paper must be mailed “in a sealed envelope, with postage paid”].)

Notwithstanding the notice defects, plaintiff opposed the demurrer. The court therefore rules as follows.

First, a complaint for unlawful detainer must “[s]tate specifically the method used to serve the defendant with the notice or notices of termination upon which the complaint is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (a)(5).) “This requirement may be satisfied ... by attaching a proof of service of the notice or notices of termination served on the defendant[,]” which the Complaint does here. (Ibid.; see May 11, 2026 Complaint, at p. 2, ll. 15–18, exh. A, at p. 3.) However, the proof of service does not show that the sixty-day notice on which the Complaint is based was served, instead referring to an unknown notice to pay rent or quit. (Complaint, exh.

A, at p. 3.) Accordingly, while the Complaint alleges that “plaintiff caused to be served upon the defendant a written notice terminating their tenancy and requiring defendant to deliver up possession of said premises on or before May 1, 2026,” the Complaint fails to state specifically how that notice was served and therefore fails to state a cause of action.

Second, “after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property shall not terminate a tenancy without just cause, which shall be stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a).) The Complaint admits that the tenancy began in 2024 (Complaint, at p. 2, ll. 11–13), and thus a statement of just cause in the notice is required unless the Complaint adequately pleads an exemption from the statutory requirement.

September 2, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ The Complaint attempts to rely on the exemption provided by subdivision (e)(8) of Civil Code, section 1946.2, which provides that residential real property alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit is exempt provided that (1) the owner is not a real estate investment trust, corporation, limited liability company with a corporation as a member, or management of a mobilehome park and (2) the tenant has been provided a written notice of the exemption “in the rental agreement” using prescribed statutory language. (Civ.

Code, § 1946.2, subd. (e)(8).) While the Complaint alleges that it meets the first requirement, it does not expressly allege that written notice of the exemption was provided in the rental agreement. (See Complaint, p. 2, ll. 20–28.)

The omission of this allegation is understandable, given that the Complaint admits the rental agreement was oral. (Complaint, at p. 2, ll. 11–13.) It nonetheless appears an attempt to cure the absence of written notice was made by altering the rental agreement’s terms to include the written notice pursuant to Civil Code, section 827, which allows a landlord to change the terms of a lease for a periodic tenancy “upon giving notice in writing to the tenant, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Civ. Code, § 827, subd. (a)(1).) The written notice of termination includes a paragraph stating that the terms of the subject tenancy were amended to include the written notice of exemption, effective thirty days after service. (Complaint, exh. A, at p. 1 [also reciting the tenancy is month-to-month].)

Taking all the Complaint’s allegations as true, however, it is indisputable that, at the time the notice of termination was served, the property was not exempt from the requirements of Civil Code, section 1946.2, because the lease did not yet include the written notice of the subdivision (e)(8) exemption. Thus, the notice of termination was required to set forth just cause for terminating the tenancy. (See Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (a).) The notice of termination of tenancy on which the Complaint’s cause of action is based does not do so. (See Complaint, exh.

A, at pp. 1–2.) Thus, in serving the notice without a statement of just cause, Carlotta failed to comply with a provision of Civil Code, section 1946.2. “An owner’s failure to comply with any provision of this section shall render the written termination notice void.” (Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g).) The notice of termination is therefore void.

Service of a valid notice to quit is an essential prerequisite and element of an unlawful detainer cause of action. (Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607, 611.) The notice must be in strict compliance with statutory requirements. (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 394–395.) Because proper service of a valid notice is an element of the cause of action, defects in the notice and service thereof are subject to demurrer. (Attenello v. Basilious (2022) 88 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 7–8; see Code of Civ. Proc., § 1166, subd. (a)(5) [complaint must allege method of service].)

Because the Complaint does not allege proper service of a valid notice, it fails to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. And because the notice of termination is void, there is no manner in which the Complaint may be amended. Accordingly, once sufficient proof of proper notice is provided, the demurrer will be sustained without leave to amend.

September 2, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, defendant shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, providing written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), which states in part that the “prevailing party on a tentative ruling is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim (emphasis added). The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.

POSTED: 3:00 PM