LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

26CV163017: LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer DEFENDANT AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE; filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (Defendant) CRS# 497887034690 in Department 19

Tentative Ruling - 09/01/2026 Joscelyn Jones

The Demurrer filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. on 03/25/2026 is Sustained with Leave to Amend.

The Court rules as follows on Defendant’s Demurrer to, and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from, Plaintiff’s Complaint.

The demurrer to the First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d) is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2023, she “entered a warranty contract with Defendant, regarding a Certified Pre-Owned 2020 Honda Pilot”. (See Complaint, paragraph 6.) Plaintiff does not identify from whom she purchased the vehicle. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action alleges that Defendant failed to replace or pay restitution for Plaintiff’s vehicle, as purportedly required by Civil Code § 1793(d).

The obligation of a vehicle manufacturer to replace or pay restitution for a vehicle applies to “new motor vehicles” (see Civil Code § 1793.2(d)(2)), which include a vehicle “sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty”. (See Civil Code § 1793.22(e)(2).) Plaintiff does not allege that she bought a new vehicle, or that it came with a “new car warranty”. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to the replace or repurchase remedy of § 1793.2(d). (See Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.) The Court observes that Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, cited by Plaintiff, held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief under Civil Code § 1795.5, not § 1793.2(d).

The demurrers to the Second Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b) and Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3) are OVERRULED. Defendant has not cited any statutory or case law that claims for alleged violations of § 1793.2(b) and § 1793.2(a)(3) can only be brought by owners of new (as opposed to used or pre-owned) vehicles.

The demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability is OVERRULED. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant issued her a Certified Pre- Owned warranty with her purchase of the vehicle. A manufacturer can be liable under Civil Code § 1795.5 for issuing an express warranty with the sale of a used product. (See Kiluk, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at 337, 340.)

The demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment is SUSTAINED, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 26CV163017: LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer DEFENDANT AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE; filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (Defendant) CRS# 497887034690 in Department 19

The rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has not pled fraudulent concealment with the required particularity. (See Complaint, paragraphs 46-48.) However, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege facts demonstrating a transactional relationship with Defendant that would impose on Defendant a duty to disclose material facts to Plaintiff. There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. (See Bigler-Engler v. Breg Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311.)

Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting she was in a fiduciary relationship with Defendant. Where, as here, a fiduciary relationship does not exist between the parties, only circumstances (2)-(4), supra, potentially apply. However, those circumstances presuppose the existence of a transactional relationship between the parties in which a duty to disclose can arise. (Bigler- Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 311.) Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting she was involved in a transactional relationship with Defendant that gave rise to a common law duty to disclose.

This case is distinguishable from Dhital v. Nissan North America Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, cited by Plaintiff. In Dhital, the court found that for pleading purposes, the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a transactional relationship with Nissan giving rise to a duty to disclose concealed facts where they alleged they bought their vehicle from a Nissan dealership, Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and Nissan’s authorized dealerships were its agents for the purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. (Id. at 844.)

Here, by contrast, Plaintiff alleges she “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant”, but she has not identified from whom she purchased her vehicle, nor has she alleged that the person or entity from whom she purchased her vehicle was Defendant’s agent for the purposes of the sale of Defendant’s used vehicles to consumers. Plaintiff is given leave to expressly so allege, if that is what she contends.

OCM Principal Opportunities Fund LP v. CIBC Worlds Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, Collins v. eMachines Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255, and Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 835, cited by Plaintiff in her opposition brief, all predate Bigler-Engler, supra, and do not address the latter case’s requirement that in the absence of a fiduciary duty, a duty to disclose must be based on a transactional relationship. Therefore, those cases are not persuasive on this issue. Moreover, Daugherty did not involve a claim for common law fraud by concealment.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim is barred by the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV163017: LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Demurrer DEFENDANT AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH MOTION TO STRIKE; filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (Defendant) CRS# 497887034690 in Department 19 economic loss rule. A claim for fraudulent concealment is not necessarily barred by the economic loss rule. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at 843.) However, the economic loss rule generally bars tort recovery for claims that arise in contract (e.g., a contract to purchase a vehicle) unless two conditions are satisfied.

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct violated a duty independent of any contractual duties; second, the defendant’s conduct must have caused injury to persons or property that was not reasonably contemplated when the contract was formed. (See Rattagan v. Uber Technologies Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 20-21.)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any concealment by Defendant caused an injury to persons or property, or indeed any damage that could not have been contemplated when she purchased her vehicle. Instead, as the Complaint is currently pled, Plaintiff alleges that she purchased a vehicle that is not worth what it would be absent any defects. (See, e.g., Complaint paragraphs 65-67.) Plaintiff also alleges that she unknowingly exposed herself “to the risk of liability, accident, and injury” as a result of Defendant’s purported concealment (Id.), but she does not allege that she in fact suffered any damage from those hypothetical, speculative risks.

Buying a vehicle that is allegedly defective is within the reasonable contemplation of the parties to a vehicle purchase agreement. (See Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 37.) Plaintiff is given leave to amend to allege that she suffered an injury to person or property that could not have been contemplated when she purchased her vehicle, so as to fall outside the scope of the economic loss rule.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Prayer for Punitive Damages is GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to reallege a claim for punitive damages if Plaintiff can allege a viable cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The Court observes that punitive damages are not an available remedy under the Song-Beverly Act. (Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 227.)

In amending, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that any fraudulent conduct on which the punitive damage claim is based was either committed by, or authorized or ratified by, an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. (Civil Code § 3294(d).) Complaint paragraph 50 consists of factually devoid conclusions and is inadequate.

The Court will prepare the order. Defendant shall serve Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall have 10 days to amend, running from service of Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiff by Defendant. Defendant shall have 10 days thereafter to respond.