Rodriguez vs. American Honda Motor CO., INC

was filed on January 15, 2026. Once Cross-Complainants realized their mistake, the cross-complaint was dismissed in March 2026. Only two months have passed before dismissal, which does not tend to show that Cross-Complainants were trying to use the cross-complaint as a means for harassment, unnecessary delay, or to thwart competition.

For these reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Cross-Complainants to give notice.

8 Hamidi vs. OFF CALENDAR Gordonstone & Tiles, Inc. 9 Mills vs. CONTINUED TO 9/9/26 Nexgen Air Conditioning and Heating, LLC 10 Rodriguez vs. TENTATIVE RULING: American Honda Motor For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Tax Costs brought by CO., INC Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is GRANTED in part. The Court will tax $89.50 in costs incurred after March 19, 2026, from the Memorandum of Costs filed by Plaintiff Robert Andrew Rodriguez.

“[A] prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) Additionally, a “prevailing party” includes “the party with a net monetary recovery....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, sub. (a)(4).)

In addition to the above, pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), a prevailing buyer in a Song-Beverly action “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses...determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party pursuant to the accepted section 998 Offer. (Declaration of Ashleigh K. Gideon (“Gideon Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. A [998 Offer, ¶ 2: “[Defendant] will also pay Plaintiff’s statutory costs and expenses under California Civil Code section 1794(d).... Plaintiff will be considered the prevailing party.”].)

Further, the Court finds that both the memorandum of costs and the instant motion were timely filed.

Per California Rules of Court rule 3.1700, “[a] prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment...or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” (Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

Plaintiff filed his memorandum of costs on May 4, 2026, prior to judgment being entered. Notably, the premature filing of a memorandum of costs is not jurisdictional and is treated as “a mere irregularity at best” that “does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice.” (Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880.)

Thereafter, “[a]ny notice of motion to strike or tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).) If the cost memorandum is electronically served, the deadline is extended by two court days under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3). (Ibid.) Here, Defendant timely filed and electronically served the motion on May 21, 2026, within the 15- day period as extended by two court days for electronic service.

“In ruling upon a motion to tax costs, the trial court’s first determination is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item and whether it appears proper on its face.” (Foothill-De Anza Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29.) “If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show [the costs] to be unnecessary or unreasonable.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) “[I]f the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Nelson v.

Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.) “[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face.” (Ibid.) “However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the [prevailing party], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].” (Ibid.)

“Where costs are not expressly allowed by statute, the burden is on the party claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and necessary.” (Foothill-De Anza Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29.) “Whether a cost item was reasonably

necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].)

The Court has the ability to disallow costs that are otherwise identified as recoverable, “when it determines the costs were incurred unnecessarily.” (Perko’s Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 245, citing Code Civ. Proc., §1033.5, subd. (c)(2) [“Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.”])

Defendant challenges $2,008.25 of Plaintiff’s $4,508.05 in claimed costs, consisting of: (1) $89.50 in costs incurred after Defendant’s March 19, 2026, section 998 Offer; (2) $1,821.25 in expert witness fees for a vehicle inspection; and (3) $97.50 in filing and electronic filing or service fees associated with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and related IDC proceedings. Defendant requests that the memorandum of costs be stricken in its entirety or, alternatively, that Plaintiff’s costs be reduced by $2,008.25, from $4,508.05 to $2,499.80. Plaintiff opposes each challenged item and seeks recovery of the full $4,508.05.

To the extent Defendant seeks to strike the memorandum of costs in its entirety, the request is denied. The challenged items appear proper on their face, and Plaintiff’s verified Memorandum of Costs constitutes prima facie evidence that they were necessarily incurred. The specific objections are therefore addressed individually below.

1. Post-998 Offer Costs:

Defendant seeks to tax $89.50 in costs incurred after its March 19, 2026, section 998 Offer. Defendant identifies $89.50 in costs incurred on March 23 and 24, 2026, consisting of $4.50 in filing fees, $22.00 in electronic filing or service fees, and $63.00 in other First Legal fees.

The Offer provides that Defendant will pay Plaintiff’s statutory costs and expenses under Civil Code section 1794(d), including reasonable attorney’s fees, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred “to, and including, the date of this Offer.” (Gideon Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Plaintiff accepted the Offer. (Id., ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that these costs were incurred after March 19, 2026. Instead, Plaintiff relies on Civil Code sections 3513 and 1790.1 and argues that the limitation on post-offer costs constitutes an unenforceable waiver of rights under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff

further contends Defendant’s section 998 Offer is ambiguous and contains impermissible one-sided conditions.

Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. The Offer expressly limits recoverable costs and expenses to those incurred “to, and including, the date of this Offer.” That language is unambiguous and does not encompass costs incurred after March 19, 2026. Although Civil Code section 3513 provides that “[a] law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement,” and Civil Code section 1790.1 broadly prohibits waiver of rights afforded by the Song- Beverly Act, neither provision categorically prohibits the settlement of Song-Beverly claims. Further, settling parties remain free to agree to their own allocation of costs and attorney fees. (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 602 [the parties remain free to agree to their own allocation of costs and attorney fees as part of the settlement agreement].)

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the $89.50 in costs incurred after March 19, 2026.

2. Expert Witness Fees:

Defendant seeks to tax $1,821.25 incurred for Plaintiff’s expert’s inspection of the Subject Vehicle, relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(1), which generally excludes fees of experts not ordered by the court. That provision, however, does not preclude recovery of expert witness fees by a prevailing Song-Beverly plaintiff. In Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, the court held that Civil Code section 1794(d)’s authorization of “costs and expenses” permits recovery of expert witness fees notwithstanding section 1033.5, subject to the requirement that such fees were reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action.

Here, the inspection occurred on March 11, 2026, before Defendant’s section 998 Offer and shortly before the then-operative March 30, 2026, trial date. Plaintiff contends the inspection was necessary to evaluate the Subject Vehicle, assess the alleged defects, and prepare the case for trial. Defendant does not otherwise demonstrate that the $1,821.25 charge was unreasonable. The expense therefore appears reasonably incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s prosecution of the action.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the $1,821.25 expert witness fee.

3. Costs Associated with Motion to Compel and IDC Proceedings:

Defendant also seeks to tax $97.50 in filing and electronic filing or service fees related to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and the associated IDC proceedings. Defendant argues the costs were unnecessary because Plaintiff withdrew the motion shortly before the August 18, 2025, IDC, despite Defendant’s meet-and-confer efforts and offers to extend the motion deadline while it reevaluated its discovery responses. Defendant further contends Plaintiff withdrew the motion because counsel would not appear in person for the IDC.

Plaintiff, in opposition, contends that the motion was reasonably necessary when filed because Defendant’s discovery responses were deficient and Defendant repeatedly sought additional time to reevaluate and supplement them. Plaintiff further explains that the Motion was withdrawn because counsel lacked an attorney available to attend the August 18, 2025, in-person IDC.

Filing and motion fees are expressly allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(1). Fees for electronic filing or service are likewise recoverable where the court requires electronic filing or service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(14).) Such costs, however, must still be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.

Defendant has not shown that the challenged costs were unnecessary. The record reflects ongoing discovery disputes and Defendant’s requests for additional time to reevaluate and supplement its responses. Plaintiff’s later withdrawal of the Motion does not establish that the related costs were unnecessary when incurred.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the $97.50 in filing and electronic filing or service fees associated with the Motion to Compel and related IDC proceedings.

Defendant to give notice.

11 Singh vs. JBT TENTATIVE RULING: Aerotech Corporation For the reasons set forth below, Counsel Marc Grossman’s unopposed motion to be relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiff Jaswinder Singh is GRANTED.

Counsel Marc Grossman is ORDERED to submit to this court a revised proposed Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to Be Relieved